

RESTRICTED

Army Code 71844



## **STABILITY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ**

**(OP TELIC 2-5)**

### **AN ANALYSIS FROM A LAND PERSPECTIVE**

Prepared under the direction of  
the Chief of the General Staff

RESTRICTED

**CONDITIONS OF RELEASE**

- Copyright** This work is Crown Copyright (CC) and the intellectual property rights for this publication belong exclusively to the Ministry of Defence (MOD). No material or information contained in this publication should be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form outside MOD establishments except as authorised by both the sponsor and the MOD where appropriate.
- Security** This document is issued for the information of such persons who need to know its contents in the course of their official duties.
- Authority** This publication is issued under the overall direction of DGS on behalf of CGS.
- Distribution** As directed by DGS Publications Coordinator, who is the sponsor and to whom comments and queries concerning this publication should be addressed.

RESTRICTED

**OPERATION TELIC 2-5  
GENERAL STAFF ANALYSIS**

**FOREWORD**

**By Major General W R Rollo, Assistant Chief of the General Staff**

The post 'major combat operations' phase of Operation TELIC has posed complex challenges to the Armies of the Coalition in Iraq. The complexity comes from the need to deter and if necessary fight armed groups opposed to our presence, as well as to help enable (and sometimes lead) the humanitarian, reconstruction and nation-building activities in support of distinctly fragile or non-existent governance structures. There is every sign that the British Army will become engaged in similar 'complex' operations in other theatres, and some broad similarities are already apparent in operations in Southern Afghanistan. The style of asymmetric conflict in failing or fragile states is also now available for global trouble-makers to copy. It cannot be 'disinvented', and is likely to be with us for some time. Moreover, our enemies are analysing our strengths and weaknesses as an Army in order to achieve their ends.

The analysis of Operation TELIC in the period May 2003 to 31 January 2005, when the first Iraqi elections were held, offers a number of insights for study and action. There are positive comments, notably about Service people. Work is needed, however, on cross-Government campaign planning (the 'Comprehensive Approach') and its execution (including funding and SSR) on optimising the Army's counter insurgency response, including its intelligence and logistic capability, and on developing our training to ensure that we are fit for all three blocks of the 'Three-Block War'.

This Analysis is not intended as a campaign history, but it pays tribute to the contributions of the very many British Servicemen and women who served in Iraq during this period, and to those who gave their lives or who were injured in the course of this demanding operation.

We must learn from the insights in this Analysis, always remembering that, as with doctrine, judgement is needed in the application of lessons from one campaign to what may be a very different situation in another place at another time.

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a stylized 'M' followed by a horizontal line underneath it.

i  
RESTRICTED

## PREFACE

### INTRODUCTION

1. The Army Doctrine Committee commissioned an internal Army analysis of the period following the major combat operations phase of Op TELIC, known variously as Phase IV, or from the British troop roulement, Op TELIC 2-5, which ran from May 2003 to 31 January 2005, the date of the first Iraqi elections. This analysis is intended to complement publication of *Operations in Iraq – An Analysis from a Land Perspective* which covered the warfighting operations.<sup>1</sup>

### AIM

2. The aim of the Op TELIC 2-5 Analysis is to provide the Chief of the General Staff with an evidence-based, thematic analysis of Land Operations in Iraq from May 2003 to January 2005.

### READING GUIDE

3. This Analysis comprises:

a. The Main Report (known as 'Theme Zero' during the production of the Report). This includes 38 Insights, which will be of relevance to senior commanders, and Head Office planners.

b. The Supporting Themes One to Ten. These summarise the detailed data submitted to the Analysis Team. Themes One to Ten includes a further 42 Insights which will be of relevance to staffs working on specific issues.

4. Insights fall into three broad categories, and relate to what the Army is able to influence.

a. The first category of Insight comprises observations which Officers may wish to pass on in the planning and execution phases of an expeditionary operation related to a complex crisis like that in Iraq.

b. Secondly, there are some specific lessons for the Army, for example, the need for commanders and their soldiers to understand the complexities of the law in stability operations in greater detail than before.

c. The third category comprises questions or issues which may lead to work on future concepts, combat development and experimentation, doctrine work, and in turn structure, equipment and training: these run in parallel to the 2005 Future Army Study Period insights published by the Director General Doctrine and Development.

---

<sup>1</sup> AC 71816 *Operations in Iraq – An Analysis from a Land Perspective* published Feb 2005.

## OVERALL FEATURES OF THE ANALYSIS

5. The complexity of the situation in Iraq suggested that a thematic approach would be the best basis for the analysis. A small Director General Doctrine and Development Analysis Team chose ten themes relating to predominantly *Army* issues which they felt should be examined with a view to developing military effectiveness. The analysis does touch on some Joint issues, and the roles of other Government Departments. Some Joint aspects, eg. Effects Based Operations, media and air support have been commented on elsewhere, and have not been covered in this Report. It was decided that observations from the Iraq Survey Group report should be included since *ad hoc*, international, teams which include British military elements may well be formed at short notice in the future.

6. The Team recognised that valuable operational lessons work had already been done by DOC in the joint arena, and by the Land Warfare Centre (LWC), the Arms and Service Directors, and others.<sup>2</sup> The Army, however, published Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) *Land Operations*<sup>3</sup> in Spring 2005 and discussed various scenarios during the Future Army Study Period in September 2005. The thematic approach draws on both these sources, and should inform future concepts, combat development and doctrine.

7. Army policy branches were invited to produce submissions on their areas of expertise: where necessary, suitable lead branches had to be found.<sup>4</sup> In parallel, evidence was also drawn from formation post-operational reports, and from over 40 post-tour interviews with key Officers from formation level to sub-unit commanders, and some staff Officers. Parliamentary Reports, journal articles, and views from commentators outside the Army have also been considered. The themes were subject to internal and external review, before consideration by a 'just men' reference group in January 2006.<sup>5</sup> The Analysis was discussed by the Army Doctrine Committee on 28 February 2006.

8. Most of the Analysis in the report is based on current military assumptions and long standing principles for the use of force in the land environment. Some distinguished commentators and academics, including some retired Senior Officers, are now widening the public debate about the use of force in the contemporary operating environment, and their arguments have implications for the Army's approach, its equipment and training. This Analysis is designed to inform debate regarding size, shape and balance of investment decisions for intervention forces in the longer term timeframe as well as to suggest areas for change which will enhance effectiveness in campaigns now and in the immediate future.

9. The Op TELIC 2-5 Analysis Team would like to thank the subject matter experts and branches who produced submissions on top of their normal busy schedules. We are also most grateful for the interviews conducted by the Land Warfare Centre, which have proved particularly valuable, and for the contributions from a range of other commentators.

July 2006

---

<sup>2</sup> D/DOC/TELIC/TELIC 2 dated 22 Feb 05 *Op TELIC Lessons Study* Volume 2.


<sup>3</sup> AC 71819 ADP *Land Operations* published May 05.

<sup>4</sup> The MOD Central Staff Director of Targeting and Information Operations (DTIO) led on the Information Operations and Culture themes. DGD&D led on Stability Operations, Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance, Logistics and Additional Factors.


<sup>5</sup> Progress reports were given to the Army Doctrine Committee in September and December 2005.

**CONTENTS**

	<b>Page</b>
Foreword by ACGS	i
Preface and Reading Guide	iii
Map 1 South Eastern Iraq	vi
Map 2 Overview	vii
Main Report ('Theme Zero')	1
 Supporting Theme Summaries:	
One - Stability Operations	31
Two - Command and Control	35
Three - Legal	39
Four - People	45
Five - Culture	50
Six - ISTAR	54
Seven - Information Operations	58
Eight - Equipment	60
Nine - Logistic and Medical	64
Ten - Miscellaneous	69
 Annexes:	
A. A Layman's Guide to the Insurgency	A - 1
B. An Outline Chronology	B - 1
C. The Iraq Survey Group	C - 1
D. Victoria Cross Citation for Private Beharry	D - 1
 Bibliography	 Bibliography-1



Map 1  
South Eastern Iraq



Map 2: Overview (CC)

For illustrative purposes. International boundaries do not necessarily represent the views of the UK government on boundaries or political status.

© Crown Copyright 2003

**AN ANALYSIS OF OPERATION TELIC 2-5  
(MAY 2003 – JANUARY 2005)  
FROM A LAND PERSPECTIVE**

**THE MAIN REPORT  
(‘THEME ZERO’)**

**INTRODUCTION**

1. The British formations, battlegroups and supporting elements operating with the Coalition in Iraq have achieved a considerable amount of tactical success despite demanding climatic conditions, and a complex and dangerous threat environment. Senior Officers and Staff Officers in Coalition headquarters in Baghdad, and detachments elsewhere have also influenced the campaign positively. During Op TELIC 2-5 the UK contribution to the Coalition was, however, relatively small: only around 5% of the troops and a much smaller proportion of the reconstruction finance were from Great Britain.

2. The vast majority of the c.80,000 British Servicemen and women deployed to Iraq since February 2003 have acted with adaptability and professionalism, and often with great gallantry. The British military deployment in the four Southern Provinces has made a significant contribution to the Coalition efforts to create an Iraqi state with a representative system of government.<sup>1</sup> The period of this Analysis ended with an election which was not significantly disrupted by violence, and deemed ‘free and fair’ by international observers – a strategic success. The violence during the ‘stability operations’ was, however, greater than that encountered by the Army for many years: the 1<sup>st</sup> Bn Princess of Wales’ Royal Regiment battlegroup stopped counting ‘contacts’ (of all types) when they reached 900.

3. Some of the Analysis of the UK contribution, set out in this internal Army Report, may look critical when set against the achievements. Professionally, however, the Army has a duty, enshrined in doctrine, to learn from experience so that it can maintain and build on its success. The Army’s doctrine and development staff should identify pointers to the future, something our opponents and others are also doing. There are concerns over the planning of Phase IV, the post-combat operations phase, and issues arising in several functional areas of the Army, and the overall UK effort in Iraq which need to be addressed.

4. Several of those who contributed to this Analysis, or whose work has been used, expressed guarded optimism for the future in Iraq despite the insurgencies and political difficulties. It is too early to predict how the situation might turn out, but the positive gains will be based on the achievements of determined and capable Coalition Servicemen and women in Iraq, their civilian counterparts, and the local people who have benefited from Coalition achievements.

---

<sup>1</sup> The four Southern Provinces comprising the British Area of Responsibility were BASRAH, MAYSAN (which includes AL AMARAH) DHI QAR and AL MUTHANNA. The MND(SE) AOR, if overlaid on a map of the UK, would extend from SOUTHAMPTON - BLANDFORD - CARDIFF - CHESTER - DARLINGTON - SKEGNESS - MARGATE - SOUTHAMPTON, a vastly larger area than an [Army] Corps AOR in warfighting.

**NATIONAL AND COALITION STRATEGIC PLANNING**

5. Many observers identified a failure to plan the military *and non-military* Phase IV tasks for Iraq in timely fashion and in sufficient breadth and depth. To put this in context, during the Winter of 2002-03 there were fears (in London) that several factions might compete for power if the Saddam Regime fell, and that violence or moves towards civil war in Iraq were possible. However, the UK Government's overriding concern was to achieve a further United Nations Security Council Resolution (UN SCR) with robust language relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction. As the junior partner in a provisional coalition the UK had to work to a timetable and strong ideological views set in the United States. As one Senior Officer put it: 'the train was in Grand Central Station, and was leaving at a time which we did not control'. The military planning Main Effort in both the US and UK, before the combat phase of Op IRAQI FREEDOM / TELIC started, was, reasonably enough, for the expeditionary force deployment, preparation and warfighting (Phases I-III). In Whitehall, the internal OPSEC (operational security) regime, in which only very small numbers of officers and officials were allowed to become involved in TELIC business, constrained broader planning for combat operations and subsequent phases effectively until 23 December 2002.

6. At that time little was known in detail or understood, in both the US and UK, about the state of the infrastructure, and public services, in Iraq. These proved worse than anticipated. The scale of Iraq, a country the size of France, was a factor identified in MOD but not appreciated in detail. In the US, much planning was done by the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) under General Garner (mainly on displaced persons and life support). This was taken on by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) under Ambassador Bremer. The planning suffered from being militarily directed and orientated, and from lack of coherence and resources.<sup>2</sup> ORHA planning also focused on US priorities. Coalition issues are covered from para. 18 onwards.



**Figure 1: The River Tigris at Al Amarah (CC)**

<sup>2</sup> The CPA ran from May 2003 - Jun 2004, when sovereignty passed to the Iraqi Interim Government.

7. In UK the political and planning realities coupled with the restrictive OPSEC regime meant that few people in MOD, and very few in other Government Departments (OGD) were planning the overall operations, including Phase IV. Departments had very different views of the crisis. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Treasury were involved in Phase IV planning, as were the Departments for International Development (DfID) Trade and Industry, and Constitutional Affairs (ex-Lord Chancellor's Department) to a very limited extent. The Cabinet Office played a co-ordinating role. OGD (and some officials in MOD) took some persuading that they would have obligations under the Geneva Conventions (1949) if or when the UK became an Occupying Power: the implied tasks or responsibilities were very significant in size, range and complexity.

8. The requirements to plan, find resources for, and undertake interim government and reconstruction in Iraq, the *non-military tasks*, were discussed in outline across Whitehall, but approaches to potential contractors were not made until combat operations were coming to an end. Planning was not done in sufficient depth, and, at the outset of Phase IV little finance was requested (and approved) for reconstruction purposes.



**Figure 2: Delivering Medical Supplies in accordance with the Geneva Convention (CC)**

9. There was a hope among some senior officials in MOD and OGD that the UN, or other countries might take on interim government and reconstruction tasks. The lack of planning ran counter to potential Geneva Convention obligations and to the principle of

contingency planning: it also failed to take into account the evident reluctance of other countries to support the Coalition intent and further 'robust language' UN SCR.<sup>3</sup>

10. In the event, the rapid fall of the Saddam Regime led to an unexpected and precipitate breakdown of law and order. Lack of planning and resources resulted in delays before reconstruction of essential services could start, and before the new government and security structures in Iraq could be established. 1<sup>st</sup> (UK) Armoured Division's declarations that essential services could be quickly restored proved hopelessly optimistic in the four Provinces, particularly BASRAH. In MAYSAN locals were proud that they, not the Coalition, had 'liberated' their Province; they sought material help, not occupying forces. Overall, during the initial months, *reality on the ground* and *Iraqi expectations* were far apart, and local support for and confidence in the Coalition ebbed; in late-2003 violent incidents increased.<sup>4</sup> Local activists were able to capitalise on these, and to develop an insurgency against the 'forces of occupation'.<sup>5</sup>

11. The strands of the Coalition Campaign were not linked effectively: a senior British Officer observed that '... the UK Government, which spent millions of pounds on resourcing the Security Line of Operations, spent virtually none on the Economic one, on which security depended'. In several theatres affected by insurgencies, the state of the local economy has proved an important factor affecting popular support for the insurgent cause. In counter insurgency campaigns – and in complex crises – money tends to be a potent 'soft power' or 'non-kinetic' weapon, but in Iraq, apart from the relatively small but useful sums allocated to Quick Impact Projects (QIP) UK troops lacked the resources to assist economic development or other projects which might achieve influence.

**Insight: The anticipated, and planned-for post-conflict humanitarian crisis did not happen. An implosion in Iraqi society, with a serious breakdown in law and order and a developing insurgency, both of which did occur, were not expected. In the UK, some US assumptions on stability and reconstruction in Iraq in the post-combat operations period were accepted uncritically.**

**Insight: The failure to plan early, and in enough detail affected most areas of the Coalition response, and influenced the operational situation: it has had implications for almost all the themes analysed in this study.**

**Insight: A strategic, cross-Government Estimate and plan is essential if the likelihood exists that the UK may be involved in an intervention operation. The Estimate should be revised as the situation evolves. Troops can assist in restoring law and order, but military forces cannot by themselves take on interim government and reconstruction tasks in the post-combat phase for more than a short period. Troops also lack the resources and expertise to play more than a limited role in other campaign strands - political, economic,**

<sup>3</sup> While there was a small Iraq Secretariat Team working in MOD, the Iraq Planning Unit was not set up in the FCO until late-Feb 2003.

<sup>4</sup> According to Sir Hilary Synott, seconded from the FCO to run CPA(South) (Jul 2003-Jan 2004) local expectations focused on law and order on the streets (first priority); rapid and visible progress in reconstructing Iraq's worn-out and damaged infrastructure; new post-Saddam regime systems of Government; and an effective way to spread good news and scotch rumours. 'Prior planning and preparation, the Coalition's civilian organisational structures, available staff and levels of expertise all proved inadequate.' *State-Building in Southern Iraq*, Sir Hilary Synott, *Survival* (IISS Quarterly) Vol 47 No.2 Summer 2005 p.35-6.

<sup>5</sup> See Annex A for a 'Layman's Guide' to the extremist factions in Iraq.

**social, legal and cultural - in a state in which there has been conflict. Linkages and co-ordination between campaign strands must also be effective.**

**Insight: A military intervention operation mounted into a failing or fragile state is likely to cause the existing government or regime to collapse. Contingency plans for interim government, support to an existing administration, humanitarian aid and a justice system, as well as reconstruction and nation-building (if required) should be made alongside those for combat operations.**

**Insight: If a military intervention is related to an insurgency with global implications, then the operational level goals for the campaign should be related to the strategic campaign goals (including Information Operations) for other theatres where British or allied troops are deployed.**

12. Two insights relating to logistics and stability operations are also relevant here.

**Insight: British deployment plans will be constrained by contract arrangements within the Defence Logistics Organisation, and outside, relating to commercial air and sea lift, support for other Government Departments, and post-conflict service providers. Some contracted goods and services can be hastened, at a cost premium, but many suppliers may be unable to deliver at more rapid rates. These constraints have significant implications for decision-making when the UK is not setting deployment timetables.**

**Insight: Post-conflict priorities, the split of responsibilities, outline system of government, and security and reconstruction plans should be agreed by Coalition partners *before* intervention forces are deployed. If the *non-military tasks* are not co-ordinated with expeditionary military force efforts, and a comprehensive approach is not followed, the reconstitution of a failing state will take longer, with delayed exit strategies and military drawdown.**

13. The UK assumed *military responsibility* for the four Southern Iraqi provinces. Confusion arose, however, over the *non-military* responsibilities. The legal obligations relating to an Occupying Power under the Geneva Conventions fell to the UK; the civilian authority (CPA(South)) had other responsibilities; and many of the reconstruction plans and resources were provided by the US. CPA(South) worked to the CPA in Baghdad, and was unresponsive to HQ Multi-National Division (South East) (MND(SE)) requests.<sup>6</sup> Ambassador Bremer's view was that the Coalition's main strategic priority was the stabilisation of the Baghdad region.<sup>7</sup> Initially, in the Southern Provinces, help came mostly from the troops there rather than the CPA. Later, the CPA paid significant sums for Iraqi salaries and reconstruction projects. It was decided in 2003 that the UK would not take on the administration and reconstruction of the Provinces for which it was the Occupying Power. The post-1945 British Zone of Occupation in Germany model deserves examination in any future crisis, however, despite the major resource implications.

14. As a principle, British Officers and officials in theatre (military, diplomatic, intelligence, police and aid / reconstruction) need to be briefed and supported from UK in

<sup>6</sup> UN SCR 1483, adopted 22 May 2003, recognised the US and UK as Occupying Powers in Iraq. The Transfer of Authority to the Iraqi Interim Government was recognised by UN SCR 1546 in June 2004.

<sup>7</sup> Synott, *op cit.* p.40.

order to maximise British influence locally. Whitehall structures for directing and co-ordinating UK efforts are less well integrated than teamwork in theatre, however. Improved co-ordination in London could assist British endeavours in Iraq and other theatres.

**Insight: The British doctrinal model (usually applied to counter insurgency) of a single authority eg a Director of Operations, co-ordinating political, economic, social, legal, security and cultural strands of a campaign is still valid but was not followed in the UK Area of Responsibility in Iraq. This created confusion, although the appointment of a British diplomat to head the Coalition Provisional Authority (South) resulted in better co-operation with British military commanders.**

**Insight: The legal authority, obligations for government and security, and resources in an area of responsibility should belong to the state that is the Occupying Power, until such time as the authority passes to appropriate host state structures and leaders. When a country is administered by more than one Occupying Power, zones of occupation should be considered, providing the issues of resources for administration and reconstruction can be resolved.**

**Insight: If the United Kingdom, as an Occupying Power, has responsibility for a Zone of Occupation or an area of responsibility, it has a moral and a pragmatic incentive, as well as legal obligations to ensure that *all* lines of operation are properly resourced even if, in overall coalition terms, the area is not assigned priority as the Main Effort.**

15. On the other hand, the requirement to plan for the post-conflict phase and to co-ordinate campaign strands is a *military* observation, and many outside MOD and the Services, including some Officials in OGD, do not plan as systematically as those in Defence. OGD generally lack crisis management expertise or experts and executives able to deploy to operational theatres, and different priorities abound in Whitehall. In addition, many commentators and informed members of the public believe that the 'war in Iraq' was, and still is, an operation 'of choice' or 'elective' and not one of national survival. It would therefore be unnecessary or inappropriate, they believe, to mobilise OGD and national resources to any great extent, and certainly not to the level seen between 1939 and 1945.

16. Military people, often with recent operational experience, can readily point to the consequences of failing to plan, and of not committing both military *and non-military* resources to complex crises in which UK Servicemen and women are deployed in unpleasant and dangerous conditions. From the Army perspective, there is a presentational challenge which needs to be addressed in Westminster, Whitehall and further afield. Those with field experience will have to *educate* and *convince* people about what is required (and what is obligatory, for example under the Geneva Convention) in military *and in non-military* terms if a successful end-state is to be achieved in pursuit of HMG policy in post-conflict situations.<sup>8</sup> A greater emphasis on keeping Non-Government Organisations (NGO) and

---

<sup>8</sup> During the Second World War the planning for the administration of liberated Europe and Occupied Germany was initially co-ordinated by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and his Department, and was then taken on by several other Departments. The charities – we would now call them NGOs – were given common purpose and co-ordinated by the officially-sponsored Joint War Organisation. The point was made quite strongly by several of those who gave evidence to the Analysis Team that, given the level of resources being committed to the military and non-military operations, and the complexity of the situation, a single

selected contractors informed about events in crisis areas is also highly desirable.

17. Convincing the public may not be easy (as the Police are finding over terrorist threats in UK) but shaping expectations is important for many reasons. MOD is investing heavily in intervention capabilities so that it can meet HMG policy goals. When intervention operations are mounted, however, civilian teams will be required to help deliver post-conflict success, unless a policy of strategic 'raiding' is intended to deliver the effect required, which seems unlikely.

**Insight: Cross-Government team efforts are vital to strategic success: a strategic failure will affect not just the British military, but Her Majesty's Government itself, and British civilians at home and abroad**

**Insight: Senior military Officers should be prepared to advise proactively and engage in dialogue across Whitehall during a crisis, so that strategic tasks can be identified and accepted by appropriate Government Departments, including the Ministry of Defence (MOD). The MOD has campaign planning and operational experience and can help identify key tasks. Operational lessons identified by MOD show starkly the results of lack of planning.**

**Insight: The Army (and more widely, those in Defence) need to explain their well-established campaign principles to planners outside the Ministry of Defence, to agencies (International Organisations/Non-Government Organisations) and to those who may undertake reconstruction projects, through a formal information strategy, involving the Army Presentation Team and the cross-Government Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU). Future campaign partners need to understand the parts that military and non-military bodies play in resolving complex crises.<sup>9</sup>**

#### **THE UK AS A SUBORDINATE PARTNER IN THE COALITION**

18. The UK has been a subordinate partner in the US-led Coalition (of 30 nations in 2004) providing, as stated above, around 5% of the Coalition troops and a similar proportion of financial resources during the period. The UK and its deployed commanders have, where required, made their own decisions. The perception that the UK's influence at the higher levels is necessarily limited both in national capitals and in theatre should be balanced by the tangible and substantive contributions made by British Officers. US Commanders have accepted advice at the operational level, certainly since 2004, and the UK has filled a disproportionate number of key staff appointments in the US Multi-National Forces / Corps (Iraq) Headquarters. This has prompted some comment from US military Officers not in Iraq. Equally, the perception of US reluctance to accept advice from other Coalition commanders, and the sensitivity of US Officers to criticism needs balance: suggestions from British Officers have been adopted, and great efforts have been made to avoid criticising individuals in a very difficult operational situation. Senior US Officers both

---

Government Minister or Department should be tasked with co-ordinating British policy and efforts in Iraq. The Secretary of State for Defence's 'Reid Group', established in late 2005 for co-ordinating plans for Afghanistan should go some way towards achieving this requirement.

<sup>9</sup> Some positive progress has been made in Whitehall with the MOD-led Generic Strategic Campaign Plan initiative. Certainly the cross-Government approach to the 2006 Afghanistan deployment has benefited from the experience gained on Op TELIC.

at home and in Iraq have accepted criticism in published articles and responded in a measured way. Playing a subordinate role in a counter insurgency operation may recur, and British doctrine and staff training should take this into account.

19. British commanders and forces faced several constraints as subordinate partners in Iraq. There were significant differences in *approach*, particularly relating to counter insurgency. British counter insurgency experience is respected by some Coalition commanders, but others had not studied previous campaigns or did not want to hear about Northern Ireland or 'colonial' struggles (eg in Malaya or Kenya). The unrest and violence following the fall of the Saddam Regime were recognised by British Officers in mid-2003 as indicators of insurgent activity, but it took longer for US commanders to accept this, and to take suitable counter-measures.<sup>10</sup> Some Coalition actions (eg. de-Ba'athification) alienated many Iraqis, however, and made counter insurgency much more difficult to achieve.

20. Many Coalition nations fail to appreciate the impact of the media, and good media operations. The global media has many facets and agendas. It includes domestic media in Coalition countries, global 24-hour networks, Internet sites, regional and Islamic media (including *Al Jazeera*) in Iraq, and (influential) bloggers. Events, in theatre but outside the British area of responsibility, may be reported as 'US-UK Coalition' actions. A striking image can cast local military 'success' in a very different light in strategic or political terms. This may directly affect the way UK and British troops are regarded in the Islamic world.

**Insight: Coalition actions reported in the global media may affect British domestic politics and public opinion. It is therefore important that clear political aims, and information operations / media messages are agreed by Coalition partners at the outset and updated when necessary.**

21. Coalition partners take different stances on other issues too, including, notably, the law. This embraces international and human rights law, proportionality and collateral damage concepts, rules of engagement (ROE), a forensic approach to incidents, and post-incident investigation. There is a major difference of view between those who have signed the European Convention on Human Rights and those who have not. Political engagement is required to resolve differences of opinion, but there is no guarantee of success.

22. Some senior British commanders felt that the Coalition did not give enough support to potential friends and the uncommitted people in Iraq: many who endured the Saddam Regime stayed alive by 'sitting on the fence'. Many Iraqis, of all ages, have, however, come to regard Coalition troops as Occupying Forces, and act accordingly. The Coalition is therefore not reaping the rewards for its humanitarian, reconstruction and nation-building efforts (often described as 'multi-sector issues') and is not able to gain the intelligence critical to defeat insurgent groups. Information operations may not have identified the most significant issues influencing opinion in an Islamic country, and reconstruction or 'quality of life' efforts have not been co-ordinated with these.

23. In reality, while British Officers can do little about differences in approach and perceptions that the problems in the South are remote from those elsewhere in Iraq, they should continue to try to influence the campaign plan, and its various strands, and to apply British principles within our own area of operations.

---

<sup>10</sup> A comprehensive Coalition campaign plan was not developed until August 2004.

## WIDER IMPLICATIONS

24. Having looked at strategic implications, insights from the Supporting Themes will be examined. The first two issues fall within the Conceptual Component.

### THE APPROACH TO OPERATIONS

25. At an early stage of the Analysis the (then) Army Doctrine Committee, and other senior Army Officers, discussed the focus for the Army, considering whether the *most demanding* or the *most likely* future warfare scenario should be the Main Effort. There are problems of definition here, but there is also a perception among some Officers that with resource constraints, operational commitments and BOWMAN conversion, the Army is not always training as effectively for high intensity warfighting as it has done in the past, at least collectively at formation level. The consensus is firmly that the *most demanding* activity, high intensity warfighting, should remain Main Effort. Maintaining high intensity warfighting as Main Effort should not, however, prevent the continuing development of some low cost capabilities with utility in counter insurgency or complex crises, particularly in the Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) and force protection areas. In turn, training and exercises should reflect the reality of modern conflict, in which complex crisis issues are never far away: soldiers need the leadership, flexibility of mind and skills to be able to respond, at least for short periods, to non-warfighting tasks.



**Figure 3: ‘... flexibility of mind and skills to be able to respond ...’ (CC)**

26. The operational context and activity in Iraq has been challenging. The ‘Three Block War’ concept was developed in ADP *Land Operations* in the form of the Continuum of Operations in which a range of simultaneous high intensity, lower intensity or counter

insurgency / armed policing tasks might be conducted alongside stability operations eg humanitarian or nation-building tasks.<sup>11</sup> Op TELIC 1 brigades were able rapidly to adopt this approach in order to take BASRAH in April 2003, but the Army has not yet begun systematically to train in a way that embraces the Continuum of Operations. The challenges of mental adjustment to the activities in the Continuum of Operations are considerable, as those who have served in Iraq in Phase IV can testify. Adjustment between categories of task is more difficult when casualties occur, and the local population, their leaders and the police are partisan if not hostile. Developing the right mindset, and balancing offensive action with force protection concerns, and the use of 'soft power' methods rather than 'hard power' or 'kinetic effects' against armed, politically-motivated factions are essential, but have proved very difficult to achieve.

27. The Effects Based Approach was used for many tasks, and was effective in Iraq: no major changes are recommended. As one battlegroup commander said 'you had to use an indirect approach and kinetic effects were not always the best or indeed the only methods'. Equally, training in how urban areas can be policed is highly desirable. General Chiarelli's approach to training for Iraq included, for example, taking 1<sup>st</sup> (US) Cavalry Division Officers to study the problems of running the city of Austin, Texas, a model followed by other US divisional commanders.

**Insight: The implications of the Continuum of Operations, and the training required for simultaneous but different operational challenges, require practical development. Innovative education, training and exercises should be identified so that the Army's capability in stability operations can be enhanced.**

28. The operational situation during the period often required a high intensity, *peace enforcement* approach, as the number of contacts in which the Princess of Wales' Royal Regiment battlegroup was involved suggests.<sup>12</sup> During Op TELIC 2-5 an approach broadly consistent to British counter insurgency doctrine, based on maintaining consent, was ensured at Divisional Commander level through directives, although force postures and responses changed according to threat, time and place. Tactical commanders employed Mission Command effectively according to the circumstances of the moment. While some have raised the question of consistency of approach at lower levels, the more rigid the consistency demanded, the more constraints that will inevitably be imposed on commanders. *Continuity* of commanders did, however, draw comment, and longer command tours at senior level may help to promote trust and good working relationships with Coalition officials and local politicians. Continuity of approach and command was achieved in Northern Ireland through standing Formation Headquarters, and some of the means whereby continuity was achieved in the Province are worth considering for enduring medium scale peace support operations.<sup>13</sup> Taking steps to achieve continuity will be dependent on the bold assumption that the UK is to be committed to a relatively long term presence in a theatre. On Op TELIC this would have run counter to the prevailing political

---

<sup>11</sup> Three Block War: this concept, articulated by General Charles Krulak, US Marine Corps, in Oct 1997, envisaged '... in one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees, providing humanitarian assistance. ... they will [also] be holding two warring tribes apart – conducting peacekeeping operations – and, finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle – all on the same day ... all within three city blocks'.

<sup>12</sup> See para. 2.

<sup>13</sup> See comments about Deputy Commanders in para. 42 below.

views in the US, in Whitehall and Westminster, and indeed in Iraq itself. Nonetheless, the British Army has been engaged in enough campaigns of this nature to know that a rapid exit strategy is seldom achieved.

29. The principle of Minimum Force was interpreted according to the situation, and on occasions meant a considerable amount of force, but this was employed in a 'measured' way proportionate to the circumstances.

**Insight: Continuity of command arrangements to ensure both a consistent approach to the tactical situation and good links with Coalition officials and local officials deserve serious consideration in enduring complex crisis and counter insurgency situations.**

## BRITISH ARMY DOCTRINE

30. As well as the question of a consistent approach to the situation, the Iraq campaign has revealed gaps and outdated aspects of British Army doctrine. In Iraq, deployed British commanders and officials have relied on doctrine which has its origins in the analysis made by Sir Robert Thompson in *Defeating Communist Insurgency*.<sup>14</sup> Joint doctrine on *The Military Support to Peace Support Operations*, superseded by a second edition in Dec 2004, has also been useful.<sup>15</sup> Thompson's analysis of campaign strands and the *range* of responses required, political, economic, social, legal, security (military, police and intelligence) and cultural is still useful, however, the crisis in Iraq has shown the difficulties of practical application in a world very different from South East Asia in the 1950s and 60s.



**Figure 4: Peace Support Operation: an unsuccessful suicide bomb attack against the 1st Bn Black Watch Command Group on Op BRACKEN (CC)**

<sup>14</sup> *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam*, Sir Robert Thompson, London, 1966.

<sup>15</sup> Joint Warfare Publication 3-50 *The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, 2004.

31. Revised doctrine should address the global context for violence in Iraq, the asymmetry of the ends and means involved, the nature of states in crisis, the absence of definable geographical limits, the concept of 'intensity' of warfare and the effects of the use of suicide bombers. The doctrine should cover *intra-* as well as *extra-* and *inter-state* and faction disputes, and the nature of political authority (Coalition / Governments) and agencies, including UK OGD and NGOs. There are practical difficulties in persuading OGD that doctrine is required, and in getting them to identify their crisis roles. MOD is likely to have to lead on doctrine since it has the capability for analysis and drafting doctrine; through JDCC (which became DCDC on 1 Apr 06) it brokered the 'Comprehensive Approach' embracing military and non-military activities. In a complex crisis there will be a need for rapid but informed Comprehensive Approach planning, in order to answer the questions 'what capabilities are required in theatre early or in non-benign situations?' and 'who should provide them?' The key issue here is how support, of all natures, is provided to a civil power (eg. an Iraqi interim government or a governor in Afghanistan) which is itself weak, dysfunctional, and potentially corrupt, but on which success ultimately depends.

32. Scale, both in geography and the level of violence, is also a factor. British doctrine for *peace enforcement* is thin, and events in Iraq, including terrorist action in urban areas has brought this into focus. The question of large-scale urban violence has been discussed in theatre, but the questions 'what would the British have done if Fallujah had been in their Area of Responsibility?' and 'where do the centres of gravity (enemy, friendly forces and local people) lie?' require thought. The concept of 'squeezing' extremists into areas where action could be taken against them could usefully be developed. British forces have undertaken robust counter insurgency operations in urban areas at brigade strength, and their ability to be restrained, to ease tactical restraints and then re-impose them, has been notable. British determination not to respond or over-react to provocation, lack of reprisals and sparing use of heavy equipment and weapons, as well as a disciplined and generally resilient approach have also been positive. Lastly, the deployment of the 1<sup>st</sup> Bn Black Watch battlegroup to support US troops further North prompted a rapid change in tactical approach following suicide bomber attacks: further thought is needed about operating against this threat.



**Figure 5: Peace Enforcement Operations (CC)**

33. In more detail, revised doctrine should address:
- a. The obligations of an Occupying Power in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.
  - b. The legal aspects of military action in the major combat and post-combat operations phases.
  - c. Co-ordination of 'Comprehensive Approach' campaign planning and concurrent operations with OGD, and external agencies, including the UN, OSCE and NGOs. This should be linked to JWP 3-50 *Military Support to Peace Support Operations* so that security and nation-building can proceed in parallel.
  - d. The use of a range of 'soft' and 'hard power' or 'kinetic' approaches in varying circumstances.
  - e. Peace enforcement operations in large urban areas eg of the size of Fallujah.
  - f. Contending with an 'extra-state' terrorist influence eg of the Al Qa'ida type.
  - g. Information Operations, both offensive and defensive.
  - h. Occupation, transition and nation-building activities.
  - i. Network Enabled Capability: its strengths and limitations in counter insurgency.
  - j. Force protection, in its widest sense, and the use of armoured vehicles in counter insurgency; suicide bomb threats significantly affect tactical decision-making.
  - k. The use of novel weapons and equipment systems, including ISTAR developments.
  - l. Coalition counter insurgency ideas and differences in approach, including legal viewpoints.

**Insight: The Army has gained a great deal of experience in 21<sup>st</sup> Century counter insurgency in a complex crisis context in the past three years. There is an urgent need to update land component doctrine as soon as possible, even in an interim form, since British troops are now deployed in greater numbers on Op HERRICK in Afghanistan.**<sup>16</sup>

## SHIFTING THE OPERATIONAL DEFAULT SETTING

*'When I went on the recce' one Op TELIC 2 battlegroup commander recalled 'someone said "it is just like Northern Ireland". When I came back I asked "which part of Northern Ireland were you in?"'*

---

<sup>16</sup> There will be a potential doctrine gap between the DCDC work on Countering Irregular Activities (at the operational level) and Land Warfare Centre work on tactics, techniques and procedures.

34. Counter insurgency experience from Northern Ireland and the Balkans enabled the British Army to make a positive start in Iraq. The approach to people, the ability of commanders to think on their feet, to brief the media, to draw on proven tactics, techniques and procedures, and specialist skills and equipment, all proved invaluable. Many lives, including those of British Servicemen and women, have been saved as a result. Common experience, which enabled rapid shifts between the tasks described in the Continuum of Operations, and between the conditions in the UK and US areas with minimal orders, proved a huge advantage. Few armies, perhaps, can match this versatility.

35. The campaign in Iraq, however, is very different from that in Northern Ireland. The Coalition is not facing one, homogeneous, English-speaking enemy but well armed and supported groups with access to porous borders, ample finance, and state research-backed terrorist know-how, and who use very different tactics, including suicide bombing. (See Annex A.)

**Insight: Northern Ireland experience enabled the Army to achieve quick wins in the post-conflict period in Iraq. The adage that ‘armies always train for the last war’ could apply unless the Army shifts its mental approach, doctrine and capabilities to the type of complex challenge found in Iraq and elsewhere, and considers how they might develop in the future.<sup>17</sup>**

## STABILITY OPERATIONS

36. A number of factors, including the rapid collapse of the Saddam Regime, and the disintegration of its security structures, compounded the difficulties of the Coalition as it started stability operations. The Iraqi Army and police ‘melted away’ when the Regime fell, but the process was hastened by a deliberate but mistaken decision by the CPA to exclude former Ba’ath Party members from the remaining Iraqi government and police, and to dissolve the army (23 May 2003) a move regarded by many Iraqi military men as humiliating. These factors, together with the scale of the problem, the failures to plan Phase IV in detail, to agree on priorities across Iraq (not just in US administered areas) and resource them, seriously hindered Coalition chances of stabilising post-Saddam Iraq.

37. The lack of improvements to essential services and the standard of living, together with disorder meant that many locals who were ‘sitting on the fence’ were not persuaded to support the Coalition. Iraqi aspirations outran the ability of the Coalition to deliver visible improvements. When violent extremism occurred as a consequence of the Coalition intervention, and Iraqis suffered more casualties than Coalition troops and officials, there was no apparent strong counter-action against the perpetrators by local Iraqis. Major General Jeapes wrote ‘... civilians [are] not going to climb off the fence until they [are] sure which side [will] win’.<sup>18</sup> Coalition troops in Iraq found themselves fighting insurgents without clear public support.

38. While local, cultural, ethnic, religious, economic and political factors also have to be taken into account, the implications are that Stability Operations need as much planning as warfighting. Planning is more difficult since many departments and agencies, none of them under military command, are involved, and their efforts need to be co-ordinated. Stability

<sup>17</sup> See *Op BANNER: An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland*, Army Code 71842, 2006.

<sup>18</sup> *SAS Secret War: Operation STORM in the Middle East* by Major General (Retd) Tony Jeapes CB OBE MC, London, 2005 edition, p. 141.

operations take years to complete, but the achievements of the first few weeks are critical. 'The peace', Gilbert Greenall suggests, 'is won or lost in the first hundred days ... a particularly important ... time when misplaced euphoria and unrealistic expectations are quickly replaced by disenchantment.'<sup>19</sup> Lack of Phase IV planning meant that Coalition Forces were ill-prepared and equipped to deal with the problems in the first hundred days, which represent the most important or defining stage of the campaign.



**Figure 6:  
Overwatch for the  
New Iraqi  
Police Force  
(CC)**

39. In the immediate post-combat operations 'transition' phase the military requirement is likely to include light forces and 'boots on the ground' in large numbers, some to maintain or restore security, and others to undertake non-military tasks. The military have to take the lead, supported by OGD and NGOs, although agencies may need military security and life support.<sup>20</sup> At the same time as essential services are restored, plans have to be made for

<sup>19</sup> *Winning the Peace* by Gilbert Greenall, former Life Guards Officer, and a hugely experienced doctor and specialist in humanitarian emergencies and post-conflict recovery. This article, following a presentation to the Staff College (Oct 2003) was published in the *British Army Review*, no.134, Summer 2004, pp.21-23.

<sup>20</sup> Light forces need a degree of familiarity in stabilisation operations roles, and consideration should be given to the attribution of specific light forces (eg. 19 Light and 52 Brigades) to this role.

the longer-term rebuilding of security, economic and social services. A UK pan-Government response, with appropriate Treasury and other (eg EU) funding will be essential.

**Insight: Winning the perceptions of local people, and therefore the ‘peace’ in 100 days is a demanding target. Comprehensive plans must be made and resources allocated well beforehand so that humanitarian aid and reconstruction can start immediately areas are secured, or an intervention force arrives.**

40. During Op TELIC 2-5 there was no apparent common understanding of Civil-Military Co-operation and Co-ordination (CIMIC: the co-ordination of civilian activities and resources in support of military missions and tasks) in the British area. Much of the activity was described as Civil Affairs. There was little effective correlation in the planning of reconstruction projects with Coalition and UK strategic aims.<sup>21</sup> The complexity of the crisis, and anecdotal observations on the limited UK reconstruction programme, suggest that greater co-ordination of military and non-military tasks is required if strategic success is to be achieved. CIMIC and Civil Affairs are critical enabling functions to aid co-ordination of resources, and yet they (organisations and people) tend to be regarded as Cinderellas, in the limelight on occasions, but hidden away with few resources and little training for the majority of the time.<sup>22</sup> At tactical level, battlegroup commanders, particularly those at a distance from Brigade Headquarters, identified the need, in complex crisis situations, for ‘intimate support’ from civilian agencies able to advise on political and economic issues – the non-military Lines of Operation - if success was to be achieved.

**Insight: Better definition of the role, capabilities, functions and resourcing of the Army’s CIMIC and Civil Affairs elements, and of the wider liaison required with civilian agencies, is required in future intervention operations in failing states and complex crises. Further development of the role of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) should be pursued in parallel.**

## COMMAND AND CONTROL

41. UK troops were mostly deployed in the four Southern provinces under command of Multi-National Division (South East). Issues of concern included the lack of unified military direction for operations for the first part of the period. Unified direction, not critical for stability operations, became, however, more crucial as indications of an insurgency became apparent. In 2004 Coalition command arrangements were tightened, but MND(SE) was allowed a degree of autonomy. The Multi-National Headquarters evolved into its role, and adjusted its structure for multi-nationality reasons. However, it does not appear that the new structure was purpose designed for Stability Operations. If a regular British Divisional Headquarters, which should have utility in all operations, is withdrawn, any *ad hoc* Divisional or Two Star Level District Headquarters which replaces it for Phase IV operations, should be designed for the situation and tasks on the ground.<sup>23</sup> The Multi-

<sup>21</sup> *CIMIC Doctrine: UK Defence Policy for Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC)* was reissued as Interim Joint Warfare Publication 3-90 DJtCap\_JW\_CIMIC\_Policy dated 10 Feb 06.

<sup>22</sup> ‘The British military, with its greater manpower and organisational capabilities, was much more effective than the CPA in organising relatively small projects, though still far less so than the US Civil Affairs teams’. Synott, *op cit.* p.41-42.

<sup>23</sup> Project ROBERTS and Strategy for the Army (SFTA) Workstrand 11 are giving consideration to the utility of British formation headquarters for all types of operations.

National Headquarters also suffered from lack of good quality British Officers with formal staff training. Some impressive Commonwealth and European Officers played key roles, and the British Officer situation improved when the Military Secretary intervened in UK. Working in a multi-national headquarters should be considered during joint and single-Service staff training. Time and patience are needed for good working links: many officers outside the British Army have widely differing levels of staff training and operational experience.<sup>24</sup>

42. The role of Deputy Commanders has long been debated. General Chiarelli used one of his Deputies successfully in Baghdad to plan and co-ordinate the non-military tasks and to co-ordinate CIMIC, Civil Affairs and reconstruction issues. The optimum organisation of a headquarters to deliver outputs is the key question: the use of a Deputy Commander, or Assistant Chief of Staff responsible for mission support, on the non-military tasks or outputs deserves examination for complex crises and stability operations.<sup>25</sup>

43. The concept of 'reachback' drew criticism, and a military aspiration that reachback should be limited to 'information not decisions' was stated by several Officers. The degree of delegation or freedom of action, particularly where the deployment of financial resources is involved, and the role of the senior UK Official in theatre (qv Field Marshal Templer as Director of Operations) merit discussion.

## LEGAL ISSUES

44. From a legal perspective, Operation TELIC has probably been the most complex military operation involving the UK since 1945: the UK initially acted as an Occupying Power on a scale not seen since that date. In media terms, the legal basis for the war itself was, and still is, controversial. Op TELIC also represented the first counter insurgency operation requiring a Coalition approach in which the UK, as a participant, has not been the senior partner. Moreover, the operations have been taking place in a state in which there was no recent and active British tradition of government, authority and law.<sup>26</sup>

45. The recognised period of major combat operations and of the UK as an Occupying Power were governed by the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) which encompasses various treaties and the Geneva and Hague Conventions. At the declared end of major combat operations the legal situation became more complex, and ROE changed. International law, itself dynamic in nature, applied in various situations at this stage, alongside Iraqi law and, for aspects of UK military discipline, UK Statute Law.

---

<sup>24</sup> The question of filling posts with the right quality of augmentees is being addressed through the Army Augmentation Paper 2006, which explores linking operational posts to branches and departments on a permanent basis.

<sup>25</sup> The role of Northern Ireland Headquarters was mentioned in para.28. Deputy Commanders in Northern Ireland had responsibility for liaison with non-military organisations, CIMIC (under other names) and civil affairs as well as providing continuity and allowing Commanders the chance to leave Theatre (for leave and Duty) which in turn enabled the latter to sustain pressured tours for longer, and provided an overlap of experience. When formed UK headquarters are deployed the Commander Artillery / CRA has occasionally been employed to co-ordinate mission support tasks.

<sup>26</sup> Iraq had a British drafted Constitution in the 1920s, which was amended in 1958 to take account of regional identities and Sharia law. Further changes followed during the Saddam Hussain Regime.



**Figure 7: Challenges in the ‘... transition between warfighting and situations requiring self-defence’ (CC)**

46. Four major points emerge from the Land Warfare Centre Operational Law Branch submission. MOD and Headquarters 1<sup>st</sup> (UK) Armoured Division had insufficient time and resources to plan the legal aspects of Phase IV, and address ‘what if’ questions before the UK took on obligations as an Occupying Power. Guidance was issued to commanders and updated as situations arose, but there was no time to train all the troops in the changes to ROE for Phase IV.<sup>27</sup> Op TELIC was conducted in a new and developing legal environment: the UK had recently ratified Additional Protocols to the 1977 Geneva Conventions; the Human Rights Act (2000) and had become a signatory to the Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998). While in theory different legal considerations apply to combat operations and occupation phases of a conflict, there was inevitably some overlap on Op TELIC 2-5.

47. The handling, processing and looking after the various categories of ‘prisoners’ proved a major task (as in 1991). Op TELIC 2-5 provided a graphic reminder that looking after prisoners is manpower intensive and procedurally complex, and the penalties for failing to do so properly can be strategic. The chain of command must ensure that soldiers are clear about their responsibilities, and are trained for prisoner handling tasks so that the Army can meet its legal obligations in this area. Troops can help restore a system of law and order (police, judiciary, courts and detention facilities) but they lack resources to run it.

**Insight: Commanders and staffs now need much more detailed knowledge of the laws that govern their actions, and the legal implications in complex crises. Legal issues should be considered as a factor in Estimates, and legal guidance may need to be included in orders and briefings before operations.**

**Insight: Ensuring soldiers have a clear understanding of the use of force, and the consequences of using force during irregular or asymmetric operations in complex crises, particularly in the transition between warfighting and**

<sup>27</sup> See paras 3-7 to 3-11 in Theme Three – Legal Issues.

situations requiring self-defence, is essential, both for operational effectiveness and for ensuring that soldiers have appropriate, properly authorised legal protection.

**Insight:** Control and supervision of all types of ‘prisoners’ (Prisoners of War, [criminal] Detainees, Internees (civilians who are a threat to UK forces) and Voluntary Detainees) is manpower intensive and procedurally complex. It is near-essential that dedicated troops and specialist advisers are assigned to this task (as on Op GRANBY 1991) and trained before the first inmates arrive.<sup>28</sup>

**Insight:** It is essential that troops involved in handling prisoners are properly trained and supervised in order to avoid mistreatment. The penalties for failing to look after prisoners correctly can be immense: the Camp BREAD BASKET abuse, publicised globally, represented a strategic reverse for the Coalition.

## SERVICE PEOPLE



**Figure 8: A Soldier of 1 RHF in the Dismounted Close Combat Role (CC)**

<sup>28</sup> As currently configured, neither the Royal Military Police nor the Military Provost Service have the resources to take on operational custodial activity or wider Security Sector Reform tasks. Nevertheless, the deployment of specialist advisers able to train and guide troops in guarding prisoners of all types is essential at the outset of operations. Prisoner handling and detention arrangements quickly attract attention from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the media.

48. The vast majority of individuals in the Army operated professionally and successfully. Expecting soldiers to make the switch between peacekeeping tasks (eg. training policemen) and violent conflict, and back, on a rapid and repeated basis imposes very demanding stresses on people, however. Positive achievements in the 'People' field, reported by many commanders, do include the successful integration and performance of soldiers who had recently passed out of Army Training and Recruiting Agency establishments. Other successes included the Operational Welfare Package (OWP) particularly provision of internet and telephone communications, and good expeditionary campaign infrastructure 'life support': proper ablution facilities and essential air conditioning were in place at a relatively early stage in Phase IV. In addition, the Reserves Training and Mobilisation Centre (RTMC) at Chilwell did great service, often exceeding its planned throughput. Many of these achievements result from operational lessons reports, notably from the Balkans. Most Service People issues are tackled and resolved as they arise.

49. The need to behave in an acceptable manner and to operate within the law, however, remains essential. A few high-profile disciplinary cases have resulted in much scrutiny of the Army, the specific incidents, and some individuals. Cases focused attention on the Army's reputation, and the military criminal justice system. All these issues are being addressed by the Adjutant General's staff. The small numbers of investigations, however, show that *only a tiny proportion of those who have served in theatre have been charged for offences relating to operational duty.*<sup>29</sup> All Servicemen and women need to understand the reasons for investigations, a means of accountability and exoneration as well as discipline. They should know the procedures, including recording the operational context of incidents; and the facts on the numbers of cases so that morale is not affected by rumours.

**Insight: To date, no UK Servicemen or women has been prosecuted in a military court for decisions and returning fire in 'the agony of the moment' in Iraq.**

50. Some overlooked lessons from high-intensity warfare re-emerged during the period, particularly in places where many contacts were experienced. 'The accepted level of violence' had altered, one commander said. 'We became inured to violence. It ... changed a lot of young people: their perceptions of themselves and their perceptions of what is important.' This factor puts a premium on a particular facet of leadership more studied in historical terms than in the present. Leading soldiers whose views have changed as a result of prolonged exposure to conflict is an area that merits discussion both in pre-deployment training and also in basic and career development courses: it cannot be adequately covered by distance-learning packages. Some disciplinary incidents might also suggest that we are failing to allocate sufficient resources to the development of junior leaders, who are faced with a challenging and rapidly evolving environment, a global media spotlight, and network enabled capability that potentially allows senior commanders to sit on their shoulders.

51. General Lamb commented, in his address to the Infantry Conference in 2005, reprinted in the British Army Review, on the need consciously to *mould* and not just train the young soldiers, male and female, who are joining the Army today. This is so that they

---

<sup>29</sup> Figures for the numbers of investigations are given in Theme Four, para 4-8.

fully understand and embrace the 'slightly old-fashioned but essential corporate values and standards' on which the Army, its morale and its operational success are based.<sup>30</sup>

**Insight: The strategic gain achieved by a professional Army can be quickly undone by the unacceptable behaviour of just a few soldiers. Time spent moulding and inculcating all ranks with the need to comply with values and standards on operations as they do in peace is a key leadership task. The selection and training of junior commanders should also be re-evaluated in order that they have the appropriate skills and standards for leadership in the most demanding environment of today's complex crises.**

52. The Army experienced significant mission-creep for some individuals employed outside their normal military capabilities in CIMIC and reconstruction tasks. Many Servicemen and women, Regular and Reservist, have been given jobs for which they are not trained, very often without professional advice or supervision, and have done well. There are dangers here: for the safety of individuals, for expectations that soldiers know what they are doing; and that people may not be able to cope with the tasks given.

53. The requirement for every Serviceman and woman to be able to fight 'as infantry' – in the dismounted close combat role - has been identified. Combat support and combat service support troops have had to provide their own escorts and quick reaction forces in the non-linear battlespace in Iraq.

**Insight: All soldiers on operations in a non-linear battlespace need the skills and equipment to be able to fight in the dismounted close combat role and conduct force protection successfully. A Training Needs Analysis is needed to define this *de facto* requirement for both training and equipment, which should then be costed and, when possible, implemented.**

54. All individuals and formed units deploying on operations and on Op SPEARHEAD are mandated to conduct pre-deployment training (PDT).<sup>31</sup> The Chain of Command is responsible for delivering this, but is assisted by the Operational Training and Advisory Group (OPTAG). OPTAG are the subject matter experts in tactics, techniques and procedures, and impart theatre-specific knowledge and skills, including cultural awareness and ROE training: they continue to help deliver battle-winning capability. In particular OPTAG also assisted combat support and service support elements in improving their dismounted close combat skills in order that they could react to incidents and escort convoys. OPTAG is a tried and tested organisation that hones the operational edge of all who deploy. The manpower bill, found from augmentation, has risen in line with the threat, and is significant. In the next six months, an additional three Captains, and over 40 experienced Senior Non-Commissioned Officers will be required to serve with OPTAG.

**Insight: The Operational Training and Advisory Group (OPTAG) is a war winner, and some Allies have copied the concept. It provides essential**

---

<sup>30</sup> 'Operational Success: Strategic Failure'. Address by General Graeme Lamb, General Officer Commanding 3<sup>rd</sup> (UK) Division, to the Infantry Conference 2005, reproduced in the *British Army Review*, no.137, Summer 2005, pp.48-51.

<sup>31</sup> Current operations for which OPTAG provides training are those in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, Northern Ireland: troops assuming the Op SPEARHEAD Land Element commitment also receive an OPTAG package.

background knowledge and skills, and the confidence to put training into practice that Servicemen and women need to be able to operate effectively and with minimum casualties. The manpower bill for OPTAG is significant, however. Augmentation of OPTAG with quality people should be recognised by the Army as the highest manning priority for those not committed to operations, after support to the special forces group and HUMINT tasks.

## CULTURE

55. In the past, the British ability to understand local 'culture' has been a military strength, and to support this Analysis the Defence Intelligence Staff produced useful ideas on the subject. 'Hearts and minds' is a central tenet of stability and counter insurgency doctrine. These can only be won over, however, if local culture is understood: one senior Officer commented pragmatically '... we may be able to influence their minds but we will never win the [Islamic] heart ... The Army must do enough to gain tolerance and depart before intolerance sets in'. Operational commitments and resource constraints have militated against the Army achieving the desired degree of cultural awareness in Iraq. A senior Officer commented '... we failed to understand how important appearances are to the Arabs'. The challenge is to improve understanding of Islamic culture, the Arab 'mind', their views of allegiances and way of doing business in Iraq, and to address the shortage of linguists able to speak (and read) Arabic with Iraqi dialects. A sense of history relating to the campaign theatre or region, and how local people perceive it, is also important.

56. In Coalition operations, British Servicemen should understand not only their opponents, and the politically committed and uncommitted people in theatre, but also the 'culture' of their Coalition partners. Understanding policy goals, political caveats, and operational strengths and limitations of allies is important. The Director of Education and Training Services (DETS(A)) provides the Army lead for the 'culture' issue and is now actively addressing 'culture' issues. In addition, during deployments, cultural advisers similar to POLADs should be considered.



**Figure 9:  
Doing  
Business in  
Iraq  
(CC)**

**Insight: The Director of Education and Training Services (DETS(A)) is overseeing development of 'cultural' advice. Links with those able to advise on culture in overseas theatres should be strengthened, probably through subject matter experts in the broader academic and business communities.**

## **INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, TARGET ACQUISITION AND RECONNAISSANCE**

57. On Op TELIC 2-5, the UK ISTAR capability produced results often regarded as disappointing by battlegroups. Certainly the tactical level intelligence product varied, usually related to the availability of HUMINT. The faults appear to lie both in ISTAR practice and the Intelligence part of ISTAR, and in the lack of collection capabilities, particularly 'overhead' assets. The deployed C4 and ISTAR deployed on Op TELIC 2-5 appeared primarily configured to support formations rather than battlegroups, and the structure may not have made the best use of the scarce collection capabilities available. Assets were, however, delegated to battlegroups on occasions, although some commanders felt that better training in how to maximise the use of ISTAR assets is required. During the period, the ISTAR capability in Theatre appeared to be configured more for warfighting rather than peace enforcement, stability operations and counter insurgency.

58. Well-known constraints also affect the capability, including shortages of specialist HUMINT and Intelligence Corps manpower. Remedial measures appear very slow while the Army is deployed on difficult operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and there is some doubt as to whether the additional HUMINT teams will be available by the target dates. Intelligence sharing was challenging too: the Army was operating with Coalition allies, civilians (coalition, NGO and Iraqi) and the Iraqi police, who 'led' on operations in BASRAH. Many of these observations are not new: they have featured in operational reports in the past 25 years. Overall, the evidence submitted suggests a lack of faith in the deployed ISTAR capability: establishing the facts is important for morale and confidence on operations, and to support MOD Short Term and Equipment Plan (STP, EP) submissions for any changes required.

59. Major ISTAR projects (eg. DABINETT and WATCHKEEPER (UAV)) are in the EP and there are plans for Operational Intelligence Support Groups.<sup>32</sup> None of these will deliver enhancements for the next four to five years, however, and some key elements will not be in place until 2017. A critical look at the balance of EP investment priorities and timescales would be valuable. The function of the proposed G2 / ISTAR Battlefield Information Systems Applications (BISA) is also worth reassessing: it may merely automate existing procedures rather than facilitate new ways of working. It is not clear whether a single Army lead for all ISTAR issues exists, and certainly Land Component Officers appear under-represented in the Equipment Capability ISTAR area. The evidence made available to this Analysis suggests that the Army needs to reassess its lower level ISTAR requirements (suitable for counter insurgency or complex crises) and if necessary make its case through the EP process for its high priority enhancements.

60. The UK reports into intelligence failures (including Weapons of Mass Destruction issues) commented on poor and inconsistent standards of analysis, and therefore Army intelligence analyst training should be re-evaluated. Lack of CIS and particularly an


<sup>32</sup> DABINETT should deliver an efficient and effective ISTAR management process and a deep, persistent collection capability to *inform* commanders and enhance decision-making across the full range of military tasks.

intelligence database, with a browser system, and inadequate knowledge of local culture and language were of major concern in Iraq.<sup>33</sup>

**Insight: The ISTAR capability deployed during Op TELIC 2-5 did not produce the timely, actionable intelligence that battlegroups sought for effective operations on the ground. The evidence seen by the Analysis Team is not definitive, however. An 'end-to-end' Land Component Intelligence and STAR audit for Op TELIC should be considered as a priority so that the critical weaknesses and constraints can be identified and remedied. Bringing forward interim capabilities and structures should be investigated.**

## INFORMATION OPERATIONS

61. Information Operations had difficulties relating to longer-term planning and development of themes, particularly over major events necessitating a change of message. The reluctance to recognise Information Operations as a campaign strand, and at tactical level, as an essential complementary activity to a tactical presence on the ground waned as a result of pre-tour training, and through initiatives such as the 'Leader Engagement' *aides memoires*. Better All Arms Information Operations training is highly desirable. Information Operations have to be planned and run alongside tactical activity in all types of operations.<sup>34</sup> If friendly forces do not put out a positive message with every patrol, then hostile factions may be quick to fill the vacuum, to the detriment of friendly forces.



**Figure 10: HUMINT or Information Operations? (CC)**

<sup>33</sup> An intelligence database is being deployed to both Iraq and Afghanistan. It is important that EP funding is found so that this key ISTAR capability can be developed further and regularly updated.

<sup>34</sup> The Directorate of Operational Capability (DOC) Audit of the Information Operations Capability (5/05) with policy, doctrine and equipment recommendations was considered by the Chiefs of Staff on 24 Jan 06.

**Insight: An Army lead for Information Operations is highly desirable in order that concepts, doctrine, expertise, manpower and training aspects of this campaign activity to win the vital battle of *perceptions* can be developed.**

## **EQUIPMENT**

62. Op TELIC 1 demonstrated that soldiers, their families, Parliamentary representatives and the media expect that troops should be fully equipped to the most modern standards at the start of a campaign. During Op TELIC 2-5 the key issues were area surveillance, and force protection enhancements, where protective equipment developed for Northern Ireland was further enhanced to contend with local environmental and threat conditions. Insights were gained with regard to small UAVs, but the optimum capability for wide area and complex terrain surveillance is not yet clear. The Army was slow to deploy a scientific adviser (SCIAD) to Headquarters MND(SE) partly because of the time taken to establish the requirement, and partly because of the complexity of the Central Staff *process* in MOD. From Iraq, and other campaigns it is clear that SCIAD advice will invariably be required, for equipment requirements during counter insurgency operations and for a wide range of advice in general stability operations. Early deployment of a SCIAD should enable research and development, operational analysis and Urgent Operational Requirement projects to be commissioned with the minimum of delay.

**Insight: Risk is routinely accepted in the Defence Programme for training, but soldiers, their families, Parliamentary representatives and the National Audit Office, and the media expect Servicemen and women to go on operations with the most capable modern equipment available, almost regardless of cost. MOD equipment staffs should maintain lists of Urgent Operational Requirement aspirations. Commanders should keep troops informed as to what enhancements can reasonably be expected and when.**

**Insight: The priority between scientific and research support for immediate operations, including Op TELIC, and for the long term MOD Equipment Programme needs to be addressed. Early deployment of a Scientific Adviser and Operational Requirements staff officers is a near-essential in complex crises and counter insurgency operations if delay in commissioning research and development, operational analysis projects and equipment enhancements is to be avoided.**

## **LOGISTIC AND MEDICAL ISSUES**

63. The logistic input included some worrying indications of *ad hoc* development and supply inefficiencies. A lower priority evidently continues to be afforded to logistic plans and deployed resources. It is a credit to logistic commanders, staffs and units that battlegroups have been well supplied, despite logistic troops having to guard their loads in transit in what evolved into a non-linear battlespace with no 'safe' rear area, and some protracted engagements in which significant quantities of first line ammunition stocks were expended.

64. Considerable progress was made over the period of this Analysis, however, the drawdown of logistic troops was evidently too hasty after Op TELIC 1, and this in turn slowed the overall MOD recuperation process. Insights will be drawn on development

issues, but the detail is a matter for the Assistant Chief of Staff for Combat Service Support at Headquarters Land and Operations Branch at the Defence Logistics Organisation.

**Insight: The key logistic issues are the continuing difficulties of asset and stores tracking and accounting, and logistic organisations as well as the return of stores for warfighting to the UK, and the tactics, training and equipment required for escorting supply convoys.**

65. On the medical side, no unexpected medical issues arose during Op TELIC 2-5. New treatments available to aid blood clotting were deployed and may help reduce fatalities. The question of medical support to contractors needs clarification: the 'population-at-risk' may not reduce when the numbers of front line troops in theatre fall, and a different spectrum of pathology may be represented, since MOD contractors and OGD civilians (civil servants and contractors) are likely to swell the entitled 'population-at-risk' in theatre.



**Figure 11: Casualty Care at 202 Field Hospital, Shaibah Logistic Base (CC)**

**Insight: The key medical issues concerned the time from point of wounding to surgery, often significantly greater than the 'Golden Hour' target time, and worries over the level of risk taken in the ability of surgical facilities to cope with multiple or massed casualty situations. The issue of advice to troops on the most appropriate means of casualty evacuation (balancing casualty care with force protection) also requires attention.**

## ADDITIONAL FACTORS

66. Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a potential Phase IV ‘force multiplier’. SSR, like Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) and other aspects of Phase IV, was not planned in detail before fighting started. Thus, when the Saddam Regime collapsed, major opportunities were missed. It took several months before new security structures, including Iraqi police and army units, could be designed, embodied and trained, and the process is still far from complete over a year after the end of Op TELIC 5. SSR and DDR are not exclusively military activities. They require a pan-Government policy lead and the actions of various agencies, OGD and military contributors to be synchronised carefully. SSR doctrine and definitions should be developed with OGD as part of the Comprehensive Approach.

**Insight: Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) should invariably be considered as factors in any strategic estimate concerning a possible intervention in a failing state: they are key enablers towards achieving an early end-state. Doctrine and SSR plans should be developed jointly by the Departments that contribute to them: SSR and DDR are not exclusively military activities.**



**Figure 12: Implementing Security Sector Reform (CC)**

67. The issue of unexploded ordnance clearance in Iraq, which should have been addressed under SSR / DDR, contributed significantly to the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) capability of the insurgents (see Theme Ten). During the period, IEDs killed 313 Coalition military personnel as well as many hundreds of Iraqi civilians. Attacks with small

arms and rocket propelled grenades met a robust response from Coalition troops, and so remotely detonated IEDs became a more attractive insurgent option. A joint US-UK task force and the Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell (CXEC: with a database) were set up in order to provide a co-ordinated counter-IED approach. There may be too much military materiel and expertise at large in Iraq for a successful counter-IED strategy, but this area merits study for future campaigns.



**Figure 13: The Ordnance Disposal Challenge (CC)**

**Insight:** Improvised Explosive Devices, produced in industrial quantities with military munitions became the weapon of insurgent choice in Iraq. Finding successful counter-measures to the suicide bomber has proved difficult. A future expeditionary force should have Explosive Ordnance Disposal and anti-IED equipment available at the outset. Co-ordinated counter-IED strategies linked to Security Sector Reform activities deserve consideration.

**Insight:** Improvised Explosive Devices were the greatest source of fatal Coalition casualties in Iraq, a battlespace with no 'safe' rear areas. The protection levels of *all* UK military vehicles in theatre, and those due to enter Service worldwide, including the Future Rapid Effects System (FRES) and logistic vehicles, should take into account the IED threat found on Op TELIC.

## CONCLUSION

68. During Op TELIC 2-5 (Mar 03-Jan 05) British Servicemen and women achieved a great deal in very demanding conditions. The handover to the Iraqi Interim Government in Jun 04, and the first elections in Jan 05 represent real strategic successes against a background of popular distrust, perceptions of 'hostile occupation' and violent insurgencies. In the UK, however, entrenched views on the original intervention operation dominate media reporting on Iraq. Too often only bad news is broadcast. In post-conflict / counter insurgency operations, *perceptions* are frequently more important than facts: bad news reinforces negative perceptions of the Coalition, and has eroded support in the crucial 'hearts and minds' campaign. This has affected the perceptions of the Iraqi people which are key to the situation.

69. Three areas deserve emphasis in this internal Army analysis of a most complex campaign. The first concerns what *ADP Land Operations* describes as the '... *balance of military and non-military means required for success*' in peace support, including enforcement and stabilisation operations.<sup>35</sup>

a. **Planning.** The evidence shows that too little planning was done for Op TELIC Phase IV, particularly on the non-military side, and that too few resources, both human and financial, were allocated to the post-conflict situation. In military terms, it is axiomatic that leaders should not start an operation without thinking through the options and implications for their plans; and military operations always have non-military implications.<sup>36</sup> Mission Command and Estimates are thus taught exhaustively to all commanders: it is not enough just to identify the desired end-state. At the operational level, the military effort is only one part of the bigger, pan-Government Comprehensive Approach. The view that "'UK plc' is just not joined up and its bureaucratic approach to problem solving is not capable of supporting a dynamic operation like TELIC" was echoed by several Officers and others contributing to this Analysis. In future, military and non-military planners, and deployed commanders, should identify objectives on a priority basis: this may mean hard choices. Military Officers are likely to have to explain across Whitehall what is involved in operations in a complex crisis.

b. **Standards.** The involvement of a few soldiers in unacceptable behaviour resulted in a wave of criticism against the Army. Penalties for lapses in standards can be huge. A photograph of abuse, real or fake, may be iconic and will remain in public perception (in UK, in Iraq and in the hearts and minds of potential enemies) and picture libraries for ever. An image may constitute a long term strategic Information Operations reverse, with impacts that extend to Army recruiting and retention. Remedial action has started (see paras 49-51 and Theme Four) and, separately, disciplinary action is being taken, but it is vital that a systematic approach

---

<sup>35</sup> Op cit. p.20.

<sup>36</sup> 'No one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so – without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective.' *On War* by Carl von Clausewitz, originally published in 1832, Princeton 1984 Edition, Book 8, Chapter 2, p.579.

is taken in education, guidance and regular and pre-deployment training so that the actions of a few do not undermine the efforts of the many in dangerous conditions.<sup>37</sup>

c. **C3I.** Lastly, the UK C3I in theatre had evident limitations. Continuity of command (as in Northern Ireland), a divisional headquarters designed for purpose (when a formed British formation headquarters is not present) and trained Staff Officers in the right appointments require consideration. ISTAR, and particularly intelligence issues are more worrying and need early resolution. Deficiencies include the need for better understanding of cultural aspects, and of information to enable all troops to appreciate fully the complex environment in which they are operating.

70. These limitations were, however, counter-balanced by the gallantry, and particularly the versatility shown by all ranks of the British Army deployed. These are key qualities that must be retained and nurtured at all costs.



**Figure 14: Gallantry – Private Beharry VC, with his Comrades (one Distinguished Service Order, one Conspicuous Gallantry Cross and five Military Crosses)<sup>38</sup> (CC)**

<sup>37</sup> See also House of Commons Defence Committee *Iraq: Assessment of Post-Conflict Operations* First Special Report of Session 2005-06, HC436 dated 27 Jul 05, paras 10-11.

<sup>38</sup> The citation for Private Beharry's Victoria Cross is included at Annex D.

THEMES ONE TO TEN

SUMMARIES OF THE DATA SUPPORTING THE ANALYSIS OF OP TELIC 2-5

THEME ONE – STABILITY OPERATIONS

1-1. Stability Operations are defined in ADP *Operations* as ‘operations that impose security and control over an area while employing military capabilities to restore services and support civilian agencies’.<sup>39</sup>

1-2. The shortcomings in planning for Phase IV in both the US and UK, before the start of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM / TELIC warfighting, had a significant affect on Stability Operations in theatre.

1-3. Once major combat operations in Iraq were declared ‘over’, some CPA actions proved ill advised. The disintegration of the Iraqi army and police, and the de-Ba’athification programme, was rapid: much of this happened spontaneously, although the CPA formalised the process in August 2003 for the Iraqi army. The ‘melting away’ of the existing structures, however unpopular, created a security vacuum which the Coalition lacked the manpower to fill, and meant that disaffected Iraqi officers, soldiers and officials were excluded from the security and reconstruction process. Disorder, which started as the Saddam regime collapsed, escalated. Delays in re-establishing order and creating security forces gave credence to the Iraqi view that the Coalition would occupy their country for years, and gave a cause to anti-Coalition activists.

1-4. On the UK military side, neither the UK Theatre Headquarters nor HQ 1<sup>st</sup> Armoured Division had a dedicated Phase IV planning team or time to plan for Occupying Power obligations in detail. Single representatives from the FCO and DfID joined the Division just before it entered Iraq. Following the warfighting success, the delay in developing the vital non-military roles of government and reconstruction, and the rapid drawdown, meant that British forces were initially unable to contend effectively with the wave of lawlessness, including looting. Suitable ROE against such lawlessness were not initially available. The lawlessness led to international (Human Rights Watch) criticism, and to opportunities which anti-Coalition activists sought to exploit. The inability to restore security early during the Occupation was a critical failure; human rights abuses involving detainees then compounded the problem of lack of respect for the Coalition and Iraqi Interim Authority.

**Minority View.** *Several inputs to the Analysis raised the question of who was responsible for the premature drawdown of troops, when, during a tense public order situation, the visible requirement was for ‘boots on the ground’. Several officers stated that many difficulties arose owing to the lack of British military capability available in theatre. The Analysis Team feels that this was a decision outside the scope of the Analysis, however, there is an information and a morale issue here, and a lesson for the future. Strategic decisions must be supported by the military and non-military resources that enable the tasks assigned to be carried out.*

1-5. The Multi-National Division (South East) tasks were broad. They included: provision of security for the region; Security Sector Reform; assistance with Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (both SSR and DDR are covered in Theme Ten); support

<sup>39</sup> AC 71819 ADP *Land Operations*: Glossary.

for the Iraq Survey Group's search for weapons of mass destruction (see Annex C); and assistance to the CPA for reconstruction and nation-building tasks.



**Figure 15: “The lone and level sands stretch far away” (Shelley) (CC)**

1-6. Security tasks during the post-combat operations phase were varied. Apart from securing military, logistic, police and government bases there was a need to ensure the security of borders, the protection and orderly functioning of health facilities, food warehouses, and detention centres / prisons, arms and ammunition storage sites, banks / financial institutions, shops and markets, media offices, and, as events in Iraq showed, museums and cultural sites. Local people rapidly resorted to violence in order to obtain food, drinking water and fuel, consumer goods and property (of the former regime and its overlords) behaviour that may feature during humanitarian disasters as instances in post-Hurricane KATRINA New Orleans showed. With no local police, military forces had to restore order. However, in Iraq, as in Kosovo in 1999, there was no effective legal structure and process available to the troops at the outset. (See Theme Three.) Failure to restore law and order quickly led to the emergence of rival factions as well as media condemnation.

1-7. Restoration of essential services is important for humanitarian reasons, and to meet Geneva Convention IV (eg health care) and UN Charter obligations. The key lesson re-learned in Iraq is that an intervention force needs to establish itself quickly as a credible and efficient administrator. Factions will be quick to capitalise on situations in which the new authority appears less able to provide than the previous or an alternative regime; in a failing state armed factions may already exist. Plans to avert a humanitarian disaster in the post-combat phase were made by CJO and 1<sup>st</sup> (UK) Armoured Division, with Treasury funding, but in the event a disaster did not occur. The pipeline to bring clean drinking water from Kuwait was valuable and successful, but it was not followed by similar projects.

1-8. The UK did not at the outset envisage becoming involved in protracted large-scale reconstruction, and initially no financial resources were approved specifically for reconstruction (as distinct from DfID funds, and the small scale Quick Impact Project funding, which was a success). The CPA in Baghdad expected the UK to provide significant funding for reconstruction in the South, and had a limited understanding of the needs in the British Provinces, which were not on the US Main Effort in the Baghdad area.

1-9. After the riots in BASRAH in August 2003, however, the UK (HM Treasury) did approve c.£500M for reconstruction funding. It took MOD four weeks, from initial statement of the problem to Ministerial discussion in the Cabinet Office, to develop this new initiative and to gain Treasury approval. An initial strategic estimate could have identified this non-military requirement, and at least identified the need for funds. Allowing a period of five months with no reconstruction to elapse lost not only time, but also the support of many local Iraqis.

**Insight: A law and order problem, local (armed) factions and elements of an insurgency may emerge after an intervention and fighting in a failing or failed state. Expeditionary deployments should have contingency plans (including draft Rules of Engagement) to deal with disorder, criminality and insurgency, and for rapid reinforcement of force levels in theatre if required.**

**Insight: Troops on the ground in large numbers, and some specialist, primarily engineer equipment, are likely to be needed immediately after a conflict in order to establish and maintain law and order. Drawdown plans for an intervention force should take these possible tasks into account.**

**Insight: Military plans to support restoration of essential services should cover both prevention of a humanitarian disaster, and for an efficient interim administration so that occupying forces are seen to be more effective than the authority or regime they are replacing. Strategic and immediate operational military advantages accrue from a force's ability to support provision of food, fuel and drinking water, and basic essential services (health care, sewerage and education). The immediate post-conflict period sets the conditions for the population and its respect for the new authority for the next few months.**

1-10. In Iraq, the UK military staffs worked both with UK OGD (who did not always have the same priorities as the deployed British military forces) and with a wide range of NGOs.

**Insight: British military elements at formation and battlegroup level worked closely with International and Non-Government Organisations. These bodies invariably have their own priorities and agendas, but there is a need to co-ordinate efforts, particularly with security plans.**

1-11. The tenets of the guidance in *The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations* include the creation, sustainment and enhancement of the campaign authority, and the use of military elements employing 'reasonable force' with perseverance.<sup>40</sup> These were followed on Op TELIC 2-5 with some success, however, some early theatre-level decisions, including the de-Ba'athification programme and disbandment of the army and police, and

---

<sup>40</sup> See footnote 15.

an inadequate reconstruction programme, have militated against the achievement of success to date. The lack of a unified Coalition political and military authority able to co-ordinate the campaign strands created confusion, and diffused reconstruction efforts.

1-12. Commander 7 Armoured Brigade described the production, at the end of Op TELIC 1, of a 'BASRAH Road Map' with four Lines of Operation: humanitarian relief and assistance; security and rule of law; governance and administration; and infrastructure recovery. This was developed into a Campaign Plan, with measurements of success to assess progress. The Plan proved useful and helped the Brigade to estimate the amount of effort required on the lines of operation other than Security and the Rule of Law, the Brigade Main Effort.

1-13. The implication for Stability Operations doctrine is how to reflect the cross-Government 'Comprehensive Approach' when there is an insurgency as well as the problems of a fragile or failing state. A crisis may be said to become 'complex' if there are economic, social, legal or ethnic / cultural difficulties in addition to political or governmental weaknesses, and if violent threats necessitating the use of armed policing or military elements on operations are also present. Op TELIC has been significantly different to other operations on which British forces have been deployed in the last 85 years, due to the Coalition approach, and also due to the territory having no recent tradition of British administrative and legal structures and processes (as in Malaya or Northern Ireland).

**Insight: The complex crisis in Iraq includes elements of inter-, intra- and extra-state violence. In addition, many in the Islamic crescent, and their supporters worldwide, regard Iraqi insurgents as 'soldiers' rather than criminal terrorists. Al Qa'ida may not be a homogeneous, global terrorist group, but its message, and that of sympathetic Islamists, is global, and this will require a co-ordinated worldwide effort if it is to be countered effectively. This context will need to be reflected in a revised counter insurgency doctrine.**

## THEME TWO – COMMAND AND CONTROL

*'The whole issue of how a European division brokered by the United Kingdom [could] slot into a US warfighting-focussed coalition had to be worked out on the hoof, and in many ways it was a deeply flawed structure.'*

Anonymous Senior British Officer on Op TELIC – 2004.

2-1. The Op TELIC 1 Report was critical of the size of some Headquarters, and staff procedures, including lengthy, over-detailed orders produced too late to influence operational activity. The observations from Op TELIC 2-5 are more on the role and staffing of the Multi-National Division Headquarters than size or the timeliness of orders. The chain of command and liaison was, however, not clear, and co-ordination with non-military agencies, including CPA(South) was not always satisfactory.

2-2. For much of the period, the Coalition did not have a single military commander exercising overall command and control, or acting, in the British phrase, as a unitary campaign authority or director of operations. The US military chain of command comprised Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF7) reporting to the US Department of Defence. Initially CJTF7 had the Multi-National Force (Iraq) (MNF(I)) Headquarters, and a Multi-National Corps (Iraq) (MNC(I)). In 2004 this was redesigned so that MNF(I) acted as the Corps Headquarters with MND(SE) as one of eight subordinate Divisional-level headquarters.

2-3. The UK military commander, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) MND(SE) acted under the broad direction of US military commanders in Baghdad while co-ordinating actions on the security and reconstruction side with CPA(South) in BASRAH, and in turn acting as the leading member of the Occupying Power in the four Southern Provinces (until June 2004).<sup>41</sup> The tasks given often exceeded the resources available to MND(SE). The CPA (and to an extent HMG) did not appear to appreciate the limits of military capability and resources for reconstruction and nation-building, and CPA(South) did not provide a good structure for non-military tasks in their Provinces. Contractors were often working in an insecure environment: they were sometimes unwilling to work with military forces.

2-4. In parallel, largely due to different experience, understanding of the violence in the central provinces in Iraq and the emerging insurgencies differed between Coalition military commanders in BAGHDAD and BASRAH. British Officers identified the warning signs around the time of the BASRAH riots in August 2003. While violence had been occurring in the 'Sunni Triangle' for some months, it took longer for senior Coalition commanders to recognise the implications, and to plan and execute appropriate counter-measures. The insurgencies did not grow at the same rate in all areas. Much of the insurgent activity, *modus operandi* and many IEDs seemed to be developed and tested in the Sunni Triangle before being exported to other provinces, including those in the South.

2-5. In June 2004 the Interim Iraqi Government was established, and the UK's role as an Occupying Power ceased. This relieved the UK from civil responsibility for the four Provinces, but the Iraqi authorities had few effective troops and policemen and formally requested UK troops to continue to provide security. Two insights emerge: SSR should have been planned at the outset (see Theme Ten) and secondly, the shortage of officers

---

<sup>41</sup> See footnote 1 for the four Provinces.

with Arabic language skills able to work with local government, police and military forces was acute (see Theme Five).

2-6. Two other views emerged from the inputs received. There was a feeling that although the UK military chain of command was effective, and counter insurgency direction was positive, there was an absence of local (UK) political direction for what, overall, the UK wished to achieve in its Provinces. There was no firm political view as to how political factions and their militias, or political affiliations among newly appointed Iraqi officials, and by extension economic development and reconstruction, should be handled. This led to further violent incidents after the period of this Analysis. Secondly, there was renewed criticism of some staff procedures. Without evidence it is difficult to recommend detailed changes, however, it would appear that while British battlegroups were expected to play their part in the various strands of the overall campaign plan, the non-military input, and resources for projects to win 'hearts and minds' were insufficient. This suggests that the role and responsibility of political advisers (POLAD) should be reassessed.



**Figure 16: Hearts and Minds (CC)**

2-7. Comment from a senior UK OGD Official suggested that the Army worked with great energy and effectiveness in many roles that were not traditionally military. Lack of OGD staff meant, however, that in some cases they could not support the pace of military activity. The implication was that sometimes military forces would deliver a quick solution to a non-military task that was not necessarily in the best, long term interests of local people and their future government. This could have been resolved had the UK had an effective overall Director of Operations or empowered ambassador in their provinces and more OGD staff or timely contractor support. In the absence of these functions, the Army will have to

take less well resourced OGD contributions along with their own, even if civil direction is inadequate.

2-8. General Chiarelli has described his experiences commanding 1<sup>st</sup> US Cavalry Division in Iraq, his pioneering of integrated estimates and work between his troops and reconstruction agencies in Baghdad. He analysed insurgent incidents against the state of essential services in some areas of Baghdad, and developed an integrated ('comprehensive') approach which embraced soldiers, civilian contractors and local people in cleaning up their areas.<sup>42</sup> In effect he adapted Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in a form he described as a 'Sewage, Waste, Electricity and Trash' (SWET) Analysis.

**Insight: General Chiarelli's 'Sewage, Waste, Electricity and Trash' Analysis and associated concepts should be evaluated by Joint and Army doctrine staffs and OGD representatives, in order that British efforts can be properly focused and co-ordinated in accordance with British Government aims. This should be a major part of the cross-Government Comprehensive Approach.**

2-9. Moving to military C2 topics, the Divisional Headquarters evolved into its role. Once the British Divisional Headquarters left theatre, the Headquarters was multi-nationalised: it was not, however, designed or optimised for its purpose. A properly designed Headquarters (in the absence of a formed British Headquarters) should be an aspiration for the future, and the design should be reviewed when the tactical situation changes significantly, and additional non-military tasks have to be co-ordinated. As new staff cells are created, their subordination needs careful thought in order that they add value to planning and aid decision-making rather than slow it. The concept of a Operations or Mission Support branch, with clear direction and carefully defined levels of authority, proved useful: it provided the means of co-ordination for military support and liaison to non-military efforts in accordance with campaign priorities.

2-10. As in previous campaigns, the practice of 'reachback' was used extensively. More communication means are available now, however, for reachback. Many issues, particularly of a non-military nature were referred back to UK for policy decisions, and this occasionally resulted in misunderstandings and slow decision-making. With the focus for political decisions remaining in Whitehall, reachback generally proved useful. The preferred military option is that, in operational terms, reachback should be limited to information, not decision-making, however, this may not be acceptable to PJHQ and MOD crisis managers, and Ministers on some issues. There is, however, a parallel need for UK OGD to consider their representation in theatre when the UK is acting as an Occupying Power, and when the UK is involved in nation-building and reconstruction. Appointment of a suitably empowered UK 'ambassador' rather than over-reliance on reachback may be preferable.

2-11. During Op TELIC 2-5 the Divisional Headquarters evolved onto a trickle posting basis. The evidence suggests that it was not always manned by the appropriate quality of British Officers (at one stage it contained very few Officers with formal staff training) and one GOC took remedial action through the Military Secretary. One Chief of Staff of MND(SE) commented: 'we had no British staff-trained SO2s in the headquarters when I arrived, and it was more like a Volksturm headquarters, manned by people with the

<sup>42</sup> *The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations* by Major General Peter Chiarelli and Major Patrick Michaelis, US Army, [US] *Military Review* Jul-Aug 05. General Chiarelli Interview, Warminster, 27 Sep 05.

weakest penalty statements'. The UK was fortunate to have first rate Commonwealth and European Officers available to fill some key posts.<sup>43</sup>

2-12. During Op TELIC 5 the GOC directed the creation of a Divisional Support Command (DSCOM) capable of providing MND(SE) and British Forces Iraq with a full range of support functions. A Rear Operations Battlegroup (ROBG) was added to provide protection and functions such as Provost and military intelligence for field security. This concentrated enabling functions under one commander, and allowed the forward commanders to concentrate on intelligence-led operations. The DSCOM proved a success, particularly over the January 2005 Elections, and provides a model for future development in other theatres, particularly if they include a non-linear battlespace.

**Insight: Standing British Divisional Headquarters should be capable of commanding formations in all types of operations. If an *ad hoc* two-star level headquarters is formed for counter insurgency or peace support operations, it should be purpose designed and adjusted as the situation changes. A third deployable UK headquarters able to take on such tasks is highly desirable at least, and it should be designed with expansion potential so that the functions of an Occupying Power, and the military aspects of reconstruction and nation-building can also be co-ordinated.**

**Insight: Formation-level staff procedures were again criticised, although specific criticisms are hard to isolate. Work to identify improved staff procedures to support an approach to crises based on manoeuvre and mission command, and to consider the links to non-military agencies who work alongside the military in complex crises should be considered.**

2-13. At battlegroup level intelligence cells were built on a similar basis to those used in Northern Ireland. Some battlegroups were fortunate enough to be able to use trained people experienced in Northern Ireland in the same role during their tours in Iraq. The innovation of a battlegroup Operations Support Cell, covering CIMIC, Information Operations, PSYOPS and media operations was effective and enabled good links to be developed with the CPA(South). A few battlegroups were able to develop local regeneration plans and projects coherent with the military campaign strand through his means, and to hand projects over to successor battlegroups.

**Insight: The concept of a Battlegroup Operations Support Cell proved valuable during Phase IV operations in Iraq in some cases. Identification of 'best business practice' would be worthwhile in order that this concept can be developed further.**

---

<sup>43</sup> A notable contribution was made by Danish Officers.

## THEME THREE – LEGAL ISSUES

### GENERAL

3-1. The UK should develop a planned rather than an *ad hoc* approach for the legal aspects of Stability Operations, based on experience from both Kosovo and Iraq. Within the justice system, the UK Police Service is not well configured to provide stability police units (SPU: armed policemen in formed bodies) in post-conflict situations overseas. The UK should actively support international efforts to develop Gendarmerie-style SPU.

**Insight: Once law and order has been re-established by military forces, non-military police forces, international and local, should take on law and order responsibilities as soon as possible. A process and structure for justice (a legal code and procedures, investigators, forensics, lawyers, judges, courts, administrators, and detention facilities) are needed to make this a reality.**

3-2. In interview one influential UK media commentator on Iraq stated his view that the UK concept of ‘minimum force’ is not always regarded by local Iraqis as firm enough to deter violent activities against British forces in Theatre. He noted that the firmer US employment of force was more effective in many respects, although the counterview is that this helped fuel the insurgency in some areas. This has implications for the British approach to operations: see paras 26 – 29 of Theme Zero, above.

3-3. During the period of Op TELIC 2-5, some national contingents lacked the capability to carry out their Geneva Convention obligations in full.

**Insight: Obligations under the Geneva Conventions are laid on states and their agencies, and not just on their Armed Services.**

### LAND WARFARE CENTRE OPERATIONAL LAW BRANCH INPUT

3-4. The Operational Law Branch at the Land Warfare Centre drafted a detailed input to this Analysis, and this is summarised below. It is recommended that those involved in planning intervention operations in complex crises take detailed advice from Operational Law Branch, and read the input in full.

3-5. Op TELIC was conducted in a rapidly evolving legal environment. In 1998 the UK ratified Protocols I and II Additional to the 1977 Geneva Conventions; the Human Rights Act came into force in 2000; the UK became a signatory to the Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome 1998). There is a need to monitor the impact of evolving international legislation, and to adjust guidance if required when planning any future deployments. While in theory different legal considerations apply to the deployment, combat operations and occupation phases there was inevitably a degree of overlap during Op TELIC.

**Insight: Recent developments in international law have affected the legal basis on which United Kingdom Armed Services operate. International law continues to evolve in dynamic fashion and thus the legal basis for the use of force will continue to change.**

3-6. The legal basis for the war itself was, and still is, controversial. There is a military need, at least, at the outset of operations to reinforce the legal base for deployment by clear, unequivocal and timely direction and explanation. As ADP *Land Operations* states 'the decision to deploy UK Forces to engage in armed conflict will always be taken at the highest political and military level and the decision will be subject to scrutiny by the Law Officers and others'.<sup>44</sup>

## PREPARATION FOR PHASE IV

3-7. The legal staff in the deployed British forces, especially in Headquarters 1<sup>st</sup> (UK) Armoured Division, received no higher level direction on Occupation, and had insufficient time to prepare detailed guidance for the post-combat operations phase, and for the role as an Occupying Power. The Division's legal staff issued a Guide to Occupation to commanders in Feb 2003, but had little time to train individuals for their roles, many of which lay more properly with OGD.

3-8. The most important conventions relating to Occupation are the four Geneva Conventions 1949 and the subsequent 1<sup>st</sup> Geneva Protocol 1977: these are part of the body of International Humanitarian Law known as the Law of Armed Conflict. The legal cornerstone for the rights and responsibilities of an Occupying Power is Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Convention IV. The legal obligation to '...restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety' obliged UK and Coalition Forces to try to restore and maintain law and order once they exercised 'authority' over Iraqi territory. While many assumed Phase IV activities would be similar to a peace support operation, Occupation is governed by a different legal regime, with different legal rights and obligations.

**Insight: MOD and 1<sup>st</sup> (UK) Armoured Division legal staffs did their best to address the legal issues arising from the United Kingdom becoming an Occupying Power, and achieved some success, but overall there was insufficient time for proactive planning and too few resources to ensure implementation arrangements were effective when combat operations ended.**

## RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

3-9. While the major combat operations phase falls outside this analysis, the responsibilities of an Occupying Power started as soon as enemy territory was captured. As that stage the UK Services were operating under Op TELIC 1 combat operations ROE which allowed UK Forces to attack and destroy positively identified members of the Iraqi Forces together with members of the former regime and the Ba'ath Party. These ROE were in force until 14 Jul 2003. While appropriate for dealing with an identifiable enemy engaged in hostilities, troops are only able to use *minimum force* when dealing with law and order or criminal issues. *Lethal force* is allowed only where human life is in danger. The situation was complicated by the difficulties arising from both combatants and armed criminals, and later extremists and insurgents, dressed in 'civilian' clothes.

3-10. As well as the Guide to Occupation, the Divisional legal staff issued guides on Public Order and Safety and later regarding Looting, in Apr 2003. With ROE supplemented by specific guidance UK and Coalition troops were legitimately able to destroy enemy forces

<sup>44</sup> ADP *Land Operations* para 0711.

while at the same time acting in a policing capacity, but this complex legal environment severely tested the capabilities of UK Servicemen and women.



**Figure 17: Vehicle Check Point (CC)**

3-11. Generally ROE and guidance on opening fire were adequate, and the majority of UK troops, with experience from other theatres were able to change relatively easily from the combat operations to a self defence profile. Practical difficulties included identification of hostile individuals who were often not in combat uniforms; during Phase IV carriage of weapons by civilians was commonplace. The range and type of attacks meant that it was not possible to apply the LOAC or self defence profiles by geographical area.

### **CAPTURED, DETAINED AND INTERNED PERSONS**

3-12. The parallel activities of warfighting and acting in a policing capacity led to a situation whereby the UK Services had four sets of individuals in its custody: Prisoners of War (PW); Detainees (common criminals or 'criminal detainees'); Internees (civilians who posed a threat to UK forces); and Voluntary Detainees (those asking to be detained for their own protection). By the end of combat operations the UK was operating a PW Camp at UM QASR (a section of the US PW facility) and this contained some 3000 UK PW, of whom c.1200 had been captured in 'civilian' clothes.

3-13. The legal basis for the capture, holding and treatment of PW is the Geneva Convention III (1949). Identification of those entitled to PW status was not clear cut, and all of the c.1200 captured in 'civilian' clothes claimed to be civilians. There had, therefore, to be differentiation between PW and other detainees. As soon as the first PWs in civilian clothing were captured it was necessary for [Geneva Convention III] 'Article 5 Tribunals' to

be held to determine their status. There was, however, insufficient evidence in every case to make proper recommendations: despite the assignment of a seven-man Royal Military Police (RMP) Team, lack of resources, including interpreters, and security difficulties as well as inadequate documentation from the point of capture, prevented 'proper' investigation. As a result an 'Initial Assessment' process was devised, and three British Officers made an initial determination of status. This process received no unfavourable comment from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

**Insight: The practical difficulties of determining the status of captured persons while the UK Services are engaged in fighting 'irregular warfare operations' in a post-combat operations phase should not be under-estimated.**

3-14. During the restoration of law and order, while the UK was the Occupying Power, there was a requirement to detain those suspected of serious crimes including looting, murder, rape and kidnap. While not desirable, owing to potential confusion with the protected status of PW and the obligations of the capturing state, the only viable secure facility during the combat operations phase was that at UM QASR. Again the ICRC was informed and no objection was raised. While Detainees were afforded the rights and privileges accorded to PW, they were deemed also to be covered by Human Rights legislation and arguably the European Convention on Human Rights. It was felt that a legal review of their detention was necessary and a policy to this effect was introduced.

3-15. The next category was Internees: those people who posed a threat to the UK Forces, but who did not fall into the category of PW or common criminals in that they posed a threat but had not committed a serious criminal offence. The Geneva Convention IV makes specific provision for the review of internment by a court or administrative board, and owing to operational circumstances, this was achieved by an initial review by the staff of the Division, with a further review by the GOC within 28 days. Owing to lack of resources, the Internees were also kept in the PW Camp. The ICRC were generally content with the arrangements made and understood the constraints on UK and Coalition Forces.

3-16. Finally, a number of people requested voluntary internment. The Occupying Power is legally obliged to provide protective custody for those who ask for it, however, this category, too, was assigned to another section within the PW Camp.

3-17. A UK-run Divisional Temporary Detention Facility (DTDF) was opened in December 2003, manned by an infantry company group with specialist advice from the Military Provost Service. The DTDF was inspected by the ICRC, and recommendations made by them were implemented. The profile and interest in the facility rose sharply in the following Spring following the ABU GHRAIB abuse allegations, but access was tightly controlled in order to prevent internees being exposed to unwarranted attention. A Committee was established to take on the review process for internees.

**Insight: The obligations regarding facilities for securing and processing Prisoners of War, Detainees ('criminal detainees') Internees (civilians posing a threat to UK forces) and Voluntary Detainees are complex, and will almost certainly fall within the responsibility of an Occupying Power or an intervention force in a complex crisis. The facilities and processes have to comply with Geneva Convention requirements, and be established to International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) standards.**

## RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER

3-18. As the Occupation continued, the legal obligation to 'restore public life' together with the duty to restore law and order meant that the criminal justice system in Iraq had to be examined and where necessary, restored.<sup>45</sup> The justice system had effectively collapsed along with the Regime. The impact of International Law on the Occupying Power meant that Coalition Forces, as Occupying Powers, had to deal not only with the Iraqi military and PW, but also had to embrace the reconstruction of society as a whole, a task for which the intervention forces and their very few OGD colleagues were not prepared. This new set of tasks, unanticipated before Op TELIC Phase I, was constrained by the rapid drawdown.

3-19. Nevertheless, the Service legal and RMP staffs in theatre developed a strategy for assisting in the restoration of law and order. This comprised clarification of the constitutional and legal situation; restoration variously of the Iraqi Police Service, the Iraqi civilian courts and judiciary, and penal institutions; and then continuing supervision of the police and judiciary. Insights following para 11 of Theme Zero describe the need to identify non-military tasks, and state that **'troops can assist in restoring law and order, but military forces cannot by themselves take on interim government and reconstruction tasks in the post-combat phase for more than a short period. Troops also lack the resources and expertise to play more than a limited role in other campaign strands - political, economic, social, legal and cultural - in a state in which there has been conflict.'** Specific UK higher level direction on how the Occupation was to be conducted was not given, and a degree of confusion between the UK (the Occupying Power) and CPA(South) was a constraint.

3-20. The immediate problem in Phase IV was to identify the administrative and legal structures: a copy of the Iraqi Criminal Code (1969) in English was procured from a US Civil Affairs battalion in BASRAH and a guide to the Iraqi legal system was acquired from London University. The CPA in Baghdad initially had only two Coalition lawyers: one US and one UK seconded from the FCO. It was not until mid-Jun 2003 that the CPA began to operate effectively. In the event, the UK used its powers as an Occupying Power to update the Iraqi Criminal Code, removing offences and punishments (including the death penalty) which were contrary to UK legal practice. These amendments were promulgated in the Coalition newspaper rather than waiting for Coalition or CPA agreement.

3-21. Military elements led by the Provost Marshal 1<sup>st</sup> Armoured Division initially assisted in the restoration of the Iraqi Police Service, and within a month 15 police stations were restored and reopened; after ten weeks 40 police stations had reopened and 5000 police officers were at work. Court buildings, most of which had been looted and damaged were identified, restored and brought into use. Again, within ten weeks, using Treasury-provided Quick Impact Project funding 17 court houses were back in use. The situation in MAYSAN was different to that in BASRAH, as some judges thought close to the Saddam Regime had been dismissed: the legitimacy of some of the new judicial appointments was questionable.

3-22. The RMP assisted in the restoration of detention facilities to take over detainees from the DTDF, and efforts continued with the assignment of troops to assist a small team of senior officers seconded from the Home Office (Prison Service).

---

<sup>45</sup> Hague Convention IV (1907) Article 43: 'The authority of the legitimate power having passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the Country'.

**JURISDICTION**

3-23. On 28 June 2004 the UK ceased to be an Occupying Power and sovereign authority was transferred to the Iraqi Interim Government under UN SCR 1546. At the same time the CPA issued Order No. 17, in effect a Status of Forces Agreement. As well as the general requirement to “contribute to the maintenance of security in Iraq” CPA Order No.17 (and the associated exchange of letters between the US Secretary of State and the Prime Minister of Iraq) confirmed the exclusive jurisdiction of contributing states over their Service personnel.

## THEME FOUR – PEOPLE

### GENERAL

4-1. The evidence shows that the vast majority of British Servicemen and women, Regular and Reservist, on operational duty in Iraq and the Gulf have performed their duty with professionalism, even-handedness, restraint and often with significant gallantry. Operational conditions, particularly the climate and insurgent incidents have been most demanding.



**Figure 18: A Soldier of 2 PARA in Baghdad (CC)**

4-2. A number of People issues have been very positive. The Army's training appears to have prepared soldiers well for the varied challenges in Iraq. Several commanding officers have reported that individuals deploying to Iraq, including those who have recently passed out of the ATRA have become integrated quickly and performed very well. Most soldiers received the OWP favourably, and the widespread provision of internet and telephone facilities has gone some way to ease the strain of separation. The provision, relatively early in the period, of expeditionary campaign infrastructure life support, including good ablution facilities and air conditioning essential to enable soldiers to rest during the 50°C mid-summer temperatures, was also an important factor in maintaining operational

effectiveness. Many of these issues were identified in previous operational lessons reports, notably from the Balkans and EX SAIF SAREEA. Most current Service People issues are tackled and resolved as they arise: few issues are outstanding.

4-3. Less positive issues include the implications of Defence Planning Assumptions (DPA) and the need for augmentation and reserves; training (particularly of Reservists) and mobilisation; the Army's reputation and the effect on troop morale of incident investigation. In each area much work has been done, mostly by the Adjutant General's staff, although there remains an internal Army public relations challenge on the last issue.

4-4. The Future Army Structure (FAS) based on direction given in DPAs, aims to rebalance the Regular Army to make it capable of delivering the most likely concurrency assumptions within harmony and without the need for significant augmentation. Within FAS, the primary role of the Reserves is to reinforce the Regular structure for operations at Large Scale, but the Reserves are also expected to provide additional capability, on a volunteer basis, when planning assumptions are exceeded. At present the Army is operating in excess of DPA, and FAS has yet to be fully implemented. Therefore, a Medium Scale operation like Op TELIC, which should be found by Regular troops without recourse to the Reserves, has required significant augmentation by volunteers from the TA and Regular Reserve; this situation has been exacerbated by undermanning in the Regular Army. Some 6000 individuals were mobilised for Op TELIC 2; c.2500 in 2004 (and 1700 in 2005). Management action is being taken to reduce individual TA deployments to c.600 p.a. on six month deployments in order to allow individual recuperation. However, when force levels reduced, reservists (TA and Regular reserves) were not necessarily the first to be withdrawn. Evidence is not conclusive on this (some reservists volunteered to stay for a full tour); and the specialist tasks undertaken by some mobilised reservists may prevent their early withdrawal. However, for many individuals (other than in 'pinch point' trades) it would seem reasonable to follow the FAS policy that Medium Scale operations should, in the first instance, be met by the Regular Army, and that non-Regulars should be withdrawn when possible.<sup>46</sup>

**Insight: A review should be carried out to establish if there is likely to be an enduring requirement for significant Reserve mobilisation (on a volunteer basis) in support of enduring operations at Medium Scale in order to inform the next edition of the Defence Planning Assumptions.**

4-5. Filling augmentation posts has been demanding, and has often resulted in short notice trawls and requirements. (A Paper by DGS, with the Army Plans and Resources Committee in Spring 2006, addresses this issue.) However, even with reservists appointed to fill 'pinch point' posts the right people have not always been available. Where civil reconstruction and administration is likely to be a major Phase IV task, people with the right skills, and able to conduct tasks in dangerous environments, are needed. People with appropriate SSR skills are also needed in the Reserves. Work is being conducted to establish skills frameworks and databases to enable these individuals to be identified. In the longer term the distinction between Regular and Reserve Service may become more flexible and allow 'retained individuals' with appropriate skills to be called up for specific requirements.

---

<sup>46</sup> This subject has been addressed in part by the TA Rebalancing Paper, which was submitted to the Executive Committee of the Army Board in Dec 05.

**Insight: It is highly desirable that the process by which requirements for posts with specific skills on an operation are matched with individual reservists is reviewed.**

4-6. The ability of Staff Officers trained at the Joint Services Command and Staff College to contribute to the drafting of campaign plans, and their good understanding of the context in which the Military Line of Operation sits, was mentioned by various Senior Officers as a positive factor.

## **DISCIPLINE, REPUTATION AND STANDARDS**

4-7. A small number of high profile disciplinary incidents and court cases have brought the Army's reputation into sharp focus, and resulted in a wave of media criticism. Great efforts have been made by commanders at all levels to limit the damage and restore the Army's reputation externally, while re-establishing the highest standards internally. The chain of command has worked hard to reinforce the Values and Standards policy so that every member of the Army knows what is expected of him or her by the Army, and by extension the British Government, the British public and media, our allies and independent watchdogs. The penalties for lapses in standards can be immense, particularly if the lapses or images of abuse gain global media coverage. These may damage operational achievements or create operational or strategic reverses, and have a political impact at home which extends to Army retention and recruiting.

4-8. To put a 'small number' into context, some 80,000 British Servicemen and women have served in Iraq since February 2003. The statistics relating to incidents requiring investigation for Op TELIC, from the start of major combat operations to 12 Jan 2006, are:

- a. There have been **191 investigations since the start of operations in Iraq.**<sup>47</sup> This figure covers all types of incidents.
- b. **171 of these investigations have been closed with no further action.**
- c. **Of the remaining 20 cases:**
  - (1) **4 investigations are still ongoing.**
  - (2) **4 have been directed for trial.**
  - (3) **3 are with the prosecuting authorities.**
  - (4) **1 is with the Chain of Command for decision.**
  - (5) **3 cases have been dealt with summarily by Commanding Officers.**
  - (6) **5 cases have been dealt with by the courts.**

---

<sup>47</sup> Figures supplied by DAG, 10 Mar 06. It should be noted that *investigations* and *cases* may include more than one individual. It is not possible to say how many people overall are involved since, at different times, witnesses could become accused. These figures are only for investigations that relate to serious incidents involving the death, serious injury or ill-treatment of Iraqis. They do not include statistics for unit investigations into shooting incidents or reflect the total number of investigations undertaken by the RMP in theatre.

d. There are 5 cases which could be classed as deliberate abuse, 2 of which have been dealt with by General Courts Martial.

4-9. On the subject of Reputation, General Graeme Lamb has spoken of the need to *mould* and not just train the soldiers of Generation X. Generation X, he suggests, has been brought up in a ‘...dysfunctional, increasingly self-interested and in places, morally corrupt’ society, and this moulding is required if Officers are to lead today’s young men and women to embrace the ‘slightly old-fashioned but essential corporate values and standards’ needed to succeed on operations. This is vital to maintaining our reputation as an Army, and the trust of Government and the Public. ‘This message on our values, standards and principles needs to be underpinned by a systematic package of education, training and activity at sub-unit, unit and formation level ... that raises our soldiers’ and NCOs’ and Officers’ awareness of their responsibilities as individuals and serving members of the British Army.’<sup>48</sup> This has been addressed by the new annual Army Mandatory Annual Training Tests (MATT, replacing Individual Training Directive (ITD) tests) on Army Values and Standards.

4-10. Having looked at the foundations, there are some parts of the ‘framework of understanding of the approach to warfare’ (the function of military doctrine) that need emphasis. In the context of Mission Command, *Design for Military Operations: The British Military Doctrine* explicitly set out a Command Philosophy emphasising the importance of understanding the intention of the commander both generally and specifically, and the clear responsibility to fulfil that intention. The Doctrine then described the exercise of command, and decision-making, stating:

*‘Although the decision has been made the process is not complete until the commander has assured himself that dissemination in the manner that he requires has been carried out. He will also subsequently wish to see that his decision is executed correctly and adjusted in the light of events.*

*In the words of General Patton: ‘Promulgation of an order represents not over 10 per cent of your responsibility. The remaining 90 per cent consists in assuring through personal supervision on the ground by yourself and your staff, proper and vigorous execution.’<sup>49</sup>*

4-11. It is the business of every commander on operations, from the most junior upwards, to ensure that his or her actions, and those of the soldiers under their command are not only legal but also *reasonable, appropriate to the task* and defensible under the circumstances if legal guidance is absent. Operational training teams teach ROE and judgmental issues in tactical settings very effectively. The challenge is to teach not only the initiative to act purposefully, but *also legally and appropriately* in the absence of further orders, in front of local people and the media on operations (and at home) in order to win the vital battle of perceptions.

---

<sup>48</sup> ‘Operational Success: Strategic Failure’ op cit.

<sup>49</sup> AC 71451 *Design for Military Operations: The British Military Doctrine*, (Edition 2) 1996 p.4-13 to14, 4-19. While much of this Doctrine has been absorbed into ADP *Land Operations*, and the content will be considered in the new *British Defence Doctrine*, it was extant Army doctrine for the period of the Analysis.

## OTHER PEOPLE ISSUES

4-12. The input on Logistic and Medical Issues (Theme Nine) describes the employment of Combat Support and Combat Service Support soldiers as convoy escorts: initially soldiers in these roles lacked the dismounted close combat skills (and the appropriate equipment) to be able to undertake these tasks and react to incidents. This led to the 'every man (and woman) a soldier' aspiration. A preliminary Training Needs Analysis suggested that developing infantry skills would require an extra two weeks of basic training for regular soldiers; the implications for TA soldiers have not been identified. Pre-deployment tactical skills training, including dismounted close combat, is given to all troops.

4-13. The Reserves Training and Mobilisation Centre (RTMC) handled the preparation, training and deployment of individual reinforcements successfully, despite the planned capacity and flow rate (up to 250 per day) being exceeded on several occasions. Receiving units were not always aware, however, of their responsibilities for individual reservists joining them, and therefore work on the initial papers sent to reservists and to receiving units is required. Some concerns were expressed about the standards of shooting, fitness, first aid training and LOAC training achieved by individual reservists, but this tends to highlight the difference in training standards achieved routinely by TA soldiers and operational deployment standards. The new MATT include legal, soldier skills and Values and Standards training which should address the points raised. Headquarters Adjutant General have reviewed the mobilisation package.

4-14. Investigations following serious incidents in Iraq, and the possibility of disciplinary action, have been a source of concern to all ranks, particularly when the RMP have been involved. A number of junior commanders, commissioned and non-commissioned, passing through the Land Warfare Centre have raised the issue, particularly for shooting incidents. Clear instructions have, however, been given to RMP investigators, which include the need to reflect the threat, operational context and the tactical mission in their police reports. An Army team touring the Iraq Theatre found no evidence that post-incident investigations were constraining troops from returning fire in contact situations, nonetheless there is an issue of *perception* which needs to be addressed in the light of related, high profile court cases. Negative perceptions on investigations may also have implications for recruiting and retention, both in the Regular and Territorial Army.

**Insight: The requirement for military investigation in all serious incidents, which will include some shooting incidents, should become, and be recognised as, part of standard post-incident procedure. A proactive Army internal information campaign is required, as a matter of urgency, to inform and reassure those deploying on operations on the investigation of incidents.**

## THEME FIVE – CULTURE

*‘Whenever I hear the word culture I release the safety catch of my revolver.’*

Hanns Johst (Nazi playwright, 1934) often quoted by Goering.

*‘Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.’*

T E Lawrence *Twenty-Seven Articles*, Arab Bulletin, Aug 1917.

5-1. A limited understanding of Iraqi culture and the Arab way of thinking, and a lack of linguists able to read or converse in the Iraqi dialect of Arabic have constrained the effectiveness of deployed British forces, military and civilian, in Iraq. Defence Intelligence (DI) (Human Factors) who, with DI Gulf, PJHQ and the Headquarters in Theatre, have responsibility for joint ‘culture’ issues have produced useful ideas on the subject, but it is clear that a better, broader understanding of Iraqi culture is needed in order to improve operational and tactical intelligence in its broadest sense.<sup>50</sup> The British Army had a well-developed sense of cultural understanding in the imperial and colonial eras, and a tradition of ‘political officers’ with local expertise. Unsurprisingly, evidence or lessons regarding culture are scarce for Op TELIC, however, this is an area which needs study as the UK presence continues in Iraq, and the British expeditionary capability is developed further.

5-2. Culture can be defined as the sum of inherited or assumed beliefs, ideas, values and knowledge which underpins social action, or the shared ideas and activities of a group or people with a common tradition. It includes the artistic and social pursuits of a particular society or class. The military implications can be divided into strata (relating to levels of operation) and areas of relevance which equate to campaign strands or lines of operation. Different strata have different cultural intelligence needs. ‘Culture’ is difficult to package neatly for military training purposes.

5-3. An understanding of culture, together with some knowledge of and sensitivity to the history of the theatre or region should enable the intelligent and sensitive application of levers of power, and should assist, or not hinder, the winning of hearts and minds. It should aim to avoid a heavy-handed, ‘occupying army’ approach. The Coalition has not been particularly successful in its understanding of, and respect for, Iraqi culture. This, with the ideological strand of Al Qa’ida which opposes Western economic and cultural ‘imperialism’ as inimical to Islam, represents a serious strategic challenge. There is an asymmetry between Western cultural beliefs, in which religion has residual influence but no longer a strong role, and Islamic culture, in which religion, codes of law and conduct are much stronger. The introduction of local ‘Majlis’ (Arabic for ‘gathering’) Committees by 1<sup>st</sup> Bn Royal Regiment of Fusiliers on Op TELIC 1 provided useful *fora* to air concerns to local representatives. Winning the battle of perceptions and convincing those who ‘sit on the fence’ of the benefits of the Coalition is of major importance; loss of support is very damaging.

5-4. Cultural factors affecting military operations include the following:

---

<sup>50</sup> The Director of Education and Training Services (Army) (DETS(A)) has the Army responsibility for development of advice on ‘cultural’ issues.

## RESTRICTED

- a. Values and beliefs, including religious beliefs and concepts of honour. These are critical and have to be understood by planners and those interacting with the local population or who are involved in Information Operations. Being able to care for and move its citizens (often in large numbers) during religious festivals or events, eg pilgrimages, will often be regarded as a test of competence for an indigenous government. Differences between sects, eg Sunni and Shia and political factions eg Ba'ath Party or Badr Corps, require study.
- b. History, as a factor, includes that of the country, its beliefs and rulers, minority peoples, foreign overlords and past struggles. For Iraq this should include the establishment of the country in 1920, and the policing of the state in its early years by the British Services (including the Royal Air Force).
- c. Anniversaries and dates of religious or political significance within the year eg. in the Islamic world the festivals of Ramadan, Al Eid, the Hajj, Ashura and Jawruz, along with the activities associated with them, should be identified. Nationalists or activists will often try to link current events to past dates, and to use them as opportunities for rallies or politically charged commemorations.
- d. Social organisation and interaction, including networks and kinship relations. How people do business, how influence is exercised, and by whom, how families are organised and the nature of 'informal authority structures' need to be understood. These relate not only to forms of authority and government but also to how extremist organisations and cells are organised. Trust in some societies may relate to kinship developed over decades if not centuries; distrust and feuds may be of long standing.
- e. An understanding of symbolism and custom, including gestures, curses and taboos, dress, and the place of women and animals in society, is essential for decisions on military force posture, tactics, techniques and procedures, for Information Operations, and for political figures and speechwriters. In military terms, the searching of women, and the use of military dogs, and the disarming of individuals or 'tribes' needs to be considered carefully. Equally, the custom of paying 'blood money' needs sensitive and rapid handling (submissions have been made to HM Treasury for payments following cases in both Afghanistan and Iraq).
- f. Heartland places, including sites of religious or other significance.
- g. External influences. Exiles and migrants may have subtly different beliefs but are likely to exert political and economic influence in their original home and as lobbyists in their adopted countries, as well as in International Organisations, including the UN. '*Diaspora*' influence is a major factor in the Balkans, and to a lesser extent in Iraq.
- h. Language.

5-5. While understanding of local cultural factors is important, appreciation of the culture of allies, partners, private military providers, contractors, representatives of states with different views, NGOs and watchdogs – the last three sometimes described as orange white, and green forces - is also useful.

5-6. Careful judgements have to be made regarding local activity: one man's traditional trade may be regarded by Westerners as organised crime, and intervention in family or 'tribal' disputes may lead to resentment against outside interference.

5-7. Allegiance provokes similar difficulties. Some of the Iraqi security forces working with British troops and policemen may have 'affiliative' kinship links or structures and allegiances, partly due to the nature of Arab/Persian society, and partly due to realities stemming from the collapse of the Saddam Regime and its structures (the Ba'ath Party, the army, officer corps and police force). Individuals may be more likely to show loyalty or allegiance to local authority than to the more distant Iraqi Government in Baghdad. Parallel structures based on sectarian, kinship or political allegiance may predominate instead.



**Figure 19: Cultural Exchange (CC)**

5-8. Language training in the Services remains an intractable problem. Time needed to train individuals to useful (linguist or level 3) standards, selection of relevant languages and resource implications have hindered development of a workable Defence Language Policy for years. Hiring local interpreters in Iraq (on a basis of c.75 interpreters per battlegroup) has proved satisfactory for non-specialist uses, but does not meet the requirement in the intelligence and Information Operations fields. For specialists, time will be needed during the preparation period for acquiring language skills. Providing incentives to officers and soldiers to learn operational language skills, which could be topped up before deployments,

is worth considering for the future.<sup>51</sup> The special forces practice of putting individuals recovering from minor injuries on language courses could be followed more widely.

5-9. What action does the Army need to take now? With regard to cultural education and pre-tour training, the factors above will need to be assessed against the levels of operation and *areas of relevance* to campaign strands, including commanders', intelligence and information operations requirements in order to produce the training needs. Debriefing those who have served in Iraq could identify the cultural information required.

5-10. The Research Acquisition Organisation at the Defence Academy at Shrivenham is already looking at the various cultural guides produced in theatre. The products of this work should be used both to improve awareness of Iraqi culture, and as a basis for other cultural guides eg for Afghanistan. A network of links able to advise on cultures in different theatres would be useful. Identification of who needs to know what could be informed by looking at parallel cultural and diversity training being run for the Services at the Defence Academy.

**Insight: Training needs analysis for cultural awareness instruction, which should form part of pre-deployment training, should be developed further by the Director of Education and Training Services (Army) (DETS(A)). Instruction will need to be at different levels, and include the in-depth requirements for those in J2/G2, Information Operations and other specialist staffs.**

**Insight: Consideration should be given to adding the cultural equivalent of a Political Adviser (POLAD) to deployed J2/G2 staffs in order to advise commanders and staff branches, including Information Operations, on the implications of planned and developing activities.**

**Insight: Defence Language Training remains a difficult problem, however, with a continuing campaign it should be possible to develop language skills through contracted instruction, and to top-up skills before deployments. There are resource implications to this proposal.**

---

<sup>51</sup> The Australian model of compulsory study of a relevant language for Officer career progression is worth examining.

## THEME SIX – INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, TARGET ACQUISITION AND RECONNAISSANCE

6-1. Despite recent investment in Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities the product available to Op TELIC 2-5 battlegroups was, in several instances quoted, disappointing. This is worrying since there is historically-based scientific evidence which suggests that 77% of insurgency campaigns with good intelligence have been successful or partially successful.<sup>52</sup> The Op TELIC evidence is patchy, however, partly because, while ISTAR observations have appeared, there has been no systematic collation of G2 lessons.<sup>53</sup> ISTAR issues have a Central, Defence Intelligence Staff lead: an Army or land component ISTAR focus is highly desirable, at least.

6-2. ISTAR is defined as ‘the co-ordinated acquisition, processing and dissemination of timely, accurate, relevant and assured information and intelligence, which supports the planning and conduct of operations, targeting all the integration of effects, and enables commanders to achieve their goal throughout the spectrum of conflict’.<sup>54</sup>

6-3. The ‘top-down’ picture describes a good framework - an integrated Joint ISTAR approach - significant investment and positive action plans. Some of the senior Officers interviewed identified no problems with intelligence. ‘Bottom-up’ evidence suggests that many battlegroup commanders did not have confidence in the ISTAR ‘system’s’ ability to provide actionable intelligence to them in timely fashion, and consequently, the battlegroup soldier was seldom able to mount operations on the basis of good intelligence. This theme analyses ISTAR support to Op TELIC through the Intelligence Cycle components (Direct, Collect, Process, Disseminate) and manpower, equipment and training issues. DCI(A) has provided material on ISTAR enhancements since Op TELIC 5.

### DIRECT

6-4. The embryo Operational Intelligence Support Groups (OISG) have improved management of formation information requirements. However, battlegroups and sub-units will not receive enhancements to automate the system until the G2 ISTAR BISA enters service in 2011, and this may only automate existing processes rather than support new ways of working. Automated tasking of ISTAR assets, currently done through Intelligence Management Board meetings in deployed formation headquarters, will be increasingly necessary as more collection assets become available over the next five years.

### COLLECT

6-5. A mix of collection capabilities is essential. Strategic and operational level collection assets on Op TELIC included the capable NIMROD MR2 and R1 aircraft. Tactical assets included manned airborne surveillance (rotary and fixed wing) and UAVs. The 1<sup>st</sup> Bn Black Watch battlegroup, under US command South of Baghdad, commented that a battlegroup had never before had so many intelligence assets.<sup>55</sup> Collection assets were available to the Black Watch, however, US priorities meant that support was not guaranteed. There were difficulties over communications downlinks, integration, management and release issues

<sup>52</sup> DSTL finding in *Historical Analysis of Stabilisation Operations* dated 30 Nov 04.

<sup>53</sup> The weakness in not identifying J2/G2 lessons from Op TELIC has been identified, and 4<sup>th</sup> Armoured Brigade should examine the subject for Op TELIC 5.

<sup>54</sup> Army Field Manual Vol I Part 3: *ISTAR*.

<sup>55</sup> Op BRACKEN: 1BW/BWHQ/321 dated 9 Dec 04.

(with Coalition allies). Innovative solutions were found, and downlinks have since been standardised to enable terminals to receive products from all airborne imagery assets.

6-6. Collection capability was limited by weather, threat and terrain. At the tactical level, PHOENIX UAVs were only able to operate for about half the year due to the heat. GAZELLE helicopters were withdrawn as their Defensive Aids Suites were not sufficiently capable. The vast area of responsibility included extensive linear features eg. power lines and pipelines, and highlighted the lack of a deep and persistent ISTAR capability.

6-7. The UK aspiration is for a suite of IMINT platforms able to provide a persistent, all weather, wide-area capability, and this should be provided under DEC ISTAR sponsored Projects PICASSO and elements of DABINETT. At tactical level there is an aspiration for a battlegroup 'mini'-UAV. A statement of need, and supporting OA is required to support this aspiration, but the latter will be provided in part by the Land Tactical ISTAR Study (LTIS).<sup>56</sup> Use of DESERT HAWK mini-UAVs in Afghanistan will also help define their utility.

## **PROCESS**

6-8. Links to strategic intelligence organisations, including GCHQ, were good, and timely intelligence was given to formations, and occasionally battlegroups, during the period. The Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities system worked well, although careful briefing and explanation of commanders' intelligence requirements, and integration into Army staff procedures, is needed to ensure the best return. Links between in-theatre intelligence and Information Operations cells, both in theatre and outside, were less effective.

6-9. With OISG, formation HQs are now better able to process the large quantities of ISTAR product available, however, battlegroups will not receive an equivalent uplift until G2ISTAR BISA enters service. At sub-unit level lack of dedicated manpower is emerging as an issue as remote viewing terminals able to receive overhead imagery become available to commanders, as well as, potentially, feed from Light EW Teams (LEWT).

## **DISSEMINATE**

6-10. The major shortfalls lie in the Information and Communication Technology areas. Lack of high bandwidth communications bearers continues to be a concern, as capabilities entering service eg. WATCHKEEPER and ASTOR, will be able to send high resolution imagery across the network if bearers are available. FALCON, a high capacity bearer, may have to be extended to lower levels than planned as a result. In addition, databases, with suitable tools (eg. browsing applications) will be required at tactical level to enable exploitation of the intelligence.

## **MANPOWER**

6-11. Intelligence Corps manpower is in short supply, with officers in the Corps being managed on an individual basis in order to meet operational demand. Intelligence Corps senior ranks are also in short supply: the demand on these individuals is greater, since the right rank and vetting is needed for security posts. Junior ranks in the Corps are high calibre, and well educated (a good proportion are now graduates) and trained.

---

<sup>56</sup> The Land Tactical ISTAR Study is being conducted by Dstl on behalf of DEC's ALM, GM and ISTAR.

6-12. In terms of non-specialist manpower, a major change in the Infantry has been the development of the [Fire] Support Company to include ISTAR. This allows infantry battlegroups to have an experienced Field Officer to direct ISTAR as well as an Intelligence Officer, who is currently more a collator, briefer and passer of information. The questions of how the Intelligence Officer is used in a battlegroup, and how ISTAR can be best managed in battlegroups is being addressed jointly by the Directors of the RAC and Infantry.

6-13. Continuity of intelligence was a problem with staff deploying on six months tours, and the lack of a database which could be handed over. The continuity issue was addressed satisfactorily in NI through Continuity Officers and Non Commissioned Officers (CONCO). There has been a reluctance to introduce this on Op TELIC.

6-14. Shortage of specialist HUMINT manpower has been identified in many reports. The Defence HUMINT Unit (DHU) should produce 12 HUMINT teams by 2007, but specialist HUMINT is likely to remain a scarce, and therefore a formation, resource. The planned 12 teams may not meet the operational requirement, and the timescale for the increased number of teams may not be met. Re-examining Army assumptions with regard to HUMINT *modus operandi* would be useful. The latter are based on hard-won NI experience, but may not be appropriate in all theatres. Many feel that battlegroups can benefit significantly from low-level HUMINT product produced by their own operators. Legal and professional training standards are vital, however, to ensure that HUMINT operations are properly co-ordinated with other information gathering, and that force protection requirements are met.

6-15. Comments on the UK WMD Intelligence-related inquiries (the Hutton and Butler Inquiries) suggested that national intelligence *analysis* was inconsistent and poor. The same faults may apply to Army intelligence operators. The initiative to develop best national intelligence business practice and teaching, possibly through the creation of a centre of excellence, should be tracked closely by Service intelligence experts.

6-16. Further manpower issues include the integration of Joint Force Interrogation Teams, tactical questioning, close operation platoons and companies, and document exploitation. UK representation in the US-led theatre intelligence centre was very small (but highly valued): this represents a potentially wasted opportunity.

## EQUIPMENT

6-17. Some evidence suggests that the Army does not have sufficient ISTAR equipment to sustain more than one concurrent Medium Scale operation. The fault may lie more in integrating systems rather than a lack of equipment. Several key ISTAR projects are due to enter service in the next five years: ASTOR; PICASSO (IMINT); DABINETT (management, tasking, processing and dissemination enhancements); and the WATCHKEEPER UAV.

6-18. These equipment programmes will, however, only enhance component and formation Headquarters: planned enhancements below battlegroup level are minimal. Aspirations include mini-UAVs and capabilities for urban operations, including radar imaging. Chances of funding in the EP look slim, and therefore the imbalance between brigade and battlegroup ISTAR capability is unlikely to change under current plans.

## TRAINING

6-19. ISTAR structures are organised for warfighting operations, tempered by Northern Ireland and Balkans experience. ISTAR training for major combat operations appears to be good, but a recurring theme in reports concerns ISTAR training and awareness for counter insurgency and stability operations, which is seen as less effective. Tempo of operations may have precluded the right people from attending courses. Insufficient intelligence preparation for incoming (formation and battlegroup) staffs was also highlighted. Pre-deployment updates will be a priority role for the planned Land Operations Support Cell.

## ISTAR SUMMARY

6-20. This Analysis follows several DOC Operational Lessons Reports, and the *Intelligence Support to Deployed Forces Audit*, which commented on intelligence and ISTAR issues, and highlighted the inability to track targets, and weaknesses in HUMINT capability, CIS and databases.<sup>57</sup> The MOD process has not achieved significant improvements in ISTAR in timely fashion. Equipment Capability priorities do not place sufficient priority on low-level, land-environment ISTAR shortfalls, including integration and processing support. DEC ISTAR now leads Land (Battlefield Surveillance) Capability Working Groups to ensure that capability gaps are not missed. Nevertheless, there are few officers experienced in counter insurgency and stability operations working in this area.<sup>58</sup>

6-21. The ISTAR 'system of systems' *did not deliver the products that it should have done to low-level customers during Op TELIC 2-5*. Evidence is not, however, definitive. A conceptual flaw is apparent: the Army has not defined clearly 'what exactly do we need to know' in stability operations, and its detailed equipment capability 'needs' clearly enough.

**Insight: Good information and intelligence is a pre-requisite for success in counter insurgency and stability operations. Doctrinal guidance on requirements, and on how ISTAR structures can be adapted to such operations, particularly if a fixed infrastructure is available, would be valuable.**

**Insight: The lack of a common Defence-wide intelligence database appears in many post-Op TELIC reports. It is regarded as the greatest single point of avoidable J2/G2 failure. An intelligence database, is being deployed (in 2006) but will need EP resources so that it can be maintained and developed.**

**Insight: Battlegroup and sub-unit level intelligence capabilities (manpower, equipment, tools, processes and training) should be reassessed both for warfighting, and counter insurgency and stability operations.**

**Insight: ISTAR collection capabilities must be able to operate in all climatic and terrain conditions, and at ranges greater than for warfighting.**

**Insight: Iraq has proved a very difficult Theatre for HUMINT operations for cultural and language reasons, and the difficulties associated with surveillance operations in a high threat environment. Low-level HUMINT conducted by uniformed all-arms personnel is invaluable, but needs careful training, command and control.**

<sup>57</sup> DOC *Intelligence Support to Deployed Forces Audit* (02/99) dated Jul 99.

<sup>58</sup> In Nov 05 only 15% of posts in the DEC ISTAR organisation were occupied by Army Officers.

## THEME SEVEN – INFORMATION OPERATIONS

7-1. The Directorate of Targeting and Information Operations (DTIO) in MOD Main Building contributed input on Information Operations since there is no specific Army lead for this subject.

7-2. The planning and conduct of effective Information Operations depends on detailed intelligence and a good understanding of the culture of the target audience as well as the 'information environment', the means by which audiences receive messages. If any of these factors are weak then the potential of information operations may be degraded or lead to 'messages' which prove counter-productive. An understanding of what is effective – a feedback loop - is critical to the process.

7-3. During the Op TELIC deployment and warfighting (Phases II and III) Information Operations were successfully devised and executed against various objectives, primarily, to degrade Iraqi willingness to fight, and to limit damage to the national oil infrastructure in Southern Iraq. These required development of specific messages for defined target audiences. Consideration of information operations for Phase IV was limited. The rapid collapse of the Regime led to a hiatus as new messages and means of delivery had to be developed for different target audiences. To an extent this pause may have passed unnoticed in the euphoria and lawlessness that followed the collapse. The means of delivery changed from regime-controlled broadcast media to newsprint and leaflets, and back to broadcast media: print media and leader engagement was used to fill the gap.

7-4. A similar pattern emerged later, following the Information Operations campaign before the Iraqi Elections in Jan 2005. Once the results had been declared Information Operations staffs had to develop new campaign messages, and a void was created which extremists and groups hostile to the democratic process began to fill, without effective counters from UK and Coalition Information Operations.

7-5. The Information Operations split of responsibilities, following the production of the MOD Central Staff Information Strategy, is for DTIO to develop guidance on issues over a 6-12 month timeframe, in conjunction with Coalition partners. PJHQ works to an operational timeframe, developing contingency plans over a 3-6 month period, while Headquarters staffs in theatre concentrate on events in their areas of responsibility and conduct contingency planning. The concept is to seek effects on a range of target audiences that bear positively on the campaign, and to avoid ceding the information initiative to insurgents.

7-6. Military Information Operations are able to convey more than just military messages, however. In a complex crisis strategic (UK-based) and operational level military staffs need to co-ordinate messages both within the military chain, but also with diplomatic and OGD actors. UK Strategic Information Operations appeared, to a great extent during the period, ineffective, being shouted down by a more strident, domestic political message which set the agenda, and resulted in the reporting largely only of bad news from Iraq. Government Information Operations in the UK (and other Coalition nations) tended to concentrate on reassurance to domestic civil populations rather than relevant messages to people in Iraq, Muslims further afield, and extremist elements worldwide, the real Information Operations targets. This mistargeting can be related to the insights on the need for a pan-Government

Strategic Estimate, and strategic co-ordination.<sup>59</sup> The Government is likely to have to identify and develop main themes over a 6-12 month timeframe, looking forward to 'campaign' developments. When British troops are deployed in more than one theatre the messages should be co-ordinated.

7-7. Military Information Operations limitations tend to emerge at brigade and battlegroup level. There has been a tendency to regard 'Info Ops' as a 'soft' skill whose influence is difficult to quantify. This becomes problematic when commanders have to set resource priorities between information operations and other military methods. Coalition battlegroups have not always been co-ordinated Information Operations with tactical action, in contrast to insurgents, who rely on publicity to amplify their effects. In counter insurgency or stability operations, the battle for perceptions is often more important than physical action. In Iraq, there were difficulties with intelligence links which sometimes limited theme development, and a lack of the deep cultural knowledge which is essential for convincing messages.

7-8. The effect of military Information Operations is difficult to measure, although opinion polling is used and can give coarse indications of the impact on local people. A more sophisticated, 'balanced scorecard'-type methodology with other indicators of success would be useful.

7-9. During Op TELIC 4, Headquarters 1st (Mechanised) Brigade Information Operations staff produced 'Leader Engagement' *aides memoires* detailing themes pertinent to policy and operations. This initiative, coupled with verbal briefs to commanders, meant that any leader engaged in discussions with Iraqis had information on current themes, and that no opportunity to gain influence was wasted.

7-10. Planning and co-ordination of Information Operations with tactical actions improved during the period, however, partly through the importance of Information Operations being stressed during pre-operational reconnaissance and collective training. Battlegroups did not always appoint the most appropriate Officers to run their Information Operations: the success of these operations depends on the quality and training of those running them. A Training Needs Analysis for Information Operations is currently being undertaken.

7-11. In summary, the difficulties encountered with Information Operations during the period related to longer-term planning and development of themes and messages, particularly over major events necessitating a change of message. At theatre level, the reluctance to recognise Information Operations as a campaign strand, and at tactical level, as an essential complementary activity to a military presence and tactical tasks on the ground reduced, partly as a result of pre-tour training, and partly through initiatives such as the 'Leader Engagement'. For the future, the Army has to improve training courses, and ensure that the most appropriate Officers at battlegroup level run Information Operations. Information Operations is an essential activity that should be planned and run alongside tactical operations in a complex crisis, a counter insurgency or stability operations.

**Insight: Information Operations activities developed reasonably well during Op TELIC 2–5 despite limitations resulting from lack of intelligence and detailed knowledge of Iraqi culture. Information Operations are an essential complementary strand to tactical activity during operations in complex crises. This message needs reinforcing through doctrine, exercises and training.**

<sup>59</sup> See Insights following para.11 of Theme Zero.

**THEME EIGHT – EQUIPMENT**

8-1. During Op TELIC 2-5 the greatest equipment capability challenge, in management terms, was to track a fast changing tactical situation. At the outset the requirement was for light forces equipment for stability operations, although the lawlessness accompanying the change of regime necessitated the rapid deployment of public order equipment.

8-2. The evolution of an increasingly sophisticated insurgent threat, with a rate of development very much faster than in other recent campaigns, required the rapid fielding of several specialist capabilities. For example, the early appearance of IEDs led to deployment of equipment developed for Northern Ireland. Post-incident assessment, technical intelligence and reachback for professional scientific support with operational analysis and other techniques, was established in mid-2003. This again paid dividends, particularly since the extremists were, and still are able to draw on extensive terrorist know-how from the Middle East, including the state research efforts from the time of the Saddam Regime. Specialist equipment (a success story) is not examined in this report.

8-3. Protected mobility with a heavy equipment and also rotary wing overwatch (eg WARRIOR, which continued to perform very well, and CHALLENGER, with battlefield and support helicopters) proved a good force combination. Force protection and ISTAR equipment headed the operational requirements list, although environmental protection against temperatures in the high 50s°C for the whole month of August, and extreme humidity, was also important.



**Figure 20: 1 BW BG WARRIORS on Op BRACKEN (CC)**

8-4. During Op TELIC, both in the major combat operations phase and subsequently, the issue of equipment has been presentationally most sensitive, with significant Ministerial, Parliamentary and National Audit Office interest, and major media coverage. A number of incidents, some involving fatalities, have led to high profile media crusades, often involving the families of those concerned. The insight is clear, and is stated in Theme Zero.

8-5. The increasing threat reinforced the requirement for Force Protection. At individual level, the assumption was made in MOD at the outset of the campaign that every soldier deploying should be issued with Enhanced Combat Body Armour (ECBA) originally developed against specific threat criteria and in the context of medical evacuation times for Northern Ireland. In Iraq, ECBA was developed and the Enhanced Personal Protection Equipment (colloquially known as 'top cover body armour') was issued. There is no doubt that both types of equipment have saved lives.

8-6. Iraq has represented the non-linear battlespace, with no 'safe' rear areas. Combat Support and Service Support troops and vehicles have been under threat as much as battlegroup patrols, and while protected convoys have been the norm, this has highlighted the lack of protection for heavy vehicle cabs, and for light escort vehicles. The protection requirement for the OSHKOSH tankers and Heavy Equipment Transporters was added at the design stage, while UOR action was taken for other vehicles.

8-7. SNATCH armoured Landrovers deployed from Northern Ireland were enhanced with air conditioning. Insufficient numbers were deployed: it is clear that *a successor vehicle of this type, available in the right numbers and with levels of protection appropriate to the local threat will be required for current and future deployments.* The General War Role SAXON showed its limitations in mobility both off-road and in confined urban areas, and was constrained by its inability to deploy top cover sentries. WARRIOR proved capable, and its armour was upgraded as the threat, particularly from rocket propelled grenades (RPG) developed.

8-8. Security of bases was enhanced through UOR procurement of surveillance systems eg Project RAIDER, an elevated electro-optical system, and its successor Project REVIVOR. In addition indirect fire locating systems including the Advanced Sound-Ranging Programme (ASP) MAMBA and COBRA weapon locating systems proved invaluable. ASP provides continuous acoustic alerting against a range of guns, rockets, mortar and small arms threats with sufficient accuracy to guide Quick Reaction Force follow-up action against firing points.

**Insight: Ballistic protection for individuals is a high profile issue of significant interest to soldiers, their families, Ministers and the media. It is essential that protection systems are kept under review so that they continue to meet current and potential threats.**

8-9. Environmental protection enhancements to the Temporary Deployable Accommodation were procured. The environmental conditions, extreme heat and humidity, significantly affected performance: on Op TELIC 2 a high rate of heat casualties occurred, and many of those evacuated were not able to return to theatre. Air conditioning was therefore a near-essential to allow troops to rest during the day: air conditioning was originally accepted by MOD and Treasury scrutineers only to enable CIS to operate. The

problem of keeping aircraft, particularly helicopters cool and shaded on the ground, and creating conditions to allow maintenance were not fully solved.

8-10. The problems with communications were anticipated early during Phase IV and Project SYNERGY was procured to provide area coverage through point-to-point communications. While generally satisfactory SYNERGY suffered difficulties with the initial contractor support to the system. The limitations of the ageing CLANSMAN system were recognised from the start, although the Personal Role Radio, part of BOWMAN, proved excellent: the Commercial Personal Mobile Radio system was procured to complement both. This provided good communications in urban areas once the optimal siting of talk-throughs had been achieved. It was less good in rural areas, and reliance was placed in some cases on mobile telephones using the KUWAIT mobile telephone system: 1<sup>st</sup> (Mechanised) Brigade reported instances of mobile telephones being the only means of communications available to troops in contact.<sup>60</sup>

8-11. Post-operational reports have identified, however, that the communications provided were inadequate to support the full range of systems required to support enduring operations: communications could not fully support UNICOM Out Of Barracks applications.

**Insight: Communications coverage of an area of operations is essential to enable military tasks to be carried out during any type of deployment. Communications must have the capacity for military and non-military tasks, and must also be able to carry the administrative and logistic traffic that enables a force to operate. Coverage should be planned at the outset of a campaign for procurement under Urgent Operational Requirements procedures. Adequate communications are also a high profile issue of significant interest to soldiers, their families, Ministers and the media.**

**Insight: Despite the procurement of commercial equipment under Project SYNERGY, and the later deployment of BOWMAN-equipped battlegroups, there were communications difficulties during the period, some of which were very serious. It is important that the BOWMAN and FALCON programmes are assessed to see whether the problems encountered on Op TELIC 2-5, including integration with other essential electronic equipment, will be solved for deployments like those in Iraq.**

8-12. In the ISTAR area, PHOENIX proved useful, contributing significantly to situational awareness and force protection for all types of operations in BASRAH and AL AMARAH. While it had difficulties in the extreme environmental conditions, sensible 'adaptive' use of the system maximised its effectiveness. UK experience with mini-UAVs was initially less successful, attempts to bring the DESERT HAWK system into service suffering from electro-magnetic spectrum congestion in the BASRAH area. An insight into the capabilities offered by smaller tactical UAVs was, however, gained.

**Insight: Challenges remain in the ISTAR environment in providing persistent surveillance over wide areas, and in operating in urban areas in a non-permissive environment.**

---

<sup>60</sup> Op TELIC Post Operational Report Headquarters 1<sup>st</sup> (Mechanised) Brigade.

8-13. The importance of close relationships between deployed commanders and the Defence scientific staffs has been mentioned. The ability to react quickly to changing operational conditions with equipment solutions is underpinned by the MOD research programme, some of which, in sensitive areas eg Explosive Ordnance Disposal, is conducted through the Defence Scientific and Technical Laboratories (DSTL). An increasing amount of research effort has been contracted through competition in industry. While many of the new requirements have been addressed as a result of existing work in the research programme (eg body armour development) the research emphasis changed sharply during the period in order to deliver force protection for both people and vehicles. Traditionally much of the Defence scientific research effort has been in support of the long term investment in the Equipment Programme, and resources have been diverted from this to service the needs of the current deployments. Given the limited resources available, the balance of investment priorities for scientific research need to be reconfirmed.

**Insight: The close relationship between deployed commanders and staff in headquarters and scientific advisers (SCIAD) developed well in Northern Ireland, again proved extremely valuable in seeking solutions to developing threats and situations in theatre. Maintaining the system in UK for providing timely scientific advice to deployed forces is a potential life saver and war winner. The MOD process for the deployment of SCIADs needs, however, to be streamlined.**

## THEME NINE – LOGISTIC AND MEDICAL ISSUES

### LOGISTIC ISSUES

9-1. The deployed logistic structure evolved from a conventional, doctrinally recognisable land logistic warfighting organisation (with 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> line troops) into an organisation rationalised for stability operations. The National Support Element (NSE) was initially based on a logistic brigade headquarters, but then became a Joint organisation although 90% of its activity and responsibility was for land component logistics. The staff appointed were not well selected, and the new organisation did not capitalise on established peacetime procedures, relationships and operational lessons.<sup>61</sup> Since Op TELIC 1 D Joint Commitments and the Defence Augmentation Cell have reviewed the Consolidated Augmentation Manning Lists (CAML) and linked anticipated staff officer requirements to suitable individuals filling established posts.

9-2. At unit level, a Composite Logistic Support Regiment was developed around the Regimental Headquarters of the Royal Logistic Corps Regiment in theatre. The drawdown was accompanied by an increase in contracted support, however, it was not always clear what support the military elements should give to the individual contractors in terms of force protection, communications, medical support, food, fuel, access to the NAAFI etc.

9-3. With the non-linear battlespace becoming an alarming reality, normal logistic tasking was complicated by the need to plan routine supply tasks as deliberate operations and to assign up to 25% of available troops for force protection duties eg escorts and Quick Reaction Forces. While battlegroups provided support for convoys within their areas of responsibility on occasions, convoy escort was routinely a combat service support task in order not to detract from the offensive effort against extremists, until a Rear Operations Battlegroup was introduced during Op TELIC 5. There was, however, no overall British or MND(SE) direction on the protection of supply for the early part of the period of the Analysis, which runs contrary to the last Principle of War: Sustainability (formerly Administration).<sup>62</sup> Some of the forward bases were poorly sited in terms of access without the risk of ambush.

9-4. The supply task was complicated by stock inloading from two directions. Thousands of containers and pallets of unused combat and other supplies were left over from Op TELIC 1 and needed to be collected and rationalised. There were also many tons of items arriving from UK which had been demanded by Op TELIC 1 units which had left theatre. During 2003 the headquarters and logistic troops were spending as much time on reconciliation of accounts and return of significant quantities of containers and stores as they were on sustaining the in-theatre forces.<sup>63</sup> Hard work in theatre and supply chain improvements in UK turned round the situation from a low point in May 2003. By the end of Op TELIC 3 the contents of over 700 containers had been reconciled with accounts and

<sup>61</sup> 'The composite nature of the headquarters led ... to the Chief G3 Operations officer being a Royal Navy submariner responsible for battlegroup echelons, the Logistic Regiment, the Equipment Support Company and other Land Combat Service Support units.' From the original Theme submitted.

<sup>62</sup> 'No tactical plan can succeed without administrative support commensurate with the aim of the operation: it follows that a commander must have a degree of control over the administrative plan proportionate to the degree of his responsibility for the operation.' Principles of War: Administration.

<sup>63</sup> The 1<sup>st</sup> (UK) Armoured Division Post-Operational Report mentions over 800 containers of materiel and several acres of other stores that were 'left for Op TELIC 2 logistic units to sort out'.

returned to UK. From then, rationalised procedures led to more effective achievement of the logistic task. By Op TELIC 5 the procedures were very different from those on TELIC 2.

9-5. Supply and distribution of materiel continued to be hampered by an incomplete asset tracking and accounting system, despite elements of systems being deployed.<sup>64</sup> Secondly, although many containers had been returned to UK, Storage Agencies were often not willing to fund the receipt, overhaul and storage of returned materiel which had already been replaced. One option was to leave the stock in theatre: on OP TELIC 5 some £80M worth of materiel was in theatre, much of it stored in unsuitable conditions. Re-demanding or overdemanding due to lack of confidence in the supply chain, which could not always meet projected delivery times, was a major problem. Transparency is needed in the supply chain: this should be part of the asset accounting system. By early 2004 in-theatre delivery times had been reduced to 24 hours, despite constraints imposed by the security situation.

9-6. Following attacks on logistic vehicles in May 2003 force protection emerged as a major issue. Vehicles and equipment were modified, with both in-theatre initiatives and UOR procurement enhancing crew protection.<sup>65</sup> However, as well as protecting logistic vehicle crews two other significant issues emerged. Combat service support soldiers employed on convoy escorts did not initially have a reasonable level of dismounted close combat skills to be able to react to incidents. Secondly, force protection parties in soft-skin Land Rovers lacked vehicle communications, optical sights, MINIMI machine guns, grenade launchers and night vision devices.<sup>66</sup> Equipment enhancements arrived, but troops were not fully equipped until Op TELIC 5. The 'every man (and women) a soldier' issue is covered in Theme Four.

9-7. In addition to asset tracking and 'every man a soldier' the logistic development issues which emerged include the need to design and develop an effective NSE and national logistic headquarters at the point of theatre entry. This is not a new lesson, similar observations having been made after the Kosovo operation in 1999 and Exercise SAIF SAREEA in late 2001. Forward of the NSE, the observation was made that precise ORBATs were dictated for the roulements, rather than logistic missions and tasks being given from which incoming logistic commanders could build or adjust ORBATs as the situation evolved. This led to many reservists being called up: by Op TELIC 4 the Logistic Support Regiment was 55% TA. With regard to individual reinforcements for headquarters it is evident that a better system stating competencies is required. As in other areas, there is scope for looking at longer tours in theatre which could be acceptable if conditions of service, including time out of theatre, could be agreed. Lastly, several comments were made about the training of battlegroup and regimental quartermasters for their role on operations: this is an issue that requires examination.

**Insight: Combat Service Support elements, comprising both Regular and Reservist individuals, provided very good service to battlegroups despite having to sort out Op TELIC 1 stores in large quantities, and taking on their**

<sup>64</sup> The LARO report in Mar 04 reported that during a three-month period the Army placed demands on UK Distribution Centres (depots) on 15,772 occasions for stores which were already in theatre.

<sup>65</sup> Local innovation by Staff Sergeants Webley and Woolley led to the fielding of their Webley-Eagle armour system for vehicle cabs.

<sup>66</sup> Combat service support elements were equipped with the LSW, and thus had very limited integral firepower compared to battlegroup elements equipped with the 7.62mm GPMG and the 5.56mm MINIMI machine gun.

**own protection in what rapidly became a high threat, non-linear battlespace. Old lessons regarding asset tracking and accounting were reinforced. Overall, the logistic system appeared improvised rather than planned, and significant follow-up is required on some logistic issues.**

## **MEDICAL ISSUES**

9-8. The medical input suggests that no major health issues emerged that had not been identified before operations began. However, resources have not been available to allow the analysis of significant amounts of medical data collected.

**Insight: The medical data collected from Iraq should be properly assessed.**

9-9. In terms of general health in theatre, 'D&V' occurred at low background rates, with predictable peaks during roulement periods while incomers developed 'resistance' to local pathogens and the requirement to adhere to field hygiene was reinforced. Heat illness generally peaked during the first few weeks of each roulement, however, following a visit by the Army Professor of Occupational Medicine a fall in heat injuries was noticed. Generally heat injury prevention relies on the training of the individual soldier and junior commanders.

**Insight: Roulement should be managed so that major troop movements do not occur during the hottest periods. For individual augmentees the acclimatisation policy should be strictly enforced.**

9-10. In terms of trauma care, the 'Golden Hour' criterion (evacuation from the point of wounding to a hospital within 60 minutes) is long-established and widely supported by Coalition military surgeons experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan. Op TELIC 4 analysis suggests that the Army was failing to meet this norm. Although 85% of casualties were evacuated by helicopter to Role 3 hospitals the average time into surgery was over 2½ hours.<sup>67</sup> The low numbers of British casualties makes statistical comparison with other British and US campaigns difficult. The UK has exploited US data, which suggests that:

- a. Operational medical support should as far as possible replicate the integrated trauma systems which are common in civilian practice.
- b. Non-haemostatic agents such as Quick-Clot and Chitosan have resulted in a significant reduction in the number of (US) deaths due to uncontrolled haemorrhage. The UK adopted a similar policy regarding the use of these agents in Apr 2005.
- c. Swift evacuation direct to a hospital facility, bypassing other field medical posts, although these may contain a multi-disciplinary medical team, is associated with an improved mortality.

**Insight: The net effect of current practice is to draw 'forward' a greater weight of hospital medical support, with its logistic enablers and care facilities.**

---

<sup>67</sup> Draft Op TELIC MACE Clinical Audit, Royal Centre for Defence Medicine.

**Insight: The average time from wounding to surgery of over 2½ hours appears excessive, and urgent steps should be taken to identify the causes of delay, and to eliminate them.**

9-11. In terms of casualty evacuation, the UK policy of relying on allocated rather than dedicated aircraft for casualty evacuation proved adequate in Iraq. Calls for helicopter evacuation, possibly based on the perception that movement by air is 'best', may have resulted in delays and casualties being moved in less than optimal circumstances. Movement of casualties has to be dictated by clinical need (tempered by the tactical situation) and the person providing the first medical response will generally be able to make appropriate evacuation decisions. The Medical Group deployed in Iraq has now received armoured wheeled ambulances, following attacks on ambulances (one of which was fatal). Although this may suggest a reduced requirement for helicopter evacuation, the improved force protection offered by armoured ambulances may be counter-balanced by longer evacuation times and lower quality patient care (owing to the ground and vehicle characteristics). There may therefore be an increased requirement for helicopters to make up for lost time.

9-12. Heavy reliance was placed on medical Reservists. Several factors need to be assessed here. Frequent changes in people can undermine continuity of care and affect Clinical Governance and Assurance measures, while long tours can result in clinical skill fade, and can create difficulties with NHS Trust employers. Risk analysis is important when considering the range of clinical specialists retained in theatre. Contracted civilian nurses have been deployed in Iraq since mid-2004: this initiative has reduced pressure on the Defence Medical Services, but the contracts limit employment (for medico-legal or operational reasons). Employing contract nurses in general duties or away from a hospital facility can be contentious. The UK has been involved in multi-national medical support, hosting medical personnel from several countries. The UK has benefited from US medical arrangements, but there are limitations in the attachment of medical personnel to and from other nations through language, legal constraints and varying standards in clinical practice.

9-13. The Divisional Medical Staff were also involved in the medical reconstruction effort both by involvement in re-establishing local health services (which were neglected, often as a means of coercion under the Saddam Regime) and in initiating health practice reform. Medical planners needed a range of skills to be able to contribute to this programme, which follows Geneva Convention obligations. Successive Commanders Medical were involved in discussions with the Minister of Health in Baghdad, and with the CPA(South), necessary to ensure that projects to improve health care for the many were supported and not just prestige projects for a few. Raising standards and 'democratising' the health profession in Iraq was also important. Despite much good work, efforts across Iraq have not been uniform due to lack of central direction.

**Insight: The consensus among senior medical commanders is that health activities as part of nation-building and reconstruction should be co-ordinated by the J9 branch of the regional headquarters. Regular and reservist staff with appropriate skills could be assigned to provide expertise in this area.**

9-14. Lack of clarity over the position and entitlement of contractors and private military companies extended to medical care. There were significant numbers of non-MOD contractors in Iraq, and many arrived in theatre with no arrangements for medical

organisations to treat or evacuate them if they fell ill or were injured. This task fell, *de facto*, to the coalition forces who were trying to reduce their medical footprint. JSP 567 *Contractors on Deployed Operations* (CONDO) indicates that the UK will provide full medical support only to contractors directly employed by MOD. It does not cover those on supporting contracts or private suppliers: OGD employee medical support was a grey area.

**Insight: Force planning staffs should be aware that medical support may have to support a 'population-at-risk' greater, and with a different spectrum of pathology, than the uniformed Service personnel deployed, including entitled contractors and, in some cases, individuals from Other Government Departments. Arrangements may have to be negotiated for support for other unentitled contract personnel.**

## THEME TEN – ADDITIONAL FACTORS

### CIVIL AFFAIRS AND CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION

10-1. Immediately after the end of major combat operations, a number of UK reservists used their civilian skills successfully in the commercial, engineering and reconstruction fields. Subsequently, the tasks moved more into the staff role of co-ordinating security and non-military tasks (government and nation-building, and reconstruction) and liaison with CPA(South) and the many NGOs in theatre.

10-2. In 2004, the 10 regular and 100 reservist soldiers in the Army's Civil Affairs (CA) Group became part of the Joint Civil-Military Co-operation and Co-ordination (CIMIC) Group (JCG) and the regular element was increased to 44 posts. A formal UK Joint CIMIC doctrine was produced in November 2003: it was updated in February 2006.<sup>68</sup> The UK approach to CIMIC differs from that of Coalition partners: the US, for example, has a much larger Civil Affairs force dedicated to what they regard as a specialist role.

10-3. CIMIC describes the co-ordination of activities and production of resources by civilian organisations in direct support of a commander's military mission and tasks.<sup>69</sup> The JCG is not, however, structured or trained for nation-building or civil infrastructure projects, or project management, except as a short-term emergency measure, however, JCG elements have routinely been employed on such tasks in Iraq. JCG elements do not normally run health, power, water or sanitation services.

10-4. At the start of Op TELIC 2 there was no common understanding of the role and function of CIMIC in the British area, and no effective correlation of reconstruction projects with strategic requirements.

### SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

10-5. Security Sector Reform and its subset, Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration were both considered in MOD before the start of the combat operations on Operation TELIC, but no detailed plans were made. It should be stressed that both SSR and DDR require a cross-Government plan, and approach, although the military has its part to play in both activities.

10-6. SSR was embraced by the UK in its Area of Responsibility, as it was the Coalition intention to raise new Iraqi military forces, police services and other organisations for border control, policing waterways and rivers. Initially some UK money was available under Quick Impact Project funding, and subsequently resources were allocated under formal SSR plans. An SSR Estimate was done in Aug 2003, and determined that the Main Effort

---

<sup>68</sup> See footnote 21.

<sup>69</sup> The definitions, drawn from JWP 0-01-1, are as follows:

*Civil affairs*: Any question relating to relations in wartime between the commander of an armed force and the civilian populations and governments in areas where the force is employed, and which is settled on the basis of a mutual agreement, official or otherwise.

*Civil affairs group (UK)*: A manpower resource of CIMIC trained regular and reserve staff who are available to augment deployed headquarters with CIMIC advisors, and provide CIMIC practitioners at the tactical level.

*Civil-military co-operation (UK)*: The process whereby the relationship between military and civilian sectors is addressed, with the aim of enabling a more coherent military contribution to the achievement of UK and/or international objectives.

was to establish Iraqi Security Forces through a bottom-up approach involving selection, training and mentoring of the new forces. Some of the early efforts were undertaken through a US-contracted effort, while the UK then undertook military training for troops and police in JORDAN, BASRAH and AL AMARAH and sent potential officers to RMA Sandhurst. In retrospect, the delay in setting up an SSR programme was unfortunate, but early in Phase IV SSR did not have the urgency that it gained later. Lack of vetting of recruits' political affiliations emerged as a key issue in 2004/05, as local factional loyalties emerged.

10-7. The new security forces did, however, achieve sufficient operational capability to be able to assist in the security for the 30 Jan 2005 elections. They have also been subject to major intimidation, and have taken significant casualties from insurgent attacks. Collective competence of the new Iraqi Security Forces against the developing insurgency threats remains debatable (in Spring 2006). A key question concerns loyalty to the Iraqi Government: certainly significant instances of Iraqi police elements being closely aligned with or influenced by local factions or militias are evident. (See also Theme Five.)

### **DEMOBILISATION, DISARMAMENT AND REINTEGRATION**

10-8. DDR was not formally launched and conducted in the same way as in Macedonia or Sierra Leone, largely owing to the collapse of the Iraq army and police, and the de-Ba'athification policy. Some Iraqi Army units were paid off as part of a DDR programme but most had melted away, taking their weapons with them.

10-9. SSR will almost invariably be required, and DDR may be required, when operations are conducted in failing states. The pressures on security forces being raised to support new indigenous governments will be considerable, from political factions and militias, from family clans, external influences, and organised crime. SSR is a major factor in achieving a successful exit strategy for intervention forces, and therefore commensurate resources in manpower and finance should be allocated so that UK service elements can be withdrawn.

**Insight: A Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) programme is a near-essential subset of Security Sector Reform (SSR). Significant resources may be required for building new security forces and to address the problems of arms and munitions, disarming and reintegrating soldiers. If SSR and DDR programmes are unsuccessful, extremists have trained soldiers available, and an inexperienced government has to rely on intervention forces for security.**

**Insight: Doctrinal guidance for Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) should be developed further.**<sup>70</sup>

---

<sup>70</sup> The Land Warfare Centre has produced interim, 'bottom-up' doctrine guidance for Security Sector Reform.

## **PRIVATE MILITARY PROVIDERS**

10-10. Following the drawdown of the Coalition forces at the end of combat operations, and the deterioration in security in Iraq, the numbers of 'private military providers' mushroomed. Companies and individuals varied very widely in their roles, professional standards and effectiveness. The MOD and OGD relied heavily on contract personnel for security: it is estimated that over 60 companies and 20,000 individuals have worked in 'security' in Iraq. Coalition allies, international organisations and NGOs are also large employers of private military providers. Despite major interest in Whitehall, and at least one conference, UK policy is, however, not well-developed in the area of private military providers. Troops often do not know where they stand regarding private military providers.

10-11. Issues regarding private military providers include: security for some of these groups; their relationships with the Iraqi authorities, including the Iraqi and international legal system; and potential for clashes of interest, including 'blue-on-blue' incidents, with Coalition and Iraqi Government forces. Contractor status is not defined in international law. The question of ROE for privately employed military personnel has been raised. Allegations of killings and human rights abuses by private military providers have also been reported. In addition there are also instances of financial malpractice and profiteering, and the high salaries being offered by some providers have resulted in some soldiers leaving the Army to serve in Iraq under private military providers.

10-12. Private military providers, with their lack of regulation, have also given Coalition forces a bad name by association. Political activists or extremists may not be able, or bother, to distinguish the employers of non-Iraqi armed personnel, and thus abuses by unregulated contractors or private military personnel can easily be blamed on Coalition forces, and detract from 'hearts and minds' efforts.

## **IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES**

10-13. Between July 2003, when the first IED incident was recorded, and January 2005, 313 Coalition Servicemen and women, 16 of them British, were killed by IEDs (seven of them in the period under analysis, and nine in the ensuing nine months). This total rose dramatically during 2005. In Baghdad Major General Chiarelli stated that having forced insurgents out of one particular district, and undertaken clearance operations before reconstruction projects, some 1500 dug-in IEDs were found, which suggests that IEDs were - are - being produced on an industrial scale. The availability of large amounts of explosives, mines, artillery and mortar shells, has made IEDs the weapon of choice of the insurgents, who found that small arms and RPG attacks against vehicle convoys prompted a powerful response. Sophistication of IED initiation developed rapidly. Insurgents were able to draw on products from Iraqi state research establishments (Saddam Hussein used terrorist tactics and IEDs against opponents) and from militants involved in Palestine and Lebanon, as well as a random selection of Far East technology. Developments in IEDs included the use of shaped charges, and some devices were large enough to put (US) main battle tanks out of action. The spectacular success achieved against the UN Headquarters in Baghdad convinced many that the IED was a most effective insurgent weapon, particularly if linked to the suicide bomber.

10-14. The US-UK Joint IED Defeat Task Force, created in October 2003 has had limited success, although the Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell (CXEC) has collected data

and developed databases. To date the security forces have not won the battle against IEDs, and have only partially effective counters to suicide bombers.

### **UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE CLEARANCE**

10-15. The task of clearing and destroying munitions, both unexploded ordnance (UXO) and a very wide range of Iraqi Army military materiel in dumps, was huge during the period. For example, the House of Commons Defence Committee was informed in Nov 2003 that 1600 sites (of all types) containing some 619,000 munitions had been cleared to date; three months later the items cleared figure had grown to 680,000 items, about half of which were cleared by the UK, and a third by NGOs. Of the 62 designated Captured Enemy Ammunition sites recorded, only 13 had been cleared by May 2004. Lack of security meant that sites have been available for explosives for IEDs; in addition the civilian population has suffered casualties from unexploded battlefield munitions, including blind cluster-munitions, some of which were fired into urban or suburban areas. While NGOs and contractors have cleared thousands of munitions, their efforts reduced as the security situation deteriorated.

10-16. UK policy in the past has been to leave the clearance of UXO, fired by British troops, allies or the enemy, and abandoned enemy munitions, to contractors or NGOs. The evidence from Iraq suggests that the failure to clear the large numbers of munitions has allowed an arsenal to become available to insurgents, and the civilian population has suffered casualties both from battlefield UXOs and from IEDs made from munitions taken from unguarded sites.

**Insight: While the scale of the problem in Iraq was enormous, the policy of limited British military UXO clearance during a post-conflict period may be unsustainable in future for humanitarian, 'force for good' and force protection reasons. While there are major short-term resource implications, it may well be in the Army's interest to clear ordnance in a failed state so that it is not used against us, and those whom we are seeking to protect.**

## OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN INSURGENCY GROUPINGS IN IRAQ – A LAYMAN'S GUIDE

1. **General.** This 'illustrative' overview sets the scene for the Op TELIC 2-5 Analysis. To date, the Analysis Team has identified some 17 discrete 'confrontations' in Iraq, each of which had the potential, during the Op TELIC 2-5 period, to resort to lethal force in pursuit of an intended goal. The following is a Layman's Guide to the principal insurgent groups in Iraq. PJHQ accept this Annex as a reasonable representation of the situation in Iraq at the beginning of 2005.

2. **'Global Insurgency'.** This title is Al Qa'ida (AQ) inspired, but was adopted by Al Zarqawi's organisation (AZQ) inside Iraq, and is strongly anti-Shia. AZQ is principally based in the West (AL ANBAR Province) and the North (MOSUL) but is capable of operating anywhere in Iraq. AZQ may 'sub-contract' intimidation and assassination to other radical Sunni groups. (Current UK counter insurgency (COIN) doctrine does not fully address this aspect of an insurgency.) The AQ campaign is focussed towards establishing an Islamic Caliphate extending from Indonesia to Turkey. There are also specific aims that are political (although not in a Western sense) and which seek to restore religious authority. Al Zarqawi's role was to achieve success in Iraq in order to give further momentum to this type of insurgency. There is a difference of opinion between US and UK analysts (and, it appears, commanders) as to the importance of 'Foreign Fighters'. The UK view is that most the insurgents are predominantly Iraqi although the AQ (Iraq) leadership may be foreign.<sup>1</sup>

3. **Former Regime Elements.** The Former Regime Elements (FRE) insurgency follows the accepted 'political' insurgency model (and is therefore covered by existing British doctrine). Active in both rural and urban areas, it emanates from Saddam's tribal support around TIKRIT (the 'Sunni Triangle'). FRE elements are not particularly keen to have Saddam back, preferring a Sunni dominated (New) Ba'ath Party in power. Political outreach initiatives are aimed at bringing FRE groups back on side. These Sunni groups are federated rather than homogeneous: they are mostly secular in nature but some are tending toward radicalism as the Shia gain political influence.

4. **Radical 'Islamic' Groups.** There are a relatively large number of comparatively small groups that can be characterised by two broad categories: current UK COIN doctrine does not really take account of both these types of organisation.

5. **Ansar-Al-Sunna.** Ansar-Al-Sunna is a Sunni dominated radical Islamic group with strong ties to AZQ, but it is essentially home grown in Iraq. The group has a political agenda: a fundamentalist state dominated by the Sunni interpretation of Sharia Law (which is not attractive to the West). Ansar-Al-Sunna is largely based to the West and South of Baghdad (NORTH BABIL) with growing influence in the North around MOSUL. They can operate anywhere but are generally active along the ethnic 'fault lines' within Iraq. They distrust the Shia and regularly attempt to provoke them into using violence.

6. **Wahabbi.** The Wahabbi are a Sunni dominated sect inspired by the fundamentalist Islamic view of the world (and law) in the mid-1500's Salafism. There is an Iraqi 'chapter' of

---

<sup>1</sup> Al Zarqawi was killed in Iraq on 7 June 2006.

a much wider political movement within the (older) Arab Islamic States. Essentially they are Islamic 'bully boys' who use fear and intimidation but do not generally go in for spectacular 'terrorist' actions. They hate the Shia.

7. **'Militant' Shia Groups.** Shia groups tend to be more political than purely religious in nature, although there is a clear religious dimension not least because of the number of Sunni groups intent on terrorising the Shia. While, strictly speaking, none of the following groups form part of the insurgency, the groups outlined below are important 'players' on the complex political stage in Iraq. They are:

a. **Muqtada Al Sadr's Grouping.** The grouping includes the Muqtada Militia, Office of the Martyr Sadr, Jaysh-Al-Mahdi, and others. They share a strong Shia religious tradition, with radical clerics in leadership positions, but also have a political agenda, and they may yet enter mainstream politics. They exist in Baghdad (THAWRA – ex-SADR CITY), NAJAF and KARBALA and in the South (AL AMARAH, BASRAH, AN NASIRIYAH).

b. **The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).** SCIRI is a Shia political party founded in 1982, and was led by Ayatollah Sayed Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim until he was assassinated in NAJAF in August 2003; his brother Abdul Aziz al-Hakim assumed the leadership in his place. SCIRI gained prominence after the fall of Saddam and won over many of the Southern Shias by providing aid and social services. It has close links with, and financial backing from Iran, and is often accused of furthering Iranian interests (tending towards the destabilisation of Iraq to keep it weak so that Iran is dominant, possibly as part of a wider plan towards regional hegemony). In the January 2005 elections SCIRI joined the United Iraqi Alliance. SCIRI is closely linked with the Badr Corps.

c. **The Badr Corps.** The Badr Corps was originally more a political organisation (a Shia militia) than a militant religious group, but the Corps has radical religious leanings to a Shia dominated, Sharia state. It is widely regarded as the armed wing of SCIRI (see above) and receives financial and other support from Iran. At the end of the period the Badr Corps was in the political ascendancy: it has the option of moving back to the shadows if events go against it. The Badr Corps has been linked with violent action against individuals and elements who fail to behave in traditional Islamic ways.

## CAMPAIGN CHRONOLOGY 1 MAY 03 – 31 JAN 05

(1): Numbers in brackets refer to day(s) of the month.

Iraq Campaign Events					
	Diplomatic Milestones	Iraqi Political Events	Insurgent and Terrorist Actions	Coalition Military Events	Other Events and Coalition Fatalities
<b>2003 May</b>	(1) President Bush announces a formal end to 'major operations' in Iraq.  (22) UNSCR 1483 passed 14-0 (Syria abstaining). The US and UK were recognised as Occupying Powers and sanctions against Iraq lifted.	(11) Paul Bremer III takes charge as senior administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority as a replacement for General Jay Garner of ORHA.  (16) Bremer disbands the Ba'ath Party.		(23) Bremer disbands the Iraqi Armed Forces.	(12) Clare Short resigns as Secretary of State for International Development (DfID) in protest at the British Government failure to achieve a UN mandate for post-conflict operations in Iraq.  <b>Dead</b> US: 37 UK: 4 Others: 0 <b>Cumulative Total</b> <b>US: 37</b> <b>UK: 4</b> <b>Others: 0</b>
<b>Jun</b>	(1) UN Special Representative Sergio Vieira de Mello arrives in BAGHDAD.		Guerrilla attacks on US forces start to rise.  (24) 6 RMP killed at MAJAR AL KABIR.	(13/14) First significant US operations in Central and Northern Iraq against Former Regime forces.  (15) CJTF-7 formed to command Coalition forces in Iraq in place of the CFLCC.	US: 30 UK: 6 Others: 0 <b>67</b> <b>10</b> <b>0</b>
<b>Jul</b>		(13) Bremer appoints 25-man Iraqi Interim Governing Council (IGC).  (19) Start of recruitment and training for the new		(9 & 15) Gen Abizaid says US forces are facing 'a classical guerrilla-type campaign'.  (22) Uday and Qusay	(7) Initial MoD Report <i>Operations in Iraq - First Reflections</i> .  (17) Suicide of UK WMD expert Dr David Kelly.

RESTRICTED

<b>2003 Jul</b>		Iraqi Army.		Hussein killed by US forces.	US: 47 <b>114</b> UK: 1 <b>11</b> Others: 0 <b>0</b>
<b>Aug</b>	(14) UNSCR 1500 endorses the IGC.		(7) Jordanian Embassy in BAGHDAD blown up.  (19) Suicide bomb destroys UN HQ in BAGHDAD, killing 23 including Special Representative de Mello.  (29) Ayatollah al-Hakim and 94 others killed outside the shrine of the Imam Ali in NAJAF by car bombs.	(9/10) Disturbances in BASRAH over fuel distribution.  (22) 3 RMP killed in ambush in BASRAH.	(11) Start of the Hutton Enquiry in LONDON into the circumstances of the death of Dr Kelly.    US: 35 <b>149</b> UK: 6 <b>17</b> Others: 2 <b>2</b>
<b>Sep</b>	(7) Bush announces spending on Iraq: \$51bn on Occupation and \$20bn on reconstruction.				US: 31 <b>180</b> UK: 1 <b>18</b> Others: 1 <b>3</b>
<b>Oct</b>	(16) UNSCR 1511 approves continued US exclusive control over Iraq's political affairs and a multinational peacekeeping force under US command.  (23-4) MADRID Donor Conference pledges \$37.5bn aid to Iraq. UK pledges to give grants totalling £544m over the period Apr 03-Mar 06.	(5) Iraqi Stabilization Group created by Condoleezza Rice to coordinate reconstruction and transition activities.	(26) Insurgents rocket al-Rashid Hotel in assassination attempt on Paul Wolfowitz.  (27) ICRC HQ blown up. Iraqi poll shows that 67% of Iraqis regard the Coalition as occupation forces and only 15% as liberators.	(19) Lt Gen Ricardo Sanchez (CJTF-7) officially acknowledges that an insurgency is under way.  (23) First ABU GHRAIB photos taken.	(29) US combat deaths since 1 May 03 exceed deaths during the Mar-Apr combat phase.    US: 44 <b>224</b> UK: 1 <b>19</b> Others: 2 <b>5</b>
<b>Nov</b>	(27) Bush visits BAGHDAD for Thanksgiving.	(15) Bremer signs agreement to transfer sovereignty to a US 'transitional assembly' by	(1) Italian Carabinieri HQ in NASIRIYAH destroyed by truck bomb.		(20) British Consulate and HSBC Bank in ISTANBUL (+ 2 synagogues) blown up by Islamic terrorists.

RESTRICTED

<b>2003 Nov</b>		30 Jun 04, a reversal of earlier plans for a 2006 handover.	(2) 17 US soldiers killed in helicopter crashes near Fallujah.		US: 82 <b>306</b> UK: 1 <b>20</b> Others: 27 <b>32</b>
<b>Dec</b>				(13) Saddam Hussein captured by US forces.  (28) New Regional Police Academy opened at AZ ZUBAYR.	(11) MoD Report <i>Operations in Iraq – Lessons for the Future.</i>  US: 40 <b>346</b> UK: 0 <b>20</b> Others: 8 <b>40</b>
<b>2004 Jan</b>	(4) Osama bin Laden calls for an expanded holy war in the Middle East against US occupation of the Gulf.		(18) Suicide bomb attack on CPA HQ in BAGHDAD – 8 killed.	(14) Lt Gen Sanchez begins a criminal investigation into ABU GHRAIB.	(28) Hutton Report vindicates government, criticises BBC.  US: 47 <b>393</b> UK: 5 <b>25</b> Others: 0 <b>40</b>
<b>Feb</b>	(12) UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi visits Iraq.  (23) Brahimi report concludes elections cannot be held before late 04 or early 05.		(1) 101 killed in suicide attack on PUK and KDP offices in IRBIL (Kurdistan).		(3) Butler Enquiry established in UK to investigate pre-war intelligence on Iraq.  (19) DfID Interim Country Assistance Plan for Iraq published.  US: 20 <b>413</b> UK: 1 <b>26</b> Others: 2 <b>42</b>
<b>Mar</b>		(2) Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) (Iraqi interim constitution) issued by Bremer.  (8) TAL signed by IGC members. Elections to be held by Jan 05.	(2) KARBALA and BAGHDAD car bombings kill 271 Shia pilgrims at Festival of Ashura.  (24) US forces enter FALLUJAH and encounter unexpected resistance.	(21) 6 US soldiers charged and 11 suspended for assault and indecency at ABU GHRAIB.  (22) 14 British soldiers injured in BASRAH riots.	(11) MADRID train bombings.  (14) Zapatero's anti-war Socialist Party wins Spanish election and withdraws Spanish forces from Iraq.

RESTRICTED

<p><b>2004 Mar</b></p>			<p>(31) 4 US contractors (Blackwater) killed by Sunnis in FALLUJAH.</p>		<p>US: 52      <b>465</b> UK: 0        <b>26</b> Others: 0    <b>42</b></p>
<p><b>Apr</b></p>	<p>(22) The 57-member Islamic Conference Organisation, meeting in Malaysia offers troops for a stabilising force in Iraq, but only under UN command.</p>	<p>(14) US accepts Brahimi proposal for a caretaker government to replace the IGC on 30 Jun 04.</p>	<p>(4) Start of al-Sadr uprising in SADR CITY. Widespread uprising by Shia Mahdi Army of al Sadr in KUFA, KARBALA, NAJAF and AL-KUT.</p> <p>(5-11) 1<sup>st</sup> Battle of FALLUJAH. US attack abandoned after IGC protest resignations. Estimated 600-800 dead Iraqi civilians.</p>	<p>(5-11) US Army kills 17 Sunni demonstrators in FALLUJAH leading to widespread unrest. US mounts Operation VIGILANT RESOLVE against Fallujah.</p> <p>(28-30) ABU GHRAIB prisoner scandal pictures revealed on US TV.</p> <p>(30) FALLUJAH security responsibility transferred to an Iraqi 'Fallujah Bde'.</p>	<p>(6) Jordanian court sentences al Zarqawi and 10 followers to life imprisonment (later changed to death) <i>in absentia</i> for murder of US diplomat Lawrence Foley on 28 Oct 02.</p> <p>(6) Cost of UK operations for year 2003/04: £1311m.</p> <p>(9) 1 US soldier listed as captured.</p> <p>US: 135      <b>600</b> UK: 0        <b>26</b> Others: 5     <b>47</b></p>
<p><b>May</b></p>			<p>(c.7) US hostage Nicholas Berg beheaded on internet (by al Zarqawi?) (first hostage beheading).</p> <p>(17) IGC president Izzedin Salim assassinated.</p>	<p>Siege of FALLUJAH by US forces continues.</p> <p>(1) British combat operations in AL AMARAH (see 11 Jun 04).</p> <p>(1) UK press uses fake photos to allege that British forces abused prisoners (refuted on 14 May).</p> <p>(15) CJTF-7 divides into MNF(I) (Lt Gen Ricardo Sanchez) and MNC(I) (Lt Gen Thomas Metz).</p>	

RESTRICTED

<p><b>2004 May</b></p>				<p>(27) US forces and Mahdi Army reach a truce after 7 weeks of fighting in Najaf.</p>	<p>US: 80      <b>680</b> UK: 0        <b>26</b> Others: 4     <b>51</b></p>
<p><b>Jun</b></p>	<p>(8) UNSCR 1546 endorses the Iraqi interim administration and authorises the US-led multinational force to remain in Iraq through Jan 06.</p> <p>(16) The US 9/11 Commission states that there is no credible evidence that Iraq and al-Qaeda cooperated in attacks against the US.</p> <p>(28) NATO summit in ISTANBUL fails to commit NATO forces to Iraq.</p>	<p>(1) Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) under Iyad Alawi announced. IGC disbands itself.</p> <p>(28) Bremer hands over a 'letter of sovereignty' to Iraqis and leaves on 30 Jun. John Negroponte becomes new US ambassador to Iraq.</p> <p>CPA poll shows 92% of respondents see the Coalition as an occupying force.</p>		<p>Siege of FALLUJAH by US forces continues.</p> <p>(11) British combat operations in AL AMARAH (leading to award of VC to Pte Johnson Beharry, 1 PWRR on 18 Mar 05)</p> <p>(13) Iraqi Coastal Defence Force assumes responsibility for territorial waters.</p> <p>(14) 4 RRF soldiers face court-martial for abusing Iraqi civilians.</p> <p>(21-24) 8 RN Training Team personnel seized by Iran and later released.</p>	<p>US: 42      <b>722</b> UK: 1        <b>27</b> Others: 7     <b>58</b></p>
<p><b>Jul</b></p>		<p>(1) Saddam Hussein's first court appearance.</p>	<p>(28) 70 Iraqis killed by suicide attack in BAQUBA.</p> <p>FALLUJAH considered a 'liberated city' by most Iraqis.</p>	<p>(1) Gen George W Casey Jr takes command of MNF(I).</p> <p>(31) US forces arrest al-Sadr's representative in KARBALA (al Hasnawi).</p> <p>Siege of FALLUJAH by US forces continues.</p>	<p>(14) Butler Enquiry on WMD concludes.</p> <p>US: 54      <b>776</b> UK: 1        <b>28</b> Others: 3     <b>61</b></p>

RESTRICTED

<p><b>2004 Aug</b></p>		<p>(7) Iraqi Interim Prime Minister Alawi offers a limited amnesty to insurgents who have committed crimes, but not killed anyone</p>	<p>(5-26) Sadr Uprising. 3 weeks of intense fighting in NAJAF, KARBALA, BASRA, AMARAH, KUT, KUFA and SADR CITY. Heavy combat in the NAJAF cemetery and Imam Ali Mosque. Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani returns from LONDON to broker a peace deal.</p> <p>(26) Al-Sadr's militia allowed to leave NAJAF without surrendering arms. US forces withdrew and handed over security to the Iraqi police force.</p>	<p>(3) US forces attempt to arrest al-Sadr. British forces arrest 4 al-Sadr followers in BASRAH. UK given a deadline of 5 Aug to release them.</p> <p>(5-26) US and UK military action against the Sadr uprising. UK forces involved in serious fighting in BASRAH and AL-AMARAH.</p> <p>Siege of FALLUJAH by US forces continues.</p>	<p>US: 66      <b>842</b> UK: 4        <b>32</b> Others: 5    <b>66</b></p>
<p><b>Sep</b></p>	<p>(15) UN Secretary General Kofi Annan tells BBC that the war in Iraq is illegal.</p>			<p>Siege of FALLUJAH by US forces continues.</p> <p>(17) British forces attacked by Sadr Militia in BASRAH.</p>	<p>UK post-May 03 fatalities exceed fatalities in Mar-Apr 03 combat phase.</p> <p>US: 80      <b>922</b> UK: 3        <b>35</b> Others: 4    <b>70</b></p>
<p><b>Oct</b></p>	<p>(6) Charles Duelfer's 1000-page comprehensive report to the Director of Central Intelligence states that Iraq destroyed all WMD after the 1991 war.</p>		<p>(25) 49 unarmed Iraqi military personnel massacred.</p> <p>(29) Osama bin Laden designates al Zarqawi as the representative of al Qaeda in Iraq. Bin Laden video message compares US with Israelis in Lebanon and seeks to re-establish the Caliphate and liberate BAGHDAD.</p>	<p>(1) US and Iraqi forces take control of SAMARRA.</p> <p>(27) UK 1BW Battle Group moves north to relieve US forces required for the planned FALLUJAH operation.</p> <p>Siege of FALLUJAH by US forces continues.</p>	<p>US independent estimates that 98,000 Iraqi civilians died between 20 Mar 03 and 30 Sep 04.</p> <p>US: 63      <b>985</b> UK: 2        <b>37</b> Others: 2    <b>72</b></p>

RESTRICTED

<p><b>2004 Nov</b></p>	<p>(2) George W Bush defeats his Democratic challenger, John Kerry, in US presidential election.</p>		<p>(8-14) US claims to have killed 12-1600 insurgents in FALLUJAH (Red Cross estimates about 800 civilians killed).</p>	<p>(1-4 Dec) 1 BW Battle Group deployed on Op BRACKEN in support of PHANTOM FURY.  (8-14) Operation PHANTOM FURY: 2<sup>nd</sup> Battle of FALLUJAH led to US occupation of the city.</p>	<p>US: 137      <b>1122</b> UK: 4          <b>41</b> Others: 0      <b>72</b></p>
<p><b>Dec</b></p>			<p>(21) 15 US soldiers killed at MOSUL when suicide bomber enters base and destroys mess tent.  (27) Osama bin Laden publicly recognises Musab al Zarqawi as leader of the al Qaeda organisation in Iraq (communiqué broadcast on Al Jazeera).</p>	<p>(10) Courts Martial in HOHNE and OSNABRUCK of 4 UK soldiers accused of abusing civilians.</p>	<p>US: 72      <b>1194</b> UK: 2        <b>43</b> Others: 3     <b>75</b></p>
<p><b>2005 Jan</b></p>	<p>(20) President Bush inaugurated for a second term.</p>	<p>(30) National Assembly elections throughout Iraq. About 70% of Shias and Kurds and 20% of Sunnis voted.</p>	<p>(30) UK C-130K shot down by insurgents (10 killed).</p>	<p>(3) Gen Shahwani, Head of the Iraqi intelligence service, estimates strength of insurgency at 40,000 paramilitaries and 160,000 active supporters.</p>	<p>US: 107      <b>1301</b> UK: 10        <b>53</b> Others: 10    <b>85</b></p>
<p><b>UNSCR:</b> United Nations Security Council Resolution <b>DfID:</b> (UK) Department for International Development</p>			<p><b>Coalition Fatalities (all causes) Mar-Apr 03:</b></p> <p>US: 139 UK: 33 Others: 0</p>	<p><b>Coalition Fatalities (all causes) May 03-Jan 05:</b></p> <p>US: 1301 UK: 53 Others: 85 + 1 US listed as captured</p>	<p><b>Total of Coalition Fatalities 1 Mar 03- 31 Jan 05:</b></p> <p><b>US: 1440</b> <b>UK: 86</b> <b>Others: 85</b> <b>+ 1 US listed as captured</b></p>

RESTRICTED

**Op TELIC 1- 5  
FORMATIONS DEPLOYED**

<b>TELIC 1</b> Jan 03 – 11 Jul 03		<b>TELIC 2</b> 11 Jul 03 – 4 Nov 03		<b>TELIC 3</b> 4 Nov 03 – 25 Apr 04		<b>TELIC 4</b> 25 Apr 04 – 1 Nov 04		<b>TELIC 5</b> 1 Nov 04 – 30 Apr 05	
<b>HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div</b>		<b>HQ 3 (UK) Div</b>		<b>Multi National Division (South East)</b>					
Maj Gen Robin Brims 24 Feb 03- 13 May 03	Maj Gen Peter Wall 12 May- 12 Jul 03	Maj Gen Graeme Lamb 11 Jul 03 – 28 Dec 03		Maj Gen Andrew Stewart 28 Dec 03 – 13 Jul 04		Maj Gen William Rollo 14 Jul 04 – 1 Dec 04		Maj Gen Jonathon Riley 1 Dec 04 – 10 Jun 05	
<b>102 Log Bde</b> Brig Shaun Cowlam	<b>101 Log Bde</b> Brig Ian Dale	<b>National Support Element</b> (logistic support for MND(SE))							
<b>7 Armd Bde</b> Brig Graham Binns 15 Feb – 1 May 03		<b>19 Mech Bde</b> Brig Bill Moore 28 Jun – 6 Nov 03		<b>20 Armd Bde</b> Brig Nick Carter 6 Nov 03 – 25 Apr 04		<b>1 Mech Bde</b> Brig Andrew Kennett 25 Apr 04 – 31 Oct 04		<b>4 Armd Bde</b>	
								Brig Paul Gibson 1 Nov 04 – 31 Jan 05	Brig Chris Deverell 31 Jan 04 – 1 May 05
<b>16 Air Asslt Bde</b> Brig Jacko Page 3 Mar- 25 May 03									
<b>3 Cdo Bde RM</b> Brig Jim Dutton RM 7 Feb- 1 May 03									

B-8  
RESTRICTED

## THE IRAQ SURVEY GROUP SUMMARY OF POST-OPERATIONAL REPORT

1. **General.** The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) was established in June 2003 to 'organise, direct and apply capabilities and expertise in Iraq to discover, take custody of and exploit information and material of intelligence value ... regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Counter-Terrorism (CT)'. The ISG was reassigned in November 2004. This summary is drawn from the UK One-Star, CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY Post Operational Report (POR) which was not widely circulated, and focuses on the insights relevant to *ad hoc* international teams which the UK may wish to support in the future.<sup>1</sup>

2. **Role.** Investigation of the WMD that the Coalition believed were present in Iraq started during Phase III of Op TELIC. A military unit, Expeditionary Task Force-75 (XTF-75) was tasked to find and neutralise WMD in order to aid force protection on the battlefield. The ISG's subsequent strategy was to investigate sites associated with WMD and delivery systems; to interrogate High Value Detainees; and to acquire and exploit relevant documents. The ISG had a secondary role in processing and passing on information in the counter terrorist / counter insurgency field, and it achieved several successes in this area.

3. **Structure.** Following the efforts of XTF-75, in June 2003 the US Department of Defense established the ISG, a US-led Coalition unit with embedded UK and Australian support. The ISG reached strength of 2300 people at one stage, with staff based initially in Qatar and then in Iraq. The constituent parts included:

- a. A Survey Operations Centre and Survey Analysis Centre. These included analysts and subject matter experts from the UK Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) and Counter Proliferation and Arms Control (CPAC) organisation. A few former UN arms inspectors, some from the UK, were included in the functional teams: these analysts were critical to the success of the ISG.
- b. A Combined Media Exploitation Centre. This handled all the captured document and electronic media in a large centre in Qatar (involving c.900 people); linguist support was key to this operation.
- c. A Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Centre. The UK contributed people to this until June 2004 when, due to UK policy and legal concerns, they were withdrawn.
- d. Mobile Collection Teams. The UK commanded up to four of the 12 teams.
- e. Technical Laboratory Support. The UK Field Laboratory Unit was staffed by analysts from DSTL and the Atomic Weapons Establishment.
- f. Specialist capabilities. Capabilities provided by the UK included ground penetrating radar (GPR: DSTL and Royal Engineer manned) and the Chemical

---

<sup>1</sup> UK Post Operation Report on the Iraq Survey Group by Brig J G Morrison issued from Baghdad dated 12 Nov 04.

## RESTRICTED

Detection Dog (CDD) section (a team of six dogs and four RAVC handlers). Other UK support, including EOD was also given.

4. **Command and Control.** The ISG, established as a US Presidential Mission, was a Two Star military command initially under operational control (OPCON) of CENTCOM. Operational control of the ISG was passed to MNF(I) in June 2004. Command and control of the UK contingent was OPCOM PJHQ and OPCON ISG. There was a strong link between the US Special Adviser (delegate of the US Director of Central Intelligence) and the UK Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence (DCDI) who provided a UK lead. Coherence of UK direction and policy was provided through DCDI's Whitehall-based UK WMD Task Force, containing representatives of the relevant UK agencies and other Government Departments. J2 PJHQ provided the military lead.

5. **Modus Operandi.** The approach adopted by the ISG evolved as initial investigations of sites previously declared to the UN, and suspected WMD facilities, produced little of substance. An investigative approach, debriefing of Iraqi officers and civilian officials, and methodical document and media exploitation, was then adopted. Although investigation on the ground was constrained by the dangerous operating environment – four members of the ISG were killed and many others wounded during the course of the ISG's work – emerging information was used to cue other investigations on a quick reaction and exploitation basis.

6. **UK Contribution.** The UK contributed a team of up to 70 individuals, both civilian and from all three Services, under command of a military One Star, who was Deputy Commander of the ISG. Various analysts acted as subject matter experts and were embedded completely within the ISG functional teams, and reporting through the ISF functional chain. The availability of support from scientific establishments in UK gave assurance of independent analysis, which was critical in such a politically highly charged operation. Some of the capabilities (eg. CDD) were provided wholly by the UK. For much of the time there was a UK military Chief of Staff (an Army Major on a 4-6 month tour) with a small cell co-ordinating the UK efforts in the ISG.

7. **UK Issues.** Some specific national concerns were channelled through the UK Deputy Commander for him to raise with the ISG Command Group or to refer back to the UK. Issues included legal instructions and detention operations, and classification of papers and intelligence; the Deputy Commander made pragmatic judgements on other issues (eg. dress states) in order to balance national and coalition perspectives.

8. **UK Lessons.** The main UK POR contains a 25 page section on lessons, divided into J1-J9. Some of the lessons, which are not specific to the ISG role, are similar to those raised following the UK Team contribution to the Kosovo Verification Mission in 1998-99. There are procedural and administrative limitations on the rapid establishment of an *ad hoc*, mixed civilian-military grouping some of which could be addressed without major resource implications. *It is recommended that the ISG lessons are read in full before any future deployment of this nature is made.*

a. **ISG Model.** The ISG model, and the UK contribution to it was successful, and can be considered for use in future operations. The model would be better suited to a defined or bounded mission than as a general intelligence support model.

b. **Pre-Conflict Planning.** It is thought that many WMD sites or potential leads were spoiled or destroyed by looting and the deliberate destruction of documents, facilities and safe houses. In future, pre-conflict planning should include provision of military elements, following behind front line battlegroups, tasked to gather immediately documents and materiel of potential use in investigations.

c. **Reachback.** The reachback facility to the UK was co-ordinated through the Defence Intelligence Staff in London, which compensated for the absence of some areas of expertise in the ISG. This worked well.

d. **J1/J4 Issues.**

(1) The need for a UK One Star in a Coalition Two Star Organisation was essential: the personality was as important as the rank, but the post usually gave the UK senior access to discussions, and made the UK point of view hard to ignore. The lesson was drawn that a senior DIS Manager should also have deployed to act as a lead analyst, DIS focal point in theatre and mentor to the high grade but relatively junior, inexperienced DIS staff deployed.

(2) The British ex-UN arms inspectors were invaluable and brought with them experience and corporate memory; their expertise was also recognised and valued by coalition officers, and assisted in influencing ISG strategy.

(3) The UK national cell, including national J1/J4, clerical and communications support was essential to the good administration and morale of the British individuals assigned to the ISG.

(4) The UK provided interrogators to the ISG, who, with their knowledge of legal processes and experience, significantly assisted the sensitive debriefing aspects of the ISG's mission.

(5) There were, however, significant shortcomings in the recruitment, application process and selection of the DIS analysts, and the CPAC-retained subject matter experts (including the former arms inspectors). One British member of the ISG commented that the national management of British civilians in the ISG was 'disgraceful'. These individuals were highly skilled, and often very experienced: their pay and conditions (including sick pay, death benefit and leave) should therefore be examined carefully in order that high value civilian staff are treated properly during any future deployment. A flexible and attractive 'temporary civil servant' (or military reservist) pay and conditions package should be worked out ready for use in future deployments.<sup>2</sup>

e. **J2 Issues.**

(1) The US NOFORN issue was the biggest single impediment to UK operations within the ISG. It embraced US software, and databases on the

---

<sup>2</sup> The Territorial Army's Engineer and Logistics Staff Corps was mentioned as a model for an organisation that might enable subject matter experts or civilian DIS analysts to be deployed on operations.

Coalition SIPRNet; a tendency for US Officers to use US only systems; and in some cases the use of IT systems with no coalition access. In a US-led Coalition, the US must be convinced to allow work on systems accessible to coalition individuals within the organisation from the outset, both so that they can contribute to the work, and also maintain situational awareness of developments in the work of the organisation.

(2) The UK sometimes caused similar difficulties in the release of intelligence products to the US and Australia: the UK should consider a 'Four Eyes' default setting for UK intelligence product release to a group such as the ISG (as it tends to do elsewhere in the J2 field).

f. **J3/J5 Issues.**

(1) It is often desirable for the UK to become involved in a mission like the ISG. Getting involved means producing people on the ground in reasonable numbers, and often in short order. As the POR states "doing it 'from the inside' is the only real way to achieve significant influence". Having joined, the UK must give wholehearted support across the various disciplines and ranks: "the UK can appear 'tight-fisted' about manpower and senior US officers become bored with UK special pleading regarding limited resources". In short, care must be taken not to presume influence without a significant deployed presence.

(2) The J5 planning task was not well handled by the military or the overall strategic function of the ISG. The UK may have to be robust in any future mission in order to ensure that the value and practical application of J5 Plans is fully appreciated.

(3) The pre-deployment training given to military and civilian members of the ISG was inconsistent in quality, timeliness and content. In any future mission, the pre-deployment training of the civilian elements, including any DIS analysts, should be carefully planned to ensure that it is tailored to the individuals concerned and the current situation.

(4) While the general weapons carriage policy for MOD civilians was clear, some weapon training and carriage of personal weapons would have been beneficial in the very difficult security situation pertaining in Iraq. It is important that MOD civilians are not a danger to themselves or a liability to others in such situations. While there are understandable concerns about MOD civilians carrying weapons, the policy should be related to the threat in theatre.

(5) The Chemical Detection Dogs capability was successfully developed and trialled, and may have wider utility both in UK and in other theatres overseas.

g. **J6 Issues.**

(1) The British contingent had to borrow eight BOWMAN Personal Role Radio sets from the Army for inter-communications during road moves or exploitation missions. During any future *ad hoc* deployments, the UK contingent should be deployed with the means to communicate to each other.

(2) At the higher level, UK J6 planning staffs must ensure that workable solutions for telephone communications to theatre, and robust IT/IS connectivity is achieved from the outset: to achieve effective reachback, commanders and analysts must be able to gain direct access to the UK by secure email and telephone.

h. **J9 Issues.**

The transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government on 28 Jun 04 added further potential difficulties regarding the rules on detention, which were relevant to the UK role in debriefing some of the High Value Detainees. Strong consideration should be given to the assignment of a legal adviser to any UK commander or group in a coalition operation when sensitive issues, including debriefing and detention are likely to arise. A formal review and promulgation of UK interrogation, debriefing and detention guidance to UK staff embedded with coalition units is essential.

9. **Conclusion.** Over 1600 ISG mission or exploitation activities were completed; over 4000 debriefings were carried out; and c.40 million pages of documents were scanned and processed by the ISG. The ISG established facts regarding WMD after 30 years of activity by the secretive and aggressive Ba'athist Regime, and while relatively small quantities of WMD materiel were found, a much better understanding of the long-term WMD programmes and the intent behind them was gained.

a. The ISG emphasised the power and potential of a multi-agency, multi-national and mixed civilian organisation. The UK civilians and Servicemen and women who served in the ISG acquitted themselves well, and many felt that they had gained much from the experience. The ISG offers an example of an integrated model which could be effective in intelligence and intelligence support operations in the future.

b. The exclusion of UK personnel from information and decision-making for reasons of US 'NOFORN' rules militated against successful working, and needed some robust interventions on occasion. While this may be a factor on future missions, it is an issue that needs to be raised at the outset when national contributions are offered.

c. The key UK lessons centre around People issues, particularly for the civilian element; the provision of legal advice for potentially sensitive activities; intelligence sharing with the US; and national communications and life support issues. Most of these insights are not unique to the ISG: similar observations have appeared in previous operational lessons reports and campaign analyses.

RESTRICTED

d. The issue of terms and conditions of Service, including the policy on training in and the carriage of weapons, for the British civilian individuals attached to the ISG – or any future *ad hoc* international team – emerges as needing investigation and policy resolution. The UK can often contribute very capable and experienced individuals to such missions, but it is apparent, from the ISG experience at least, that it needs to look after these high-value contributors better. This is an important factor in making the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ an effective reality on the ground in crisis areas.

**PRIVATE JOHNSON GIDEON BEHARRY –  
VICTORIA CROSS CITATION**

“Private Beharry carried out two individual acts of great heroism by which he saved the lives of his comrades. Both were in direct face of the enemy, under intense fire, at great personal risk to himself (one leading to him sustaining very serious injuries). His valour is worthy of the highest recognition.

“In the early hours of the 1st May 2004 Beharry’s company was ordered to replenish an isolated Coalition Forces outpost located in the centre of the troubled city of Al Amarah. He was the driver of a platoon commander’s Warrior armoured fighting vehicle. His platoon was the company’s reserve force and was placed on immediate notice to move. As the main elements of his company were moving into the city to carry out the replenishment, they were re-tasked to fight through a series of enemy ambushes in order to extract a foot patrol that had become pinned down under sustained small arms and heavy machine gun fire and improvised explosive device and rocket-propelled grenade attack.

“Beharry’s platoon was tasked over the radio to come to the assistance of the remainder of the company, who were attempting to extract the isolated foot patrol. As his platoon passed a roundabout, en route to the pinned-down patrol, they became aware that the road to the front was empty of all civilians and traffic – an indicator of a potential ambush ahead. The platoon commander ordered the vehicle to halt, so that he could assess the situation. The vehicle was then immediately hit by multiple rocket-propelled grenades. Eyewitnesses report that the vehicle was engulfed in a number of violent explosions, which physically rocked the 30-tonne Warrior.

“As a result of this ferocious initial volley of fire, both the platoon commander and the vehicle’s gunner were incapacitated by concussion and other wounds, and a number of the soldiers in the rear of the vehicle were also wounded. Due to damage sustained in the blast to the vehicle’s radio systems, Beharry had no means of communication with either his turret crew or any of the other Warrior vehicles deployed around him. He did not know if his commander or crewmen were still alive, or how serious their injuries may be. In this confusing and dangerous situation, on his own initiative, he closed his driver’s hatch and moved forward through the ambush position to try to establish some form of communications, halting just short of a barricade placed across the road.

“The vehicle was hit again by sustained rocket-propelled grenade attack from insurgent fighters in the alleyways and on rooftops around his vehicle. Further damage to the Warrior from these explosions caused it to catch fire and fill rapidly with thick, noxious smoke. Beharry opened up his armoured hatch cover to clear his view and orientate himself to the situation. He still had no radio communications and was now acting on his own initiative, as the lead vehicle of a six Warrior convoy in an enemy-controlled area of the city at night. He assessed that his best course of action to save the lives of his crew was to push through, out of the ambush. He drove his Warrior directly through the barricade, not knowing if there were mines or improvised explosive devices placed there to destroy his vehicle. By doing this he was able to lead the remaining five Warriors behind him towards safety.

## RESTRICTED

“As the smoke in his driver’s tunnel cleared, he was just able to make out the shape of another rocket-propelled grenade in flight heading directly towards him. He pulled the heavy armoured hatch down with one hand, whilst still controlling his vehicle with the other. However, the overpressure from the explosion of the rocket wrenched the hatch out of his grip, and the flames and force of the blast passed directly over him, down the driver’s tunnel, further wounding the semi-conscious gunner in the turret. The impact of this rocket destroyed Beharry’s armoured periscope, so he was forced to drive the vehicle through the remainder of the ambushed route, some 1500 metres long, with his hatch opened up and his head exposed to enemy fire, all the time with no communications with any other vehicle. During this long surge through the ambushes the vehicle was again struck by rocket-propelled grenades and small arms fire. While his head remained out of the hatch, to enable him to see the route ahead, he was directly exposed to much of this fire, and was himself hit by a 7.62mm bullet, which penetrated his helmet and remained lodged on its inner surface.

“Despite this harrowing weight of incoming fire Beharry continued to push through the extended ambush, still leading his platoon until he broke clean. He then visually identified another Warrior from his company and followed it through the streets of Al Amarah to the outside of the CIMIC House outpost, which was receiving small arms fire from the surrounding area. Once he had brought his vehicle to a halt outside, without thought for his own personal safety, he climbed onto the turret of the still-burning vehicle and, seemingly oblivious to the incoming enemy small arms fire, manhandled his wounded platoon commander out of the turret, off the vehicle and to the safety of a nearby Warrior. He then returned once again to his vehicle and again mounted the exposed turret to lift out the vehicle’s gunner and move him to a position of safety. Exposing himself yet again to enemy fire he returned to the rear of the burning vehicle to lead the disorientated and shocked dismounts and casualties to safety. Remounting his burning vehicle for the third time, he drove it through a complex chicane and into the security of the defended perimeter of the outpost, thus denying it to the enemy. Only at this stage did Beharry pull the fire extinguisher handles, immobilising the engine of the vehicle, dismounted and then moved himself into the relative safety of the back of another Warrior. Once inside Beharry collapsed from the sheer physical and mental exhaustion of his efforts and was subsequently himself evacuated.

“Having returned to duty following medical treatment, on the 11th June 2004 Beharry’s Warrior was part of a quick reaction force tasked to attempt to cut off a mortar team that had attacked a Coalition Force base in Al Amarah. As the lead vehicle of the platoon he was moving rapidly through the dark city streets towards the suspected firing point, when his vehicle was ambushed by the enemy from a series of rooftop positions. During this initial heavy weight of enemy fire, a rocket-propelled grenade detonated on the vehicle’s frontal armour, just six inches from Beharry’s head, resulting in a serious head injury. Other rockets struck the turret and sides of the vehicle, incapacitating his commander and injuring several of the crew.

“With the blood from his head injury obscuring his vision, Beharry managed to continue to control his vehicle, and forcefully reversed the Warrior out of the ambush area. The vehicle continued to move until it struck the wall of a nearby building and came to rest. Beharry then lost consciousness as a result of his wounds. By moving the vehicle out of the enemy’s chosen killing area he enabled other Warrior crews to be able to extract his crew from his vehicle, with a greatly reduced risk from incoming fire. Despite receiving a serious

RESTRICTED

head injury, which later saw him being listed as very seriously injured and in a coma for some time, his level-headed actions in the face of heavy and accurate enemy fire at short range again almost certainly saved the lives of his crew and provided the conditions for their safe evacuation to medical treatment.

“Beharry displayed repeated extreme gallantry and unquestioned valour, despite intense direct attacks, personal injury and damage to his vehicle in the face of relentless enemy action.”

## Iraq War Bibliography and Related Sources

Sources cover the whole period Mar 03-Jan 05.

### Official Sources

#### House of Commons Defence Select Committee Reports

##### Session 2003-04

16 Mar 04	Third Report	HC57-I to -III	Lessons of Iraq
8 Jun 04	First Special Report	HC635	Lessons of Iraq: Government Response to the Committee's Third Report of Session 2003-04

##### Session 2004-05

24 Mar 05	Sixth Report	HC65-I & -II	Iraq: An Initial Assessment of Post Conflict Operations
-----------	--------------	--------------	---

##### Session 2005-06

27 Jul 05	First Special Report	HC436	Iraq: An Initial Assessment of Post Conflict Operations: Government Response to the Committee's Sixth Report of Session 2004-05
-----------	----------------------	-------	---

#### House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee Reports

##### Session 2002-03

19 Dec 02	Second Report	HC196	Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism
7 Jul 03	Ninth Report	HC813-I to -III	The Decision to Go to War in Iraq
31 Jul 03	Tenth Report	HC405	Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism

##### Session 2003-04

2 Feb 04	Second Report	HC81	Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism
29 Jul 04	Seventh Report	HC441-I & -II	Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism

##### Session 2004-05

5 Apr 05	Sixth Report	HC36-I & -II	Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism
----------	--------------	--------------	---

### Ministry of Defence Reports

7 Jul 03	Session 2002-03		Operations in Iraq – First Reflections
11 Dec 03	Session 2003-04		Operations in Iraq – Lessons for the Future

### National Audit Office Report

11 Dec 03	Session 2003-04	HC60	Operation TELIC – United Kingdom Military Operations in Iraq
-----------	-----------------	------	--

### Department for International Development

May 03	Background Briefing: Interim Iraq Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Strategy		
May 03(?)	Interim Country Assistance Plan and First Contribution to the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq		
Feb 04	Iraq: Interim Country Assistance Plan		

## RESTRICTED

### German Army

31 Mar 04 Final Report on the Evaluation of the 2003 Iraq War

### Spanish Army

2004 Analysis of Experiences – Lessons (translated extract from Spanish Post-Operational Report)

### United States of America

Dec 02 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America

2004 The National Military Strategy of the United States of America

Mar 05 The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America

21 Jul 05 Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq

Nov 05 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (National Security Council)

### Published Sources

#### Books and Monographs

Arreguin-Toft, Ivan	How the Weak Win Wars	Cambridge	2005
Atkinson, Rick	In the Company of Soldiers	London	2004
Blix, Hans	Disarming Iraq	London	2004
Bodansky, Yossef	The Secret History of the Iraq War	New York	2004
Bremer, L Paul	My Year in Iraq	New York	2006
Burke, Jason	Al-Qaeda	London	2004
Chehab, Zaki	Iraq Ablaze – Inside the Insurgency	London	2006
Clark, Wesley	Winning Modern Wars	New York	2003
Collins, Tim	Rules of Engagement	London	2005
Cordesman, Anthony H	The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons	Connecticut & London	2003
Daadler, Ivo H and Lindsay, James, M	America Unbound – The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy	Hoboken, New Jersey (revised edition)	2005
Diamond, Larry	Squandered Victory	New York	2005
Dodge, Toby	Iraq's Future: the aftermath of regime change	London	2005
Donnelly, Thomas	Operation Iraqi Freedom	Washington DC	2004
Etherington, Mark	Revolt on the Tigris	London	2005
Fontenont, Gregory	On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom	Fort Leavenworth	2004
Degen, EJ and Tohn, David			
Franks, Tommy	American Soldier	New York	2004
Gordon, Michael R and Trainor, Bernard E	Cobra II	New York	2006
Gray, Colin S	Another Bloody Century	London	2005
Gregory, Derek	The Colonial Present	Oxford	2004
Hammes, Thomas X	The Sling and the Stone	St Paul, MN	2004
Hashim, Ahmed S	Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq	London	2006
Hersh, Seymour M	Chain of Command	London	2004
Hiro, Dilip	Iraq: A Report from the Inside	London	2003
Hiro, Dilip	Secrets and Lies	London	2005
IISS	Strategic Survey 2002/3	London	2003
	2003/4		2004
	2004/5		2005
Katovsky, Bill and Carlson, Timothy	Embedded: The Media at War in Iraq	Connecticut	2003
Kampfner, John	Blair's Wars	London	2003
Keegan, John	The Iraq War	London	2004
Knights, Michael	Cradle of Conflict – Iraq and Birth of the Modern US Military	Annapolis	2005

RESTRICTED

Mackinlay, John	Defeating Complex Insurgency (RUSI Whitehall Paper 64)	London	2005
Murray, Williamson and Scales, Robert	The Iraq War	London	2003
Napoleoni, Loretta	Insurgent Iraq: Al-Zarqawi and The New Generation	Expanded and revised London	2005 2005
Nicol, Mark	Last Round	London	2005
Packer, George	The Assassins' Gate – America in Iraq	New York	2005
Phillips, David L	Losing Iraq: inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco	Westview USA	2005
Poole, H John	Tactics of the Crescent Moon	Emerald Isle, NC	2004
Poole, Oliver	Black Knights on the Bloody Road to Baghdad	London	2003
Rampton, Sheldon and Stauber, John	Weapons of Mass Deception	London	2003
Reynolds, Nicholas E	Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond – The US Marine Corps in the Second Iraq War	Annapolis	2005
Ricks, Thomas E	Fiasco – The American Military Adventure in Iraq	London	2006
Rogers, Paul	Iraq and the War on Terror	Oxford	2004
Rogers, Paul	Iraq and the War on Terror: 12 months of insurgency 2004/05	Oxford	2006
Roone, Ben	War on Saddam	London	2003
Sands, Philippe	Lawless World	London	2005
Shawcross, William	Allies	London	2003
Short, Clare	An Honourable Deception?	London	2004
Simpson, John	The Wars against Saddam	London	2003
Snow, Nancy	Information War: American propaganda, free speech and opinion control since 9/11	New York	2003
West, Bing,	No True Glory: Fallujah and the struggle in Iraq	London	2005
West, Bing and Smith, Ray L	The March Up	London	2003
Williams, Kayla	Love My Rifle More Than You	London	2006
Woodward, Bob	Plan of Attack	New York and London	2004
Wright, Evan	Generation Kill	London	2004
Zinsmeister, Karl	Boots on the Ground	New York	2003
Zucchini, David	Thunder Run	London	2004

**Articles**

Arey, Howard E	The A2C2S: Extending Battle Command	Military Review	Nov-Dec 04
Aylwin-Foster, Nigel	Changing the Army for Counter-Insurgency Operations	Military Review	Nov-Dec 05
Bellany, Ian	Deaths among Iraqis due to the War 2003-Present Day	RUSI Journal	Feb 05
Bluth, Christoph	The British road to war: Blair, Bush and the decision to invade Iraq	International Affairs	Oct 04
Boot, Max	The Struggle to Transform the Military	Foreign Affairs	Mar-Apr 05
Bunker, Robert J	Suicide Bombings in Operation Iraqi Freedom	Military Review	Jan-Feb 05
Bull, Bartle	The Coming of Shia Iraq	Prospect	Nov 04
Burridge, Brian	Iraq 2003 – Air Power Pointers for The Future	RAF Air Power Review	Autumn 04
Byman, Daniel L	Building the New Iraq: The Role of The Intervening Forces	Survival	Summer 03
Byman, Daniel	Five Bad Options for Iraq	Survival	Spring 2005
Byman, Daniel	Passive Sponsors of Terrorism	Survival	Winter 05-06
Cavaleri, David P	“Stay the Course”: Nine Planning Themes for Stability and Reconstruction Operations	Military Review	Jul-Aug 05
Cappelli, Riccardo	Iraq: Italian lessons Learned	Military Review	Mar-Apr 05

RESTRICTED

Cassidy, Robert M	The Salience of Military Culture	Military Review	May-Jun 05
Chiarelli, Peter W and Michaelis, Patrick R	The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations	Military Review	Jul-Aug 05
Cobb, James T	The Fight for Fallujah	Field Artillery	Mar-Apr 05
Crane, Conrad C	Phase IV Operations: Where Wars Are Really Won	Military Review	May-Jun 05
Diamond, Larry	What Went Wrong in Iraq?	Foreign Affairs	Sep/Oct 04
Dobbins, James	The UN's Role in Nationbuilding: From the Belgian Congo to Iraq	Survival	Winter 04
Dobbins, James	Iraq; Winning the Unwinnable War	Foreign Affairs	Jan/Feb 05
Dodge, Toby	Violence, Incompetence, Instability	The World Today	Oct 03
Dodge, Toby	US intervention and Possible Iraqi Futures	Survival	Autumn 03
Emery, Norman	Information Operations in Iraq	Military Review	May-Jun 04
Emery, Norman, Mowles, Donald G, and Werchan, Jason	Fighting Terrorism and Insurgency: Shaping the Environment	Military Review	Jan-Feb 05
Ford, Christopher M	Speak No Evil: Targeting a Population's Neutrality to Defeat an Insurgency	Parameters	Summer 05
Freeburg, John, and Todd, Jess T	The 101 <sup>st</sup> Airborne Division in Iraq: Televising Freedom	Military Review	Nov-Dec 04
Garden, Tim	Iraq: the military campaign	International Affairs	Nov 03
Gawande, Atul	Casualties of War – Military Care for The Wounded from Iraq and Afghanistan	New England Journal of Medicine	9 Dec 2004
Gebhardt, James F	The Road to Abu Ghraib: US Army Detainee Doctrine and Experience	Military Review	Jan-Feb 05
Glasshof, Brian K	The German Werewolf and the Iraqi Guerrilla	Armor	Nov-Dec 04
Grau, Lester W	Guerrillas, Terrorists and Intelligence Analysis	Military Review	Jul-Aug 04
Greenstock, Jeremy	Security in Iraq	RUSI Journal	Oct 04
Greer, James K	Operation Knockout: COIN in Iraq	Military Review	Nov-Dec 05
Hendrickson, David C and Tucker, Robert W	Revisions in Need of Revising: What went Wrong in the Iraq War	Survival	Summer 05
Hoffman, Michael H	Rescuing the Law of War: A Way Forward in an Era of Global Terrorism	Parameters	Summer 05
Jones, David Martin and Smith, M R L	Greetings from the cybercaliphate: some notes on homeland insecurity	International Affairs	Oct 05
Kucera, Joshua	Weaponising the Truth?	Janes Defence Weekly	8 Jun 05
Krepinevich, Andrew F	How to Win in Iraq	Foreign Affairs	Sep/Oct 05
Lessard, Pierre	Campaign Design for Winning the War ... and the Peace	Parameters	Spring 05
Luttwak, Edward N	Iraq: The Logic of Disengagement Without Strategy	Foreign Affairs	Jan/Feb 05
Mackinlay, John	Draining the Swamp: The British Strategy of Population Control	The World Today Parameters	Feb 04 Spring 06
Markel, Wade			
Maxwell, Mark David	The Law of War and Civilians on the Battlefield: Are we Undermining Civilian Protections?	Military Review	Sep-Oct 04
McFate, Montgomery	Iraq: The Social Context of IEDs	Military Review	May-Jun 05
Mills, Greg	Four Scenarios for Iraq	RUSI Journal	Dec 04
Miska, Steven M	Growing the Iraqi Security Forces	Military Review	Jul-Aug 05
Moore, John C	Sadr City: The Armor Pure Assault In Urban Terrain	Armor	Nov-Dec 05
Mugridge, D R	The Development of the Iraqi Riverine Patrol Service, March-July 2004	Naval Review	Feb 05

RESTRICTED

O'Neill, Conor	Terrorism, Insurgency and the Military Response from South Armagh to Falluja	RUSI Journal	Oct 04
Payne, Kenneth	The Media as an Instrument of War	Parameters	Spring 05
Ranstorp, Magnus	Al-Qa'ida – An Expanded Global Network of Terror	RUSI Journal	Jun 05
Rathmell, Andrew	Reforming Iraq's Security Sector	RUSI Journal	Feb 05
Rathmell, Andrew	Planning post-war reconstruction in Iraq: what can we learn?	International Affairs	Oct 05
Record, Jeffrey	The Limits and Temptations of America's Conventional Military Primacy	Survival	Spring 05
Record, Jeffrey	Why the Strong Lose	Parameters	Winter 05-06
Roberts, Adam	How Terrorist Campaigns End: Evil or Error	The World Today	Mar 05
Said, Yahia	Iraq in the Shadow of Civil War	Survival	Winter 05-06
Schoenekase, Daniel P	Targeting Decisions Regarding Human Shields	Military Review	Sep-Oct 04
Sepp, Kalev I	Best Practices in Counterinsurgency	Military Review	May-Jun 05
Synnott, Hilary	State-building in Southern Iraq	Survival	Summer 05
Tomes, Robert R	Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare	Parameters	Spring 2004
Tuck, Christopher	Conflict Termination in Iraq	RUSI Journal	Oct 04

**Monographs, Academic and Special Interest Group Papers**

Amnesty International	Iraq: responsibilities of the occupying Powers	Web www.amnesty.org	Apr 03
Amnesty International	In Cold Blood: abuses by armed groups	Web	Jul 05
Baillie, Mark	Islamist Terrorism – A Primer	CDISS Paper 1	Dec 04
Beckett, Ian F W	Insurgency in Iraq: An Historical Perspective	SSI www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi	Jan 05
Conetta, Carl	Vicious Circle: the Dynamics of Occupation and Resistance in Iraq	Project on Defense Alternatives	May 05
Cordesman, Anthony	Iraq and Asymmetric Warfare: The US vs. FRL/Islamist duel	CSIS Paper	Dec 03
Cordesman, Anthony	Iraq's Evolving Insurgency	CSIS Draft Washington DC	23 Jun 05
Fratlicelli, Giulio	Reflections on Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations	Army	Jun 05
Hoffman, Bruce	Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq	RAND Paper	Jun 04
Hoffman, Bruce	Combating Al Qaeda and the Militant Islamic Threat	RAND Paper	Feb 06
Human Rights Watch	Basra: Crime and Insecurity under British Occupation	Vol 15 No 6 (E) www.hrw.org	Jun 03
Human Rights Watch	Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq	www.hrw.org	2003
International Crisis Group	In Their Own Words: Reading The Iraqi Insurgency	Middle East Report No 50	15 Feb 06
International Crisis Group	What can the U.S. do in Iraq?	Middle East Report No 34	22 Dec 04
Kilcullen, David	Countering Global Insurgency	Australia	Nov 04
Metz, Steven	Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq	Washington Quarterly	Winter 03-04
Metz, Steven and Millen, Raymond	Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21 <sup>st</sup> Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response	SSI www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi	Nov 04
Murray-Playfair, J L	ABCA Coalition Interoperability on OIF and OEF	Presentation for US CAC	Apr 05

## RESTRICTED

O'Hanlon, Michael E and Albuquerque, Adriana Lins de	Iraq Index	Brookings Institution	Apr 04
Oxford Research Group	Iraq Body Count: A Dossier of Civilian Casualties 2003-2005	Web www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk	Mar 05
Oxford Research Group	Iraqi Liberation? Towards an Integrated Strategy	Web	Dec 05
Peace Direct	Learning from Fallujah: Lessons Identified 2003-2005	Web www.peacedirect.org	2005
RAND Review (James Dobbins)	Nation-Building: The Inescapable Responsibility of the World's only Superpower	Web www.rand.org/publications	Summer 03
Record, Jeffrey and	Iraq and Vietnam: Differences, Similarities and Insights	SSI www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi	May 04
Terrill, W Andrew	Strategic Implications of Inter-communal Warfare in Iraq	SSI	Feb 05
US Institute of Peace	Establishing the Rule of Law in Iraq	Special Report No 104 www.usip.org	Apr 03
US Institute of Peace	Building Civilian Capacity for U.S. Stability Operations	Special Report No 118	Apr 04
US Institute of Peace (Faleh A Jabar)	Postconflict Iraq: A Race for Stability, Reconstruction and Legitimacy	Special Report No 120	May 04
US Institute of Peace	Who are the Insurgents?	Special Report No 134	Apr 05
US Institute of Peace (Robert M Perito)	The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Public Security in Iraq	Special Report No 137	Apr 05
US Institute of Peace (Anne E Henderson)	The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Economic Reconstruction in Iraq	Special Report No 138	Apr 05
US Institute of Peace (Celeste J Ward)	The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Governance in Iraq	Special Report No 139	Nov 05
Woods, Kevin M et al	Iraqi perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership	Joint Center for Operational Analysis USA	n.d. c. Jun 05

### Selection of Useful Websites

#### Iraq

[www.albasrahnet/moqawama/english/iraqi\\_resistance.htm](http://www.albasrahnet/moqawama/english/iraqi_resistance.htm) (Iraqi Resistance)  
[www.coalitioniraq.org](http://www.coalitioniraq.org) (Coalition homepage)  
[www.icasualties.org/oif](http://www.icasualties.org/oif) (Iraq Coalition Casualties)  
[www.iraqanalysis.org](http://www.iraqanalysis.org) (Iraq Analysis Organisation)  
[www.iraqbodycount.net](http://www.iraqbodycount.net) (Iraq Body Count)  
[www.mideasti.org](http://www.mideasti.org) (Middle East Institute)  
[www.mnf-iraq.com](http://www.mnf-iraq.com) (Multi National Forces Iraq)

#### Foreign Policy

[www.chathamhouse.org.uk](http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk) (Royal Institute of International Affairs)  
[www.brookings.edu](http://www.brookings.edu) (Brookings Institution)  
[www.dfid.gov.uk](http://www.dfid.gov.uk) (Department for International Development)  
[www.fco.gov.uk](http://www.fco.gov.uk) (Foreign and Commonwealth Office)  
[www.foreignaffairs.org](http://www.foreignaffairs.org) (Foreign Affairs)  
[www.foreignpolicy.com](http://www.foreignpolicy.com) (Foreign Policy)  
[www.fpri.org](http://www.fpri.org) (Foreign Policy Research Institute)  
[www.lmei.soas.ac.uk](http://www.lmei.soas.ac.uk) (London Middle East Institute)  
[www.postconflict.gov.uk](http://www.postconflict.gov.uk) (Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit)  
[www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov) (US State Department)  
[www.un.org](http://www.un.org) (United Nations)  
[www.usip.org](http://www.usip.org) (United States Institute of Peace)

## RESTRICTED

### Military Sites

<http://call.army.mil> (Center for Army Lessons Learned)  
[www.acq.osd.mil](http://www.acq.osd.mil) (Defense Science Board)  
[www.army.mil](http://www.army.mil) (US Army)  
[www.centcom.mil](http://www.centcom.mil) (US Central Command)  
[www.defence.gov.au](http://www.defence.gov.au) (Australian Department of Defence)  
[www.defenselink.mil](http://www.defenselink.mil) (US Department of Defense)  
[www.mod.uk](http://www.mod.uk) (UK Ministry of Defence)  
[www-tradoc.army.mil](http://www-tradoc.army.mil) (TRADOC, USA)  
[www.usmc.mil](http://www.usmc.mil) (US Marine Corps)  
[www.forces.gc.ca](http://www.forces.gc.ca) (Canadian Department of National Defence)

### Research Institutes

[www.amnesty.org](http://www.amnesty.org) (Amnesty International)  
[www.basicint.org](http://www.basicint.org) (British American Security Information Council)  
[www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters](http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters) (Parameters: US Army War College)  
[www.cato.org](http://www.cato.org) (Cato Institute)  
[www.cdiss.org](http://www.cdiss.org) (Centre for Defence and International Security Studies)  
[www-cgsc.army.mil](http://www-cgsc.army.mil) (US Command and General Staff College: links to Military Review, Center for Army Lessons Learned and Combat Studies Institute)  
[www.csis.org](http://www.csis.org) (Centre for Strategic and International Studies)  
[www.fas.org](http://www.fas.org) (Federation of American Scientists)  
[www.globalsecurity.org](http://www.globalsecurity.org) (Global Security)  
[www.hrw.org](http://www.hrw.org) (Human Rights Watch)  
[www.iiss.org](http://www.iiss.org) (International Institute for Strategic Studies)  
[www.jhuapl.edu](http://www.jhuapl.edu) (John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory)  
[www.rand.org](http://www.rand.org) (RAND)  
[www.rusi.org](http://www.rusi.org) (Royal United Services Institute)  
[www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil) (US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute)  
[www.strategypage.com](http://www.strategypage.com) (Strategy Page)

## Unpublished Sources

### Service Manuals and Papers

Army Briefing Note 03/05	Iraq Issues – Op Telic Investigations – as at 22 Feb 05	Mar 05
Army Code 71749	AFM Volume 1 Part 10 Counter Insurgency Operations	Jul 01
Army Code 71816	Operations in Iraq: An Analysis from a Land Perspective	Dec 04
Army Code 71819	Army Doctrine Publication: Land Operations	May 05
JWP3-50	The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations	Jun 04
MSG/3020	Land Tactical Lessons from US Operations in Fallujah	10 Oct 05
Warminster LWC		
Land Warfare Centre	Post Operational Interviews and PORs held by Land Lessons cell	

### Academic Papers and Presentations

HVR Consulting	Insights into Iraq Stabilisation Operations and the role of Non-Military Organisations	Paper	Aug 05
Rand Arroyo Center	Operation Iraqi Freedom: Rapid Victory - Troubled Occupation	Presentation	Sep 04
Shervington, MW	Small Wars and Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Lessons from Iraq	Dissertation Cranfield University	Jul 05
Urquhart, Neil I A	Planning for Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq	Dissertation University of Cambridge	Jul 04